Publikacje Geoportalu Wyborczego

Selection of Counties for Research Purposes by the Centre for Electoral Studies

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 12:56:37 GMT

Authors: Grzegorz Górski, Stanisław Górski

As noted in the introduction to this study, the aim of the present research is to examine the durability of political attitudes among the inhabitants of selected areas within the contemporary borders of the Republic of Poland. In particular, the study seeks to trace the persistence of such attitudes across several centuries, during which these territories functioned under markedly different political regimes and electoral systems.

A key motivation underlying the research hypothesis is an empirical observation drawn from post-1989 electoral data. When Polish electoral results are analysed at the level of individual counties (powiaty), a striking and consistent pattern emerges: voting preferences tend to correspond closely to the historical boundaries established by the partitioning powers – boundaries that remained in force until the outbreak of the First World War. This regularity has proved remarkably resilient, persisting for more than a century after the formal end of the partitions. The longevity of these patterns provides sufficient grounds for a scholarly inquiry, first to assess whether this apparent regularity can be empirically substantiated, and secondly, should this prove to be the case, to identify the principal factors that may account for it

Various explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed, though a detailed examination of them lies beyond the scope of this stage of the analysis. It is, however, worth noting one particularly widespread but fundamentally flawed interpretation, frequently encountered in journalistic and popular discourse. According to this view, the observed electoral differences are allegedly the result of enduring “civilisational” disparities between regions that once belonged to Germany and those incorporated into the Russian or Austrian partitions. This argument suggests that the populations of these territories differ in their level of civilisation – an assertion that lacks any serious historical or empirical foundation. Even a cursory analysis of county-level electoral data demonstrates that, while clear regional differences in voting behaviour do indeed exist, the principal dividing line most often corresponds not to the borders of the former partitions, but rather to the western boundary of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as it existed prior to the partitions (with only minor later adjustments, notably in western Greater Poland). This directly contradicts the aforementioned thesis, which rests on a simplistic and historically uninformed understanding of Poland’s past.

If one were nevertheless to adopt a similar mode of reasoning, a far more plausible hypothesis would be that contemporary voting behaviour differs between populations inhabiting territories that have formed part of the Polish state continuously since at least the fifteenth century and those living in areas incorporated into Poland only after 1945. The latter regions were largely settled as a result of extensive post-war population transfers, and despite well-documented processes of social and cultural assimilation, their inhabitants display political attitudes that differ noticeably from those prevalent in other parts of the country. This phenomenon is particularly evident in large urban centres, where recent decades have witnessed profound demographic changes, not so much in absolute population size as in population composition, often including ethnic structure. These shifts have had a direct impact on electoral behaviour. An even more pronounced effect can be observed in the suburban zones of major cities, which have experienced intensive in-migration from urban cores, thereby reshaping the electoral profile of surrounding counties.

These observations serve merely to illustrate broader dynamics characteristic of contemporary electoral processes, in which population mobility plays a decisive role. Such dynamics are by no means unique to Poland; they are equally evident in Western Europe, as well as in the United States and Canada, where internal and international migration continues to reshape political landscapes.

Against this background, the central research question is whether the regularities visible in maps of electoral preferences genuinely reflect deeper historical continuities. If so, a further question arises: at what stage in history did the foundations of these enduring political attitudes take shape?

Drawing on the earlier analysis of the institutional continuity of counties (powiaty) on Polish lands, a group of counties was selected for closer examination. These counties were chosen in order to investigate the potential persistence of political attitudes among their inhabitants across several centuries during which electoral mechanisms were in operation.

The selection of counties was guided by several basic criteria.

The analysis focuses on counties located in central Poland, specifically in regions that have remained within the borders of the Polish state without interruption since the sixteenth or seventeenth century. These include western Lesser Poland, the eastern fringe of Silesia (later Upper Silesia), Greater Poland, Mazovia, Eastern Pomerania, and parts of Warmia.
Most of the selected counties were areas in which processes associated with the emergence of modern political life, including the formation of political groupings, were particularly intense during the eighteenth century.
The core group among the selected counties, characterised by the longest tradition of political life within the framework of regional assemblies (sejmiki) operating at the voivodeship level, consists primarily of counties drawn from the eighteen voivodeships of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. These voivodeships include Podlasie, Chełm, Lublin, Kalisz, Poznań, Ruthenia, Sandomierz, Mazovia, Płock, the Land of Sochaczew, Kraków, Łęczyca, Sieradz, Chełmno, Inowrocław, Brześć Kujawski, and Pomerania. In most cases, the counties within these voivodeships retained institutional continuity, even during the period of the partitions, up to their re-establishment in the Third Republic of Poland.
For counties located in these regions, the study analyses the distribution of political sympathies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, seeking to determine whether the foundations of later political divisions and loyalties can already be identified within the political conflicts and alignments of that period.
A comparable analysis is then be undertaken for a selected group of counties in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, within the context of political developments in the partitioning states, as well as for the period of the Second Polish Republic.

The overarching aim of this multi-period analysis is to assess the extent to which political experiences and patterns of behaviour formed in earlier historical epochs may be reflected, directly or indirectly, in contemporary electoral preferences. The purpose of this research is to assess the validity of the aforementioned, largely impressionistic claims, formulated on the basis of a priori assumptions, according to which contemporary electoral preferences are said to constitute a direct continuation of the former partition-based divisions and, allegedly arising from them, enduring civilisational differences that persist to the present day.

For the purposes of this analysis, a total of 97 counties (powiaty) were selected within the boundaries of Poland’s present-day voivodeships. These counties are located across twelve contemporary voivodeships.

The voivodeships of West Pomerania, Lubusz, Opole, and Lower Silesia were excluded from the study. The territories of these regions were incorporated into the Polish state only after 1945, which in itself precludes their inclusion in a research design constructed along the lines adopted here. Furthermore, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the population of Polish origin in these areas was extremely limited. As a result, it is not possible, even hypothetically, to reconstruct the political preferences of that population as expressed in successive electoral processes within the Prussian state.

For a variety of reasons, it proved impossible to select an equal number of counties from each of the remaining twelve voivodeships. Nevertheless, in each case a minimum of five counties was included in the analysis. In the authors’ assessment, this sample size is sufficient to permit the formulation of conclusions and evaluations that are meaningful in relation to the objectives of the study.

It should also be recalled that, as noted earlier, political life in Poland up to the end of the First Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the late eighteenth century was concentrated around the institution of the sejmik (regional assembly), whose jurisdiction extended over the territory of a voivodeship or land. Consequently, for this period it is possible to draw certain conclusions by extrapolating political processes observed at the voivodeship level to the counties forming part of those units. For this reason, we assume that the conclusions formulated with respect to this period and these territories must, at the present stage of research, be regarded as provisional and subject to further verification. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to deny them a significant cognitive value, particularly when viewed in the broader context of later political developments and historical experiences.

Taking these considerations into account, the following counties were selected for inclusion in the analysis:

Podlaskie Voivodeship (6 counties): Białystok, Bielsk (Podlaskie), Łomża (Mazowieckie), Siemiatycze, Sokółka, Suwałki.

Figure 1. Administrative map of the Podlaskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Podlaskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_podlaskiego#/media/ Plik:Podlaskie_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

2. Lubelskie Voivodeship (6 counties): Biała Podlaska, Chełm (Chełmskie), Hrubieszów (Chełmskie), Krasnystaw, Lublin (Lubelskie), Łuków

Figure 2. Administrative map of the Lubelskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Lubelskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_lubelskiego#/media/ Plik:Lublin_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

3. Wielkopolskie Voivodeship (9 counties): Czarnków, Gniezno (Kaliskie), Kalisz (Kaliskie), Konin (Kaliskie), Kościan (Poznańskie), Ostrów Wielkopolski, Poznań (Poznańskie), Rawicz, Września

Figure 3. Administrative map of the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_wielkopolskiego#/media/Plik:Greater_Poland_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

4. Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship (6 counties): Jędrzejów, Kielce, Opatów, Pińczów, Sandomierz, Włoszczowa

Figure 4. Administrative map of the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_%C5% 9Bwi%C4%99tokrzyskiego#/media/Plik:%C5%9Awi%C4%99tokrzyskie_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

5. Podkarpackie Voivodeship (formerly Lviv / Ruthenian Voivodeships) (7 counties): Krosno, Mielec, Przeworsk, Przemyśl (Ruthenian Voivodeship), Rzeszów, Sandomierz (Sandomierskie), Tarnobrzeg

Figure 5. Administrative map of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_podkarpackiego#/ media/Plik:Podkarpackie_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

6. Mazowieckie Voivodeship (13 counties): Ciechanów (Masowieckie), Gostynin (Gostynin Land), Maków, Mława (Płockie), Ostrołęka, Ostrów Mazowiecka, Płock (Płockie), Płońsk, Przasnysz, Radom (Sandomierskie), Sierpc (Płockie), Sochaczew (Sochaczew Land), Węgrów

Figure 6. Administrative map of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojew%C3%B3dztwo_mazowieckie#/media/Plik:Masovian_Voivodeship_ad- ministrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

7. Małopolskie Voivodeship (9 counties): Chrzanów, Dąbrowa, Gorlice, Kraków (Krakowskie), Limanowa, Myślenice, Nowy Sącz (Krakowskie), Olkusz, Tarnów (Sandomierskie)

Figure 7. Administrative map of the Małopolskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Małopolskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_ma%C5%82opolskiego#/ media/Plik:Lesser_Poland_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

8. Łódzkie Voivodeship (9 counties): Brzeziny, Łęczyca (Łęczyckie), Łowicz, Opoczno, Piotrków (Sieradzkie), Radomsko (formerly Nowy Radom), Skierniewice, Sieradz (Sieradzkie), Wieluń (Sieradzckie)

Figure 8. Administrative map of the Łódzkie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Łódzkie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_%C5%82%C3%B3dzkiego#/ media/Plik:%C5%81%C3%B3d%C5%BA_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

9. Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeship (13 counties): Brodnica (Chełmińskie), Bydgoszcz (Inowrocławskie), Chełmno (Chełmińskie), Grudziądz, Inowrocław (Inowrocławskie), Lipno (Inowrocławskie), Nakło (Kaliskie), Nieszawa–Radziejów (Brzesko-Kujawskie), Rypin (Inowrocławskie), Świecie, Toruń, Tuchola

Figure 9. Administrative map of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_ku- jawsko-pomorskiego#/media/Plik:Kuyavian-Pomeranian_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

10. Pomorskie Voivodeship (7 counties): Człuchów, Kościerzyna, Puck, Tczew (Pomorskie), Gdańsk (Pomorskie), Bytów, Lębork

Figure 10. Administrative map of the Pomorskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Pomorskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_pomorskiego#/media/ Plik:Pomeranian_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

11. Śląskie Voivodeship (7): Będzin, Bielsko, Częstochowa, Katowice, Rybnik, Pszczyna, Żywiec

Figure 11. Administrative map of the Silesian Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Śląskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_%C5%9Bl%C4%85ski ego#/media/Plik:Silesian_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

12. Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship (5): Elbląg, Kwidzyn, Malbork, Sztum, Olsztyn

Figure 12. Administrative map of the Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map of the Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_wojew%C3%B3dztwa_ warmi%C5%84sko-mazurskiego#/media/Plik:Warmian-Masurian_Voivodeship_administrative_map.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Counties in the Second Polish Republic and the Polish People’s Republic

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 12:21:15 GMT

Authors: Joanna Górska-Szymczak, Stanisław Górski

During the nearly two decades of the Second Polish Republic’s existence, only a limited number of changes were made to the number of counties (powiaty), although their territorial boundaries were modified somewhat more frequently. Ultimately, following adjustments to the administrative division of the state (including extensive changes to voivodeship boundaries introduced in early 1939), the Republic of Poland comprised 264 rural counties (powiaty ziemskie) and 23 municipal counties (powiaty grodzkie).

The reborn Polish state inherited not only a network of county-level territorial units whose origins dated back to the First Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also, at least initially, the models of county administration developed under the partitioning powers. As discussed in the previous chapter, in those states the fundamental institutions of county authority were governmental in character, although in Prussia and Austria they were complemented by elements of local self-government. These arrangements exerted a significant influence on the institutional shape of county administration in the Second Republic. Drawing on these inherited models, the authorities of the Republic introduced new regulations governing governmental administration at the county level. Similarly, the legal foundations and institutional position of county self-government were initially based on the legislation of the partitioning states ¹ .

Only after several years was the system of territorial governmental administration unified under a single legal framework. These definitive arrangements were introduced by the Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 19 January 1928 on the Organisation and Scope of Operation of the General Administrative Authorities ² .

Under its provisions, the county governor (starosta) became the first-instance authority of governmental administration. Like the voivode, the starosta served as a representative of the central government and as the head of the general governmental administration within the county. Among his responsibilities was the coordination of governmental administrative activity at the county level in accordance with policies set by the central authorities. To this end, he was empowered to convene regular meetings of officials heading both integrated and non-integrated branches of administration operating within the county ³ .

The starosta also exercised supervisory authority ⁴ over the administrations of municipalities and communes located within his jurisdiction. A central duty of the starosta was the maintenance of public order and security. Accordingly, he was authorised to issue binding instructions and orders to units of the State Police in matters relating to public safety.

Figure 1. Administrative division of the Second Polish Republic in 1930. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of the Second Polish Republic, https://commons.wiki- media.org/wiki/File:II_RP_adm.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The starosta was appointed by the Minister of the Interior and was subordinated, in the performance of his duties, to the voivode.

His administrative apparatus was the county office (starostwo powiatowe). Its internal organisation was determined by the Minister of the Interior, in consultation with other ministers, and on this basis the voivode granted the office its statute ⁵ .

To facilitate access for the population, the Minister of the Interior could also establish branch offices of the county administration outside the seat of the starostwo. Within such branches, operating under the supervision of the starosta, specified administrative tasks could be carried out, including the issuance of decisions in the starosta’s name. This solution was applied in particular in the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie), where counties covered extensive territories with relatively low population density.

Cities with more than 75,000 inhabitants constituted municipal (urban) counties (powiaty grodzkie). In exceptional cases, municipal counties could also be created (by regulation of the Council of Ministers) in cities with smaller populations ⁶ .

The legal position of the municipal governor (starosta grodzki), who headed the governmental administration in such counties, was identical to that of a rural starosta. Municipal governors were appointed by the Minister of the Interior, who simultaneously conferred upon them, by regulation, the powers of a government representative.

In cities forming separate counties, these powers were transferred to the presidents (mayors) of the cities. Decisions of this kind were taken by the Council of Ministers, which also determined the scope of governmental administrative functions to be entrusted to the city president. This arrangement was intended to avoid a duplication of authority within urban centres.

In certain cases, the functions of a municipal governor were entrusted to the rural starosta whose seat was located in the same city ⁷ .

A distinct legal status was also granted to the rapidly developing port city of Gdynia, which was organised along lines similar to those applied in the capital, Warsaw, effectively enjoying the status of a separate voivodeship. In Gdynia, instead of a municipal governor, the office of Government Commissioner (Komisarz Rządu) was established8. His constitutional position closely resembled that of municipal governors in other large cities.

Until 1933, the organisation and functioning of county self-government continued to be governed by regulations inherited from the partitioning powers. In that year, as part of the first stage of a broader reform of local self-government, a new statute introduced fundamentally new solutions for county administration ⁹ .

Under this legislation, county self-government associations (powiatowe związki samorządowe) were established. These associations were endowed with deliberative bodies – the county councils (rady powiatowe) – and executive bodies – the county boards (wydziały powiatowe). County councils consisted of members of the county boards and councillors elected by electoral colleges. These colleges were composed of councillors and members of municipal and communal executive bodies operating within rural and urban communes not separated from the county. This institutional design effectively transformed the county into a self-governing association of the communes comprising it, since a substantial part of its composition resulted from indirect elections conducted by communal authorities.

Moreover, within the executive body – the county board – a specific fusion of governmental and self-governmental functions took place. The starosta and his deputy, who directed the board’s work, were appointed by the Minister of the Interior, while the remaining members were elected by the county council. In cities separated from counties, the functions of county authorities, otherwise exercised by county offices, were performed by municipal self-government bodies ¹⁰ .

As a result of a complex set of legislative measures redefining the legal foundations of public administration at the voivodeship and county levels, the boundaries of several voivodeships were revised and a number of counties reassigned. These changes were implemented at the turn of 1938 and 1939 and entered into force at the beginning of 1939. At that point, the final territorial structure of the Second Polish Republic was established (see the map below). This administrative arrangement, however, proved short-lived. Following the outbreak of the Second World War and the occupation of Polish territory by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the existing division was rapidly dismantled through unlawful regulations imposed by the occupying powers ¹¹ .

After the establishment in 1944 of communist authorities dependent on the Soviet Union and installed under the auspices of the Red Army ¹² , one of the first decisions taken by the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation was to restore the pre-war administrative division of the state.

Figure 2. Administrative division of the Second Polish Republic in August 1939. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of the Second Polish Republic, https://pl.wikipedia. org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administra- cyjny_II_Rzeczypospolitej#/media/ Plik:RzeczpospolitaPolska1939.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Figure 3. Administrative division of “Lublin Poland” in March 1945. The territories of the so-called Recovered Territories are marked on the map as “districts”.

Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of Poland as of 14 March 1945, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_ Polski_(1944%E2%80%931975)#/

media/Plik:POLSKA_14-03-1945.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

This restoration applied both to the modified number and territorial extent of voivodeships and to the structure of counties and municipalities. Accordingly, in areas gradually liberated from German control, counties were re-established within their pre-war boundaries.

By contrast, in territories that prior to 1 September 1939 had formed part of the German Reich (the so-called Recovered Territories, including Silesia, the Lubusz Land, Western Pomerania, Gdańsk, and Warmia and Masuria), a different approach was adopted. Alongside the initial creation of provisional “districts,” counties were established whose boundaries, in the vast majority of cases, corresponded to those of the former German counties.

As a consequence of these measures, a total of 294 counties were initially established within post-war Poland, including 29 urban counties. In the years that followed, the number of counties increased steadily, primarily as a result of progressive urbanisation, which affected urban counties in particular.

In June 1946, following the provisions of the Potsdam Conference ¹³ , it became possible to introduce a uniform territorial structure across the entire state.

Figure 4. Administrative division of Polish territories into voivodeships in June 1946. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of Poland, June 1946, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_ Polski_(1944%E2%80%931975)#/media/Plik:POLSKA_28-06-1946.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

A further reform of the administrative division was carried out in 1950 ¹⁴ , the most significant element of which was the creation of three new voivodeships: Szczecin, Zielona Góra, and Opole. At that time, Poland consisted of 17 voivodeships, two cities with voivodeship status (Warsaw and Łódź), and 328 counties, including 57 urban counties.

The basic framework of Poland’s administrative division during the period of the so-called Polish People’s Republic (PRL) was consolidated in 1957 and remained largely unchanged until 1975. Under regulations adopted at the beginning of that year ¹⁵ , the cities of Kraków, Wrocław, and Poznań were also granted voivodeship status.

As a result of this sequence of changes in the territorial structure, at the time of the so-called administrative reform of 1975, which abolished the powiat as a level of the state’s administrative division, there were 392 powiats in existence, including 78 urban (city) powiats.

Following the reintroduction of counties in 1999, the overwhelming majority of counties that had existed prior to 1975 were restored. At present, Poland comprises 380 counties, including 66 cities with county status; notably, the number of rural counties (314) is identical to that recorded in 1975.

Figure 5. Administrative division of Polish territories prior to the administrative reform of 1975. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of Poland before the 1975 reform, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_ Polski_(1944%E2%80%931975)#/media/Plik:PRL_1968_adm.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

In the immediate post-war period, the organisation and competences of county authorities were governed by legal provisions in force prior to 1 September 1939, subject to appropriate modifications. This situation changed fundamentally in 1950, when, under the Soviet doctrine of the so-called “uniform state authority” ¹⁶ , a new system of territorial administration was introduced. County National Councils were established as the formal legislative bodies at the county level ¹⁷ , while executive functions were exercised by their presidia. Although National Councils were nominally elected, in practice elections were purely formal. In reality, decisive influence over the composition of both the councils and their presidia, consistent with the principle of the leading role of the communist party, was exercised by the Polish United Workers’ Party ¹⁸ .

The introduction of these Bolshevik principles into the administrative structure of the state represented a radical break with the model of public administration that had evolved on Polish lands over several centuries ¹⁹ .

Figure 6. Administrative division of Poland since 1999, showing voivodeships and powiats. The voivodeships that existed until 1998 are marked in colour – source: Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of Poland since 1999 (voivodeships and counties), https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Reforma_administracyjna_w_Polsce_%2 819 99% 29# / med ia/ Plik:Poland_administrative_divi- sions_comparison_map_(1999_and_ pre-1999).svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

¹ The regulations previously in force in the former Kingdom of Poland were extended to the territories of the former Russian partition. In the former Prussian partition, the office of Landrat was replaced by that of starosta, while analogous solutions were adopted in the territories of the former Austrian partition.

² Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 11, item 86. It should be recalled that, pursuant to the so-called August Amendment of 1926, the constitutional position of the executive authorities was substantially altered.

³ These issues are discussed in greater detail in: J. Górska-Szymczak, G. Górski, Administracja publiczna w II Rzeczypospolitej, Toruń 2021.

⁴ The term was understood as a specific form of legal supervision rather than hierarchical or service-based subordination.

⁵ Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs of 30 June 1930 concerning the internal organisation of county offices and the rules governing their operation. Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 55, item 464.

⁶ Urban counties (powiaty miejskie) were established in the following cities: Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Częstochowa, Gdynia, Gniezno, Grudziądz, Inowrocław, Kraków, Lublin, Lviv, Łódź, Poznań, Radom, Sosnowiec, Toruń, and Vilnius.

⁷ In the cases of Toruń, Bydgoszcz, Inowrocław, Gniezno, Grudziądz, Poznań, Kraków, and Lviv, certain responsibilities within the scope of general governmental administration were entrusted to the presidents (mayors) of these cities, while the remaining tasks continued to be carried out by the starosts of the surrounding rural counties (powiaty ziemskie).

⁸ Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs of 3 September 1932. Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 95, item 823.

⁹ Act of 23 March 1933 on the partial reform of the system of territorial self-government. Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, No. 35, item 294.

¹⁰ For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see: J. Górska-Szymczak, G. Górski, Administracja publiczna II RP.

¹¹ The western voivodeships were incorporated, in whole or in part, into the German Reich by means of unlawful German decrees. Similarly, on the basis of unlawful decisions taken by the Soviet authorities, all or parts of the eastern voivodeships were incorporated into the USSR. By contrast, in the central voivodeships the German authorities, acting in violation of international law, established a protectorate-type para-state entity known as the General Government.

¹² This issue, together with its constitutional and legal dimensions, is examined in detail in G. Górski, Polonia Restituta. Ustrój Państwa Polskiego w XX wieku,

Toruń 2018.

¹³ The conference of the victorious powers in the Second World War was held from 17 July to 2 August 1945. One of its key stipulations was the establishment of the Oder–Neisse line (the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers) as the provisional border between Poland and Germany.

¹⁴ Act of 28 June 1950 on changes to the administrative division of the state. Journal of Laws 1950, no. 28, item 255.

¹⁵ Decree of 31 December 1956 on the separation of the cities of Kraków, Poznań, and Wrocław from voivodeships and on granting their municipal national councils the powers of voivodeship national councils. Journal of Laws 1957, no. 1, item 1.

¹⁶ For a detailed discussion, see: G. Górski, Wokół genezy PRL, Lublin 2004.

¹⁷ Act of 20 March 1950 on territorial organs of the unified state authority. Journal of Laws 1950, no. 14, item 130.

¹⁸ For a broader discussion, see: G. Górski, Historia administracji…

¹⁹ A broader analysis of this issue is presented in G. Górski, Polonia Restituta…

Counties in the Polish Lands in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 11:29:31 GMT

Authors: Joanna Górska-Szymczak, Stanisław Górski

The successive partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth carried out by Russia, Prussia, and Austria from 1772 onward led to the gradual dismantling of the constitutional order previously in force in the annexed territories. It should be emphasised that all three partitioning powers possessed political systems characterised by a high degree of centralisation ¹ . Operating within so-called absolutist systems ² , the new rulers introduced administrative arrangements fundamentally incompatible with the freedom-based constitutional model of the former Commonwealth. Moreover, the overt drive to exert strict control over the Polish population, often accompanied by policies of Germanisation or Russification, motivated by fears of restorationist aspirations, resulted in sustained and systematic pressure. One of the principal instruments of this pressure consisted precisely in the new administrative structures and institutions imposed by the partitioning powers in the annexed territories.

It hardly needs to be added that, in practice, the constitutional frameworks of these states offered no meaningful forms of social representation, let alone genuine participation in governance. Their highly centralised and powerful state administrations, operating through local agencies, relentlessly implemented imperial policy. From the standpoint of the present analysis, however, these issues lie outside the core subject of inquiry and will therefore not be pursued further here.

Genuine changes in a proto-constitutional direction ³ in these states (Austria and Prussia) began only in the early decades of the second half of the nineteenth century. Even then, it was only in practice, at the turn of the nineteenth and that one may speak of the emergence of rudimentary forms of democratic political life ⁴ . In Russia, by contrast, only weak and highly limited attempts to introduce para-democratic solutions can be identified, and these occurred solely in the final decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 ⁵ .

From the perspective of the present study, however, the processes initiated in the occupied Polish lands at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are of particular importance. This is so primarily because the county-level territorial structures introduced by the partitioning powers were, as a rule, retained in the reborn Polish state after 1918. Above all, the analysis will seek to determine whether political preferences revealed in electoral processes at the county level within the partitioning states bore any relationship to later political sympathies in the Second Polish Republic.

These considerations must therefore begin with an examination of the development of county-level territorial structures in the Polish lands at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The focus will be on those counties that later lay within the borders of the Second Polish Republic and, subsequently, within the post-1945 Polish state.

In the Austrian partition, constitutional reforms implemented in the 1860s led to the establishment, within the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire, of the autonomous Crown Land of Galicia ⁶ . As part of this reform, the earlier division of crown lands into districts (obwody), headed by district governors, and counties (cyrkuły), headed by county governors, was replaced by a uniform system of new territorial units known as counties (Bezirk). It should be emphasised that Galicia was one of only four crown lands in Austria in which, following empire-wide administrative reforms, county-level self-government was introduced ⁷ .

At this level, a distinctive relationship developed between the organs of state administration and local self-government. On the one hand stood the county governors (starostowie powiatowi), who were subordinate, through the provincial governor (namiestnik), to the central authorities in Vienna. On the other hand were the self-governing bodies elected by the local population: the county council and the county executive board (wydział powiatowy), the latter elected by the council itself. The county executive board served as the executive organ of self-government. It was headed by a president (the county marshal) and composed of six members In practice, the board operated in close cooperation with the county governor, jointly carrying out the administrative tasks assigned to the county level by statute. The county council was initially elected under a curial electoral system, with curiae corresponding to those used in elections to the Provincial Diet. Elections were held every six years. Over time, however, this system was replaced by universal and equal suffrage at the county level.

Figure 1. Map of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, showing the original division into six districts (cyrkuły). Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, https://pl.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Kr%C3%B3lestwo_Galicji_i_ Lodomerii [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

During the period of state reconstruction, the Polish Liquidation Committee ⁸ issued, on 23 November 1918, a regulation democratising the electoral system for the deliberative bodies of municipal and county self-government ⁹ . At the same time (for obvious reasons), the institution of provincial self-government was abolished.

Following the administrative reforms of the 1860s, the crown land of Galicia comprised seventy-four counties (powiaty). Subsequent changes to the territorial administrative system, introduced in 1900, increased their number to eighty-two.

Of the Galician counties, thirty-two ultimately remained within the borders of Poland after 1945. These were: Kraków, Chrzanów, Wieliczka, Bochnia, Brzesko, Wadowice, Biała, Żywiec, Myślenice, Nowy Sącz, Nowy Targ, Limanowa, Grybów, Gorlice, Tarnów, Dąbrowa, Ropczyce, Mielec, Pilzno, Jasło, Rzeszów, Kolbuszowa, Tarnobrzeg, Nisko, Łańcut, Sanok, Lesko, Bircza, Brzozów, Krosno, Przemyśl, and Jarosław.

In the Prussian partition, self-government, similarly to the Austrian model, was organised on three levels: provincial, county, and municipal (both rural and urban).

Figure 2. Map of counties in Galicia at the end of the nineteenth century (prior to the administrative changes introduced in the early twentieth century). Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://pl.wikipedia. org/wiki/Lista_powiat%C3%B3w_ Kr%C3%B3lestwa_Galicji_i_ Lodomerii_w_latach_1850%E2%80%931918 [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The legal position of county self-government was regulated by the Act of 13 December 1872 on the county system ¹⁰ . Under this statute, the deliberative body at the county level became the county assembly (sejmik powiatowy). Its members were elected through a relatively complex electoral procedure combining direct and indirect elements and subject to high property-based suffrage qualifications. Initially, county assemblies possessed only limited competences (the so-called “own powers”), but these were gradually expanded.

Executive authority was exercised by the county board (wydział powiatowy), which was elected by the assembly. Both the county assembly and the county board were headed by the county governor (starosta powiatowy), appointed by the king. In this capacity, the starosta combined the functions of state administration with those of local self-government.

The framework of county self-government was further refined by two statutes adopted a decade later: the Act of 30 July 1883 on general state administration ¹¹ and the Act of 1 August 1883 on the jurisdiction of administrative and administrative-judicial authorities ¹² .

The harmonisation of administrative structures across the German Empire was completed by 1900. Until the fall of the Second Reich, no significant changes were introduced either to the internal territorial division of the Kingdom of Prussia, which encompassed all Polish lands annexed by Prussia, or to that of the Empire as a whole.

As a consequence of these reforms, and following subsequent territorial adjustments, the following counties from the former Prussian partition were incorporated into the Second Polish Republic.

Within the Pomeranian Voivodeship were the counties of: Puck (Maritime), Kartuzy, Kościerzyna, Tczew, Starogard, Chojnice, Tuchola, Świecie, Grudziądz, Lubawa, Brodnica, Chełmno, Wąbrzeźno, Toruń, and Sępólno, together with the urban (municipal) counties of Toruń and Grudziądz.
Within the Poznań Voivodeship were the counties of: Wyrzysk, Wągrowiec, Gniezno, Witkowo, Mogilno, Strzelno, Żnin, Inowrocław, Szubin, Bydgoszcz, Leszno, Śmigiel, Grodzisk, Nowy Tomyśl, Szamotuły, Oborniki, Poznań, Środa, Września, Śrem, Jarocin, Pleszew, Gostyń, Rawicz, Kościan, Krotoszyn, Ostrów, Kępno, Odolanów, and Ostrzeszów, as well as the urban counties of Bydgoszcz and Poznań.
Within the Silesian Voivodeship were the counties of: Rybnik, Pszczyna, Lubliniec, and Katowice, together with the urban counties of Katowice and Królewska Huta (later Chorzów).

Figure 3. Administrative map of the German Empire in 1900, illustrating provincial and county divisions. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative map, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Empire#/media/ File:Karte_Deutsches_Reich,_Verwaltungsgliede- rung_1900-01-01.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

By contrast, in the former Russian partition, self-government existed only at the level of rural municipalities. In addition, municipal self-government institutions operated in towns located in the territories of the so-called Eastern Borderlands – Volhynia, the Białystok region, Polesie, the Vilnius region, and Nowogródek.

The municipal system itself was highly complex. It was introduced in 1864 ¹³ as part of the imperial authorities’ strategy to secure the loyalty of the peasantry during the January Uprising.

Four types of lower-level administrative units were established: peasant communes; mixed urban–rural communes; non-peasant communes (in privately owned villages); and manorial districts.

Figure 4. Administrative division into gubernias in the western part of the Russian Empire, c. 1900. Source: History of the administrative division of Russia, https://www.wikiwand.com/en/artic- les/History_of_the_administrative_di- vision_of_Russia [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

At the remaining administrative levels, Russian administrative models continued to operate, both at county and gubernial level. These arrangements were formally adapted to the specific conditions of the Kingdom of Poland in 1892 ¹⁴ .

Further changes to the territorial organisation of the Kingdom of Poland occurred with notable frequency. On the one hand, they reflected broader transformations within the administrative structure of the Russian Empire; on the other, they constituted deliberate responses to successive Polish national uprisings. Each reorganization was intended to facilitate more effective control over territories regarded by the imperial authorities as politically unstable.

The original territory of the Kingdom largely corresponded to that of the former Duchy of Warsaw. The Duchy had been established on territories taken during the Third and Second Partitions by Prussia and the Third Partition by Austria ¹⁵ . In 1807, with the establishment of the Duchy, a French-style division into eight departments was introduced; these were further subdivided into counties. In the vast majority of cases, these counties constituted a continuation of territorial units that had existed prior to 1795.

Following the creation of the Kingdom of Poland in 1815, the territory was divided into eight voivodeships, subdivided into districts and then into counties. In 1837, the voivodeships were renamed gubernias, while the three-tier administrative structure was retained. A further reform in 1842 reversed earlier terminology: districts were again designated as counties, while the former counties became judicial districts. In 1845 the number of gubernias was reduced to five, only to be increased again to ten in 1867. Throughout these changes, the overall number of counties remained relatively stable. Additional reforms were introduced in 1893 and 1912.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the final county network of what was then known as the Vistula Land had taken shape.

Figure 5. Administrative divisions of the Kingdom of Poland in 1907. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of the Kingdom of Poland, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_Kr%C3%B3lestwa_Polskiego [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

As illustrated by the above map, the essentially final county network in the Kingdom of Poland on the eve of the First World War comprised:

in the Kalisz Governorate: Kalisz, Koło, Konin, Łęczyca, Sieradz, Słupca, Turek, and Wieluń counties;
in the Kielce Governorate: Jędrzejów, Miechów, Kielce, Olkusz, Pińczów, Stopnica, and Włoszczowa counties;
in the Lublin Governorate: Janów, Krasnystaw, Lubartów, Lublin, Łuków, Nowa Aleksandria (Puławy), Garwolin, Siedlce, Sokołów, and Radzyń counties;
in the Łomża Governorate: Kolno, Łomża, Maków, Mazovia, Ostrołęka, Ostrów, Szczuczyn, and Węgrów counties;
in the Piotrków Governorate: Będzin, Brzeziny, Częstochowa, Łask, Łódź, Noworadomsk (Radomsko), Piotrków, and Rawa counties;
in the Płock Governorate: Ciechanów, Lipno, Mława, Płock, Przasnysz, Rypin, and Sierpc counties;
in the Radom Governorate: Iłża, Końskie, Kozienice, Opatów, Opoczno, Radom, and Sandomierz counties;
in the Siedlce Governorate (later renamed the Chełm Governorate): Biała, Konstantynów, Włodawa, Tomaszów, Zamość, Biłgoraj, Chełm, and Hrubieszów counties;
in the Suwałki Governorate: Augustów, Kalwaria, Mariampol, Sejny, Suwałki, Władysławów, and Wołkowysk counties;
in the Warsaw Governorate: Błonie, Gostynin, Grójec, Kutno, Łowicz, Nieszawa, Nowy Mińsk, Płońsk, Pułtusk, Radzymin, Skierniewice, Sochaczew, Warsaw, and Włocławek counties.

The county network that emerged at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries across the Polish lands was transferred almost unchanged to the reborn Polish Republic after November 1918. This continuity resulted primarily from the fact that, in most cases, counties in their then territorial form represented a direct continuation of administrative units that had existed in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to 1795.

In the remaining so-called Eastern Lands (that is, territories formerly under Russian rule outside the Kingdom of Poland), Russian regulations governing rural communal self-government were initially retained. At the same time, the legal framework governing municipal and county self-government in central Poland was gradually extended to these areas. These regulations were introduced by regulations issued by the General Commissioner for the Eastern Lands ₁₆ . This authority exercised civil administration over the territories in question until their affiliation with Poland was settled by treaty.

Ultimately, five voivodeships were established in these territories: Vilnius, Nowogródek, Białystok, Polesie, and Volhynia. Within them, county structures were created that broadly corresponded to the territorial divisions that had existed prior to the partitions.

Figure 6. Map illustrating the share of the Polish population in the total population of the eastern borderland counties (Kresy) in 1931. The eastern voivodeships are indicated by yellow outlines (including those established in the eastern territories of Galicia—Lesser Poland), while county boundaries are marked in black. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth before 1660, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kresy_ Wschodnie [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

₁ In Austria, the process of intensifying the centralisation of the state apparatus, accompanied by the weakening of representative institutions and the restriction of territorial autonomy, began as early as the sixteenth century, initially in the Spanish Habsburg possessions and later across the remaining Habsburg lands. This tendency accelerated markedly after the Thirty Years’ War (1648). Similar processes occurred in Brandenburg, where a rapid intensification of centralisation can likewise be observed after 1648. By the eighteenth century, Prussian constitutional arrangements were characterised by an even higher degree of centralisation than those of the Habsburg Monarchy. The autocratic tradition of the Grand Duchy of Moscow was an inherent feature of its political system, shaped during the period of Mongol domination. Ivan the Terrible played a major role in consolidating this extremely centralised order. Its modern institutional form, however, was established in the early eighteenth century by Peter I, whose reforms defined the Russian Empire as an autocratic monarchy. For a broader discussion, see: G. Górski, Historia ustrojów państw, Warsaw 2001. For a fuller treatment of the administrative systems of these states, see: G. Górski, Historia administracji, 2nd ed., Toruń 2011.

₂ There is little doubt that by the end of the eighteenth century all three partitioning powers of Poland represented some of the most advanced yet simultaneously most primitive and brutal absolutist systems in Europe. It is therefore striking that Polish historiography has often sought to minimise this reality, or even to suggest that these systems might have served as models for reform within the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

₃ The substance of this concept is discussed in greater detail, with reference to an earlier period, in: J. Górska-Szymczak, Między…. The observations made there are, however, fully applicable to the nineteenth-century context considered here.

₄ A concise discussion of this issue is provided in the analyses of the repeatedly cited work by G. Górski, Historia ustrojów państw.

₅ Following Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and the revolutionary upheavals of 1905–1907, limited attempts can be observed to democratise electoral law, to modify the constitutional position of the State Duma, and to expand the competences of territorial self-government.

₆ Formally, in accordance with the imperial titulature of the Austrian emperor, the official designation of this crown land was the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria with the Grand Duchy of Cracow and the Duchies of Oświęcim and Zator (German: Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien mit dem Grossherzogtum Krakau und den Herzogtümern Auschwitz und Zator).

₇ Provincial Act of 12 August 1866 on county representation. Provincial Law Gazette No. 21. See also: J. Piwocki (ed.), Zbiór ustaw i rozporządzeń administracyjnych, Lviv 1909, vol. I, p. 464.

₈ On 24 October 1918, representatives of Polish political parties operating in Galicia adopted a resolution calling for the immediate initiation of measures aimed at terminating the relationship of dependence on Austria. Four days later, the Polish Liquidation Committee was established and entrusted with the implementation of this objective. The political core of the Commission consisted of the Polish People's Party “Piast”, the National Democratic Party, and the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia. The Commission was chaired by Wincenty Witos. For a more detailed discussion, see: M. Przeniosło, Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna 1918–1919 , Kielce 2010.

₉ Regulation of the Polish Liquidation Committee of 23 November 1918 on the extension of electoral rights to municipal councils. Official Gazette of the Polish Liquidation Commission, no. 2.

₁₀ County Ordinance for the Eastern Provinces of 13 December 1872. Prussian Law Gazette, p. 661; amended by the Act of 19 March 1881. Prussian Law Gazette, p. 233;

₁₁ Act of 30 July 1883 on general state administration. Prussian Law Gazette, p. 155;

₁₂ Act of 1 August 1883 on the jurisdiction of administrative and administrative-judicial authorities. Prussian Law Gazette, p. 237.

₁₃ Act of 19 February / 2 March 1864 on the organisation of rural communes in the Kingdom of Poland. Digest of the Laws of the Russian Empire (1892), vol. II, arts. 194–313.

₁₄ Gubernial and county administration in the Kingdom of Poland was regulated by a tsarist decree of 19/31 December 1866. Digest of the Laws of the Russian Empire (1892), vol. II, arts. 1–125

₁₅ For a broader discussion of this issue, see: G. Górski, Akt 5 listopada w perspektywie historyczno prawnej, in: Historia Integra. Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana S. Salmonowiczowi w 70-lecie urodzin, Toruń 2001, p. 357–368 and O znaczeniu Aktu 5 listopada. Na marginesie artykuły Dariusza Makiłły, Przegląd Sejmowy 2018, vol. 4, p. 7-17.

₁₆ Regulation of the General Commissioner for the Eastern Lands of 27 June 1919 on the Provisional Municipal Act. Official Gazette of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands, no. 7, item 46; Regulation of the General Commissioner for the Eastern Lands of 16 August 1919 on the Organisation of Small Towns, Official Gazette of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands, no. 13, item 112; Regulation of the General Commissioner for the Eastern Lands of 7 November 1919 extending the Provisional Municipal Act to cities and towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants; Official Gazette of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands, no. 13, item 112.

County-Level Administrative Units in Other European States

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 09:33:53 GMT

Authors: Grzegorz Górski, Witold Mazurek

As noted in the introductory remarks, the powiaty (or ziemie) that emerged in the Kingdom of Poland during the reign of Casimir the Great generally developed out of territorial units that had already existed in the pre-state period ¹ . Across Europe, the formation of early administrative divisions followed broadly comparable trajectories; a decisive factor shaping their evolution, however, was the legacy of the Roman Empire.

The Roman Empire – Byzantium

In Western Europe, the earlier political collapse of the Empire, together with extensive migratory movements, meant that the territorial structures taking shape towards the end of the first millennium constituted a distinctive synthesis of Roman institutions and tribal, primarily Germanic, arrangements. In Central and

Eastern Europe, by contrast, the survival of the Roman Empire in its Byzantine form and its prolonged influence in the region meant that the interaction between Roman administrative models and tribal (mainly Slavic) structures likewise produced distinctive institutional solutions. Nevertheless, it was the administrative arrangements adopted and refined within Byzantium that exerted the most profound and lasting influence on the evolution of territorial structures across Europe as a whole. It is therefore useful to consider these developments in general terms, with particular attention to identifying territorial units that were functionally comparable to the Polish powiat.

A suitable point of departure is the administrative reorganisation of the Empire introduced at the turn of the third and fourth centuries CE by Emperor Diocletian. The new system of government he established – the Tetrarchy ² – was accompanied by a division of the Empire into four major units, the Praetorian Prefectures of Gaul, Italy, Illyricum, and the East, each placed under the authority of one of the tetrarchs. These prefectures were initially subdivided into twelve dioceses: Britain, Gaul, the Seven Provinces, Spain, Africa, Italy, Pannonia, Moesia, Thrace, Asia, Pontus, and the East. Each diocese was headed by a Vicarius. The dioceses were further divided into provinces, whose total number rose to approximately one hundred, ranging from four to sixteen within a single diocese. At both the diocesan and provincial levels, civil and military administrations were institutionally separated – a measure intended to improve the efficiency of the Empire’s defensive system.

Figure 1. Administrative division of the Roman Empire introduced by Diocletian. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Administrative division of the Roman Empire, https://nl.wikipedia. org/wiki/Bestand:Roman_Tetrarchy_ map_-_RU.svg#/media/Bestand: R%C3%B6mische_Tetrarchie-es.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

In subsequent centuries, within the eastern part of the Empire, which continued to exist without interruption, new territorial units emerged, most notably praetorian prefectures and themes. Alongside these, a range of extraordinary institutional arrangements appeared, including the quaestura exercitus, exarchates, kleisourai, archontates, tourmai, banda, and katepanika. These units were frequently created on an ad hoc basis in response to complex local conditions. n most cases, they took the form of combined civil–military structures designed to strengthen the Empire’s defensive capacity ³ . From the perspective most relevant to the present discussion, it is important to note that at lower administrative levels there existed territorial units known as pagi. These encompassed rural areas together with the villages (vici) and settlements located within them, often including fortified local centres (oppida) ⁴ .

At this point, one further concept that emerged within the still undivided Empire merits attention: the comes. Without entering into questions of etymology, the term came to denote a category of high-ranking officials within the imperial chancellery, a development that dates to approximately the reign of Emperor Diocletian ⁵ .

Figure 2. Part of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire at the end of the eighth century, showing the administrative division into themes. Source: Wikimedia

Commons, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plik:Asia_Minor_ca_780_AD.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The most prominent official bearing this title was the deputy of the magister officiorum (the highest-ranking civil official of the imperial administration), known as the comes dispositionum. Other offices carrying the same designation included the comes domesticorum, comes privatae largitionis, comes rerum privatarum, comes sacrarum largitionum, comes auri, comes sacrae vestis, and, of particular significance, the comes rei militaris. Several of these offices survived into the period of the Ostrogothic and Visigothic kingdoms established in Italy and Spain. Within the administrative structures of these successor states, one encounters offices such as comes cubiculariorum, comes scanciorum, comes stabulorum, comes notariorum, and comes thesaurorum.

There can be little doubt that both the pagus as a territorial unit and the comes as a type of official also persisted in Gaul, where the Frankish Kingdom emerged from the fifth century onward. It is therefore unsurprising that these institutions reappeared in a modified form within the Carolingian Empire and spread from there across much of Europe.

Drawing on the pre-existing pagi, Charlemagne introduced a new territorial unit known as the comitatus (Old French comté). Each was headed by an official appointed by the ruler, initially designated as a comes. These districts were subdivided into centenae, which were administered by vicarii. The responsibilities of the comites included oversight of the vicarii, the administration of justice, the enforcement of capitularies, the levying of troops, the collection of tolls and dues, and the maintenance of roads and bridges. Although, in principle, they could be dismissed by the king, many of these offices gradually became hereditary ⁶ .

Figure 3. Map illustrating the territorial expansion of Charlemagne’s Empire. It shows how, on the basis of his conquests, the later major territorial units emerged, with pagi forming their lower-level subdivisions. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plik:Frankish_Empire_481_to_814-pl.svgf [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Carolingian model of territorial administration (much like the Carolingian conception of the state itself) came to function as a civilisational benchmark in Europe around the turn of the first millennium ⁷ . It should be emphasised that the reception of these institutional solutions was accompanied by a pronounced tendency towards the hereditary transmission of offices. This phenomenon was already visible within the Carolingian Empire itself. An attempt to counteract its consequences, above all, the erosion of the original purpose of these offices as instruments for transmitting the ruler’s will at the local level, was the parallel institution of the missi dominici. These royal envoys were tasked with supervising the implementation of royal law and authority within the districts. Comparable processes can be observed elsewhere; for example, the establishment of the office of starosta in the Kingdom of Poland was inspired by similar concerns, particularly in response to the growing autonomy of castellans.

The Kingdom of France

Within the Kingdom of France, territorial divisions long displayed a striking degree of diversity. This reflected deeply entrenched traditions whose roots extended back to the Celtic (Gallic) period. In his still-influential classical study, Fustel de Coulanges emphasised that Gallic legacies were preserved not only in the names of French provinces, but also in lower-level territorial units ⁸ . According to his analysis, subsequent Roman domination, followed by Germanic rule, later transformations of the French monarchy, and even the upheavals of the Revolution and the Napoleonic era, failed to bring about fundamental changes to these original divisions. The smallest territorial units of the Gallic period functioned as continuations of the Roman pagi and survived (largely unchanged) through the Frankish era, becoming the basic units of territorial administration in the Kingdom of France. Today, they find their modern counterpart in the arrondissement. ⁹

During the Roman period in Gaul, prior to its reorganisation under Diocletian, divisions into provinces developed, eventually numbering eleven. These were subdivided into lower units known as civitates, whose number had risen to 113 by the fifth century. These units corresponded closely to the pagi and later became components of the Carolingian administrative system. They functioned either within, or alongside, divisions into duchies, marches, or larger comtés.

As the Frankish realm fragmented between the ninth and twelfth centuries, the institutional structures of the Catholic Church (dioceses, parishes, and abbeys) assumed an increasingly prominent role. In the context of the growing weakness of secular administration, ecclesiastical institutions often took on functions normally associated with the state.

This weakness was especially evident in the administration of justice (where officials were appointed to adjudicate in the king’s name), fiscal management, and, over time, military organisation. In response, parallel administrative offices were created whose territorial scope did not correspond to existing divisions.

In the judicial sphere, the principal criteria shaping these new units were language and legal custom. Given the extraordinary diversity in both respects, new territorial jurisdictions emerged in the form of bailliages and sénéchaussées, headed respectively by baillis and sénéchaux. At the apex of this judicial system stood more than a dozen parlements, which functioned as supreme courts for territorially defined legal and linguistic regions.

For fiscal purposes, généralités were established. Their territorial extent was fluid and lacked permanence. In addition, gouvernements généraux were created as military districts forming the basis of army organisation. Ultimately, around forty such units emerged, nearly all of which have counterparts in territorial divisions that persist to this day.

Figure 4. Map illustrating the division of the Kingdom of France into general governorships (shown in different colours); red lines indicate the boundaries of the present-day departments. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:1789_%2B_2022_France,_ noms_des_r%C3%A9gions.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The advance of absolutism in France did not favour the survival of county-type structures. This tendency was reinforced by the centralising and bureaucratic reforms of the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, which definitively consolidated this model of territorial administration ¹⁰ .

The Kingdom of England

Most counties in the Kingdom of England were established between the sixth and eleventh centuries ¹¹ . They were territorial units created primarily to facilitate the administration of justice and the organisation of military obligations within defined areas. Each county was headed by a sheriff, who was usually appointed by the monarch, although in certain cases the appointment was made by powerful secular magnates, such as palatines or earls, or by ecclesiastical authorities, including bishops. The territorial configuration of these units represented a distinctive synthesis of residual Roman administrative structures (notably the pagi) and arrangements introduced by successive waves of Germanic settlers, which often reflected ethnic composition and linguistic boundaries. Following the Norman Conquest of 1066, the institution of the sheriff was extensively employed to strengthen royal authority. For a considerable period, these offices were held almost exclusively by members of the Norman elite, who were entrusted with wide-ranging fiscal and enforcement powers. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of Parliament led to counties acquiring the right to elect representatives to the developing House of Commons. Urban representatives formed the so-called parliamentary boroughs, while counties functioned as county constituencies. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the military role of sheriffs was gradually curtailed with the establishment of the office of lord lieutenant, who assumed responsibility for organising and commanding the county militia.

Both the number of counties and their boundaries, as well as the basic functions of administration at this level, remained largely unchanged until the mid-nineteenth century. More substantial alterations were associated with electoral reforms, which included the disfranchisement of certain boroughs and, under conditions of rapid demographic change, the adjustment of county boundaries or the creation of a limited number of new administrative units ¹² . As a result, counties gradually evolved into standard units of local self-government. County councils were established as representative bodies of the local population, and sheriffs became subordinate to these councils rather than remaining directly accountable to central government. These changes were accompanied by a systematic expansion of the competences of local authorities.

Notably, despite these reforms, the number of counties increased only marginally, and since 1974 England has comprised forty-five counties ¹³ .

Figure 5. Map of English counties in the mid-nineteenth century. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historic_counties_of_England [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The German Kingdom

In the eastern part of the Carolingian realm – Francia orientalis or Regnum Francorum orientalium – the formation of the German Kingdom began in the tenth century. In territories inhabited by Germanic peoples and previously incorporated by Charlemagne, so-called “older stem duchies” (ältere Stammesherzogtümer) initially emerged, notably Bavaria, Swabia, and Saxony. These were later joined by Franconia, Thuringia, and Lotharingia, often described as “younger stem duchies” (jüngere Stammesherzogtümer). Following the incorporation of Thuringia into Saxony, five principal stem duchies remained, which went on to play a leading role in the political life of the kingdom ¹⁴ . This interpretation, however, is no longer universally accepted ¹⁵ .

As recent Polish scholarship has emphasised ¹⁶ , irrespective of ongoing debates concerning the hierarchy and classification of territorial units in Francia orientalis, it may be assumed that five duchies – Swabia (Alemannia), Lotharingia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Franconia – held a dominant political position in the period under consideration. It was the rulers of these polities who played a decisive role in the early functioning of the realm.

As a rule, these territories preserved administrative systems derived from the Carolingian period. By the end of the first millennium, the emerging German Empire (Römisches Reich), in addition to the principal duchies, also encompassed Thuringia, Frisia, the Eastern March, the nascent Northern March, the Duchy of Bohemia, and substantial portions of Lotharingia ¹⁷ .

Figure 6. Map illustrating the territory of the German Empire at the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Holy_Roman_Empire_11th_ century_map-en.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

In the following two centuries, the Empire both expanded through the incorporation of additional polities and underwent increasing territorial fragmentation, resulting in the emergence of a growing number of highly diverse political entities. This process is illustrated in the map below.

Figure 7. Central Europe during the period of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https:// commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:Mitteleuropa_ zur_Zeit_der_Staufer.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

By the fourteenth century, their number had increased still further.

Figure 8. Map of territorial units within the Holy Roman Empire in 1356. Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Golden_Bull_of_1356.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Ultimately, the Reformation of the sixteenth century, together with the religious and political conflicts associated with it, followed by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and its conclusion in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), decisively shaped the territorial structure of the Holy Roman Empire. This period marked the point of greatest internal territorial fragmentation among the German states. In the decades that followed, processes of partial reintegration began to take place within the Empire.

Figure 9. Map of the Holy Roman Empire after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Plik:HRR_1648.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Among the territorial units of the Empire were:

territories ruled by bishops as secular princes (Hochstifte),
imperial abbeys governed by abbots (Reichsabteien),
imperial circles established for purposes of collective defence (Reichskreis),
imperial estates (Reichsstand),
free imperial cities (freie Reichsstadt),
states of the Empire (Reichsstände),
numerous small polities – Kleinstaaterei. ¹⁸
Electoral History of Poland (Sixteenth Century to the Early Twentieth

The Kingdom of Hungary

Close dynastic ties between the Piast dynasty and the Hungarian rulers of the Árpád house, and later the Angevins, facilitated the transfer of various constitutional and administrative solutions from the Kingdom of Hungary to the Kingdom of Poland. In this context, it is worth examining the formation of administrative divisions in the early stages of Hungarian statehood.

The territories occupied by the Magyars at the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries had previously formed part of Great Moravia. Within this polity, territorial units known as župa were widespread. These units were probably associated with larger tribal groupings among the Slavic population. Similar structures also existed in Croatia and Bulgaria. The term likewise appeared in southern Poland, where it survived in the Polish language, although it was eventually replaced by the term opole.

Following their arrival in the Carpathian Basin, the Magyars adopted this administrative unit, referring to it as vármegye, megye, or várispánság. Under the influence of contacts with the Carolingian Empire, and owing to the functional similarity between this unit and the Carolingian comitatus, the Latin term comitatus became widely used. This was especially the case in regions of the kingdom with a strong Slavic presence. Over time, the župa, or megye, came to be headed by officials known as župans or ispáns (várispáns).

Figure 10. Map of the Kingdom of Hungary divided between Habsburg and Ottoman rule, with the counties of Transylvania and Wallachia, vassals of the Ottoman Sultan, also shown. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Territories of the Kingdom of Hungary, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/List_of_administrative_divisions_ of_the_Kingdom_of_Hungary#/media/ File:Central_europe_1572.png [accessed on: 27.07.2025].

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, nearly fifty counties had been established within the Kingdom of Hungary. On the eve of the Ottoman conquest at the beginning of the sixteenth century, their number had risen to approximately seventy. Following the partition of Hungarian territories between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, these administrative units were largely retained by the occupying powers.

During the reconstruction of the Kingdom of Hungary as an equal component of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1866, the county structure was essentially preserved. Ultimately, the Kingdom comprised more than seventy counties, the overwhelming majority of which retained boundaries dating back to the medieval period.

Figure 11. Counties of the Kingdom of Hungary after 1880. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Counties of the Kingdom of Hungary after 1880, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_administrative_divisions_of_the_Kingdom_of_Hungary#/me- dia/File:Kingdom_of_Hungary_counties.svg [accessed on: 28.07.2025].

It is also noteworthy that in the seventeenth century territorial units corresponding to counties appeared in both Denmark and Sweden.

In Denmark, they were introduced in 1660 under the name amter. Initially numbering twenty-four, their number was gradually reduced in subsequent centuries, and today sixteen such units remain.

Figure 12. Present-day counties of Denmark. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Counties of Denmark, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counties_of_ Denmark#/media/File:DenmarkNumbered.png [accessed on: 28.07.2025].

It is also noteworthy that in the seventeenth century territorial units corresponding to counties appeared in both Denmark and Sweden.

In Denmark, they were introduced in 1660 under the name amter. Initially numbering twenty-four, their number was gradually reduced in subsequent centuries, and today sixteen such units remain.

Figure 13. Counties of Sweden. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Counties of Sweden, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/County#/media/File:SWE-Map_L%C3%A4n.svg [accessed on: 28.07.2025].

In Sweden, a major administrative reform was enacted in 1634 by Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna through the so-called Instrument of Government. This reform established territorial units known as län. Numbering twenty-one, these units have survived to the present day with only minor modifications.

¹ These conclusions are based on the findings presented by the previously cited J. Osiński,

² Without entering into broader discussion, it should be recalled that Diocletian initially effected a distinctive division of the Empire into eastern and western parts, establishing a dual rule of two Augusti; at a later stage, one Caesar was appointed to each part. The resulting administrative system thus reflected a fourfold structure of imperial authority.

³ For a broader discussion of issues concerning the organisation of the state apparatus and the territorial structures of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire, see

G. Ostrogorsky, History of Byzantine State, Oxford 1956. See also: L. Maksimović, The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaiologoi, Amsterdam 1988.

⁴ For a discussion of these units, see: O. Nicholson, The Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity. Oxford University Press 2018. s.v. pagus and pagarch; see also: S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, E. Eidinow, The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford University Press 2012, p. 1062

⁵ On the institution of the comes, see: H. Chisholm, Encyclopædia Britannica. vol. 7 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press 1911, p. 312–314.

⁶ For a more detailed discussion of these solutions, see: M. Costambeys, The Carolingian World. Cambridge University Press 2011.

⁷ For a broader discussion of this issue, see: J. Górska-Szymczak, op. cit. and G. Górski, Historia administracji, Toruń 2002.

⁸ F. de Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l’ancienne France. Paris 1875, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k61706f. texteImage [accessed on: 23.07.2025].

⁹ For a more detailed discussion, see: N. Verdier, La réforme des arrondissements de 1926, https://shs.hal.science/file/index/docid/467770/filename/ Verdier_La_reforme_des_arrondissements.pdf [accessed on: 23.07.2025].

¹⁰ For a broader discussion of these issues (though not without controversial interpretations) see:: M.L. Legay, Le fin de pouvoir provincial (4 aout 1789 – 21 septembre 1791), Annales historiques de la Révolution française 2003 (332), p. 25–53.

¹¹ For a broader treatment of this subject, see: Aspects of Britain: Local Government. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 1996. See also the more comprehensive study: F. Youngs, Guide to the Local Administrative Units of England: Volume II. London 1991.

¹³ An insightful discussion of these processes can be found in: B. Keith-Lucas, Government of the County in England, The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 9, No. 1. (March 1956), p. 44–55.

¹⁴ Such view is proposed, inter alia, by P. J. Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium

Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 44 ff.

¹⁵ It should be noted that the thesis concerning the existence of “older” and “younger” stem duchies formed part of a strongly nationalist strand of German historiography, particularly in the period following unification in 1871 and later during the interwar years. An alternative interpretation is offered by H. Wolfram, The Shaping of the Early Medieval Principality as a Type of Non-royal Rulership, Viator 1971, vol. 2, p. 41 ff.

¹⁶ J. Górska-Szymczak, Między demokracją a absolutyzmem.

¹⁷ For a broader discussion, see: P. Collins, The Birth of the West: Rome, Germany, France, and the Creation of Europe in the Tenth Century, New York 2014.

¹⁸ For a broader discussion of the Empire’s complex territorial structure, see: The German Hereditary Territorial Rulers (History, territorial possesion, chronology, titles), http://grmrulers.altervista.org/ [accessed on: 16.08.2025].

The Emergence of Modern Political Parties in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Eighteenth Century

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 08:35:01 GMT

Authors: Grzegorz Górski, Stanisław Górski

The beginning of the eighteenth century brought developments that profoundly altered the existing model of political life in the Commonwealth. These changes resulted from a combination of internal factors and shifts in the international environment surrounding Poland. Unsurprisingly, they were accompanied by a range of pathologies, among which the most destructive was the open involvement of foreign powers in domestic political processes. This interference was closely linked to widespread corruption, practised by both foreign agents and domestic elites.

The processes under consideration were set in motion by two principal factors. The first was the political turmoil surrounding the election that followed the death of John III Sobieski ¹ . The second was the course, and consequences, of the Great Northern War, which proved catastrophic for the Commonwealth, particularly in its social and economic dimensions ² .

To this must be added the devastating effects of the major plague epidemic at the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Combined with the destruction caused by warfare and the prolonged, systematic pillaging carried out by Russian, Swedish, and Saxon armies, the epidemic resulted in widespread devastation, above all in economic terms ³ .

During the struggle for the throne at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, three principal political camps emerged within the Commonwealth. Much as in the preceding two centuries, however, their structure largely followed patterns already described above. What is particularly important is that, on the basis of these divisions, political groupings of a fundamentally different character were to emerge in the decades that followed. It is therefore worth examining the factions that took shape at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Around the Saxon ruling house there emerged the so-called Wettin faction, which supported the candidacy of Augustus II. Prominent roles within this group were played by members of the Flemming, Ożarowski, Denhoff, and Morsztyn families. Although the faction viewed Russia as an ally of the Commonwealth, it would be misleading to describe it, at least at this stage, as unequivocally pro-Russian.

The principal rival of the Saxon camp was the pro-French faction, which backed Stanisław Leszczyński. Its leading figures came from the Lubomirski, Sapieha, Potocki, and Radziwiłł families. In military affairs, this group consistently favoured Sweden. It was largely through the initiatives of its leaders that, at the end of 1715, the General Confederation, known as the Tarnogród Confederation, was formed ⁴ .

Alongside the struggle for the throne, a third political alignment took shape: the so-called republican faction. This group generally positioned itself in opposition to the Saxon camp, since the candidacy in question was associated with efforts to centralise royal authority and was therefore perceived as a direct threat to noble liberties. The defence of the so-called “Golden Liberty” formed the core ideological bond uniting this faction. Its leadership was drawn primarily from the Branicki, Rzewuski, Wiśniowiecki, and Sieniawski families. Ideologically, the republican faction stood close to the pro-French camp, while simultaneously sharing with the Wettin faction a broadly favourable attitude towards Russia. What ultimately united its adherents was opposition to the consequences of the predatory presence of Swedish and Russian troops on the territory of the Commonwealth. In the context of the devastating plague epidemic described above, the exploitation of Polish and Lithuanian lands by foreign armies became intolerable. Notably, the scale of destruction inflicted by Swedish forces was such that Russian troops, and their practices of plunder, came to be regarded as the “lesser evil”.

The combined effects of economic collapse, depopulation, and extreme exploitation, caused by foreign armies and compounded by the epidemic, led to a profound destabilisation of the Commonwealth’s social and economic fabric, which had only recently begun to recover from the military and social catastrophes of 1648–1660. These developments hit the petty and middle nobility particularly hard. Beyond the immediate material hardships faced by these broad strata, the crisis fundamentally reshaped the nature of their participation in political life.

As a result, the defining characteristic of this period became the erosion, among large segments of the nobility, of political independence – a feature that had been central to noble democracy until the mid-seventeenth century. From that time onward, and with particular intensity in the eighteenth century, clientelism and political corruption became widespread phenomena, as magnate leaders of emerging factions increasingly constituted the principal – if not the sole – source of financial support for the average noble household ⁵ . Impoverished nobles responded in various ways: some entered service on magnate estates (more often in private military formations than in civilian roles); others incurred debt in an effort to restore their own productive activity; but most commonly they sold their political support at local assemblies (sejmiki) and, if elected, in the national parliament (the Sejm) ⁶ .

The scale of this practice was unprecedented in the history of Polish political life. Yet, when viewed in comparative perspective, against developments in Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or in the United States in the nineteenth century, it becomes clear that such mechanisms were characteristic of a particular stage in the evolution of democratic systems ⁷ . Nevertheless, whereas elsewhere this phenomenon represented a step beyond earlier, more exclusive forms of political mobilisation, within the constitutional framework of the Polish–Lithuanian state, especially in its Polish component, it marked, in comparison with the late sixteenth century, a significant deterioration in the quality of political life. These tendencies continued to intensify in subsequent decades. Only in the final quarter of the seventeenth century, owing to a temporary improvement in the social and economic position of the nobility, did this model of political organisation experience a brief slowdown.

It should also be noted that the principal political factions possessed clearly defined territorial bases of influence. The Wettin faction was strongest in western Lesser Poland and Mazovia; the pro-French faction exerted its greatest influence in Greater Poland and in Lithuania; while the republican faction enjoyed its broadest support in eastern Lesser Poland and in the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

A decisive turning point in the political life of this period came with the so-called Silent Sejm and its resolutions, which resulted, inter alia, in the dissolution of the Tarnogród Confederation ⁸ . The proceedings of the Sejm of 1717, regardless of their most detrimental consequences (including the effective confirmation of a Russian protectorate over the Commonwealth), marked a breakthrough in the further evolution of political factions, which from this point onward began to form according to new principles. A central role in this transformation was played by the Czartoryski family, whose political activity led to the emergence of the so-called Familia.

This faction retained a dominant position in Polish public life until the end of the eighteenth century and, in a broader sense, survived in exile, carrying the idea of Polish independence until the restoration of the state. Although the Czartoryski family exercised a pre-eminent influence within it and came to personify the faction as a whole, the Familia already displayed features characteristic of a modern political party. Viewed through the lens of modern party typologies, the Familia can unquestionably be described as a voluntary political organisation of a committee-based type (one oriented towards the pursuit of electoral objectives), democratic in structure, governed through collective leadership, and, above all, distinguished by a clearly articulated political programme. It should, of course, be stressed that the Familia acquired the defining features of a modern political formation only gradually.

The Czartoryski family traced its lineage to the grand-ducal Gediminid dynasty; its political prominence, however, was largely the achievement of Kazimierz Czartoryski. He skilfully preserved the family’s economic base during the turmoil of the Great Northern War and the devastation wrought by the plague. After Augustus II was restored to the Polish–Lithuanian throne, Kazimierz strongly supported the king’s temporary anti-Russian orientation and, on this foundation, began to assemble broader social backing for his political initiatives. His efforts were supported by his three sons – Fryderyk Michał, August Aleksander, and Teodor – who stood out among their contemporaries for their intellectual abilities and level of education. The true driving force behind the Familia’s political advance, and its informal leader, however, was Stanisław Poniatowski, who married Kazimierz’s daughter, Konstancja. Taking advantage of a temporary alignment with Augustus II, the Czartoryskis focused on consolidating both their own economic position and that of their supporters. The central arena of their political activity soon became the struggle for dominance in local assemblies (sejmiki) across individual voivodeships. Even greater importance, however, was attached to securing control over the Crown Tribunal and the Lithuanian Tribunal.

At this juncture, it is worth addressing the significance of political competition over the Tribunals. After 1720, rivalry for seats in these bodies became, given the chronic inefficiency and frequent paralysis of other state institutions, especially the Sejm, and the near-total inertia of the executive under both Wettin monarchs, the principal arena of political confrontation ⁹ .

Despite their many shortcomings ¹⁰ , the Tribunals adjudicated matters of fundamental economic importance ¹¹ . For the Czartoryski family, whose economic position was expanding rapidly, judicial protection of newly acquired estates was essential. This, in turn, required dominance in the sejmiki, which elected lay judges to the Tribunals. As judicial mandates had to be renewed annually, securing re-election could not rely solely on corruption. It therefore necessitated the construction of a durable political base across a sufficiently wide network of local assemblies – an objective that, in practice, required the creation of a political faction organised on new principles. An inevitable consequence of this activity was the Familia’s growing influence over the election of deputies to the Sejm. Although, during the later years of Augustus II’s reign and almost throughout that of Augustus III, Sejms were frequently dissolved without enacting legislation, the Familia’s dominance, established in the vast majority of sejmiki and, consequently, within both the Sejm and the Tribunals, persisted at least until the early years of Stanisław August’s reign. It should be recalled that one outcome of this intensified political mobilisation was the second mass election of a “Piast” candidate – Stanisław Leszczyński in 1733 – in which the Familia temporarily cooperated with a reconfigured pro-French faction ¹² . This alliance, which sought to salvage this candidacy through the Confederation of Dzików, ultimately failed ¹³ . The Familia’s subsequent withdrawal from this venture enabled it gradually to consolidate its position around King Augustus III. As a result of its wide-ranging political activity, the Familia reached the height of its influence in the 1740s ¹⁴ .

In both Tribunals, the political predominance achieved at the level of the sejmiki in the Crown and in Lithuania culminated in a resolution favourable to the Czartoryskis, particularly to their Lubomirski allies, in the dispute over the division of the Ostrogski entail in 1754.

The success of the Familia, rooted in the creation of a political organisation that was modern by contemporary standards, prompted the consolidation of its opponents. This occurred around the former republican faction, which, owing to the leading role of families holding hetman offices, notably the Branickis, Potockis, and Rzewuskis, came to be known as the Hetman faction. Combining its forces with a significant segment of the pro-French camp and partly imitating the organisational methods of the Familia, this grouping emerged as the second major force in political life during the reign of Augustus III. Political life until the accession of Stanisław August unfolded largely under the sign of rivalry between these two camps, with the Wettin “court party” playing a more limited role than before.

It should be emphasised that this rivalry was actively exploited by foreign powers, particularly Russia. Nevertheless, the period also reveals that attitudes towards Russia – whether sympathetic or dependent – were no longer fixed. On both sides, cooperation with St Petersburg was accompanied by efforts to cultivate alternative foreign alliances capable of counterbalancing Russian influence.

A further watershed in the evolution of political life was provided by the reform period of 1764–1766 and the conflict over the rights of religious dissidents, culminating in the Bar Confederation. During the confederation, both major political camps, as well as the faction formed by Stanisław Poniatowski after his break with the Familia, assumed a highly fluid character, particularly in terms of personal alignments ¹⁵ . Following the collapse of the confederation, a new configuration of the political scene emerged which retained its core stability until the final collapse of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

It should be emphasised that, during the election of Stanisław August, the Familia entered into cooperation with Russia. As a result, it once again secured control (this time for an extended period) over the decisive majority of local sejmiki and consequently came to dominate the political profile of the Sejm. With Russian backing, the Familia was able, with relative ease, to ensure the election of Stanisław Poniatowski ¹⁶ and to initiate a series of reforms that were significant for the modernisation of the state apparatus. The subsequent rupture between the king and his “uncles”, encouraged by Russia, which was unwilling to support the Familia’s reformist agenda, set in motion processes that led to the emergence of a new political grouping, later known as the Patriotic Party. Stanisław August believed that he could persuade Catherine II to accept the modernisation of the Commonwealth in return for his unconditional loyalty. He also assumed (naively, as events would show) that the programme of reform developed by Prince Stanisław Konarski and Ignacy Potocki would meet with Russian approval.

Although the modernising ambitions of the Patriotic Party overlapped in many respects with those of the Familia, attitudes towards Russia became the decisive line of division between the two camps. The Czartoryskis, following their negative experiences with their former protégé and, subsequently, Russian pressure during the Bar Confederation, adopted a clearly anti-Russian stance. Completing this political constellation was the anti-modernisation hetmanic party, whose leaders argued that the preservation of all traditional “liberties” under Russian protection constituted the very foundation of the Commonwealth.

After 1772, this cleavage became the principal axis of political conflict, shaping the structure of the political scene. The political struggles of the 1770s and 1780s, including the gradual accumulation of influence through contests over sejmiki, thus became the main driving force behind the evolution of political life. The culmination of these processes during the Four-Year Sejm was therefore not an accidental outcome of circumstance, but the result of developments that had been unfolding for several decades. Notably, the fundamental political divisions outlined in the introduction persisted from the early 1720s until the fall of the state.

Against this background, it is important to consider, in broad outline, the influence of individual political groupings in selected voivodeships after 1772 ¹⁷ . This perspective allows for a clearer understanding of the distribution of support for the three principal political currents, particularly during the period of the Great Sejm. It should also be borne in mind that, in most legislative initiatives between 1788 and 1792 (especially in the adoption of the Constitution of 3 May) the Patriotic Party generally cooperated with the Familia.

The Ruthenian, Podolian, and Volhynian voivodeships, together with the more easterly frontier regions, became arenas of intense rivalry between the Familia and the hetmanic party. In Ruthenia itself, as well as in Podolia and Volhynia, the Familia predominated. In the remaining voivodeships of this zone, however, the influence of the hetmanic camp steadily increased. This was particularly evident in the Kyiv voivodeship, which gradually came under the dominance of the Potocki family and, through them, the hetmanic party.

In the Lublin voivodeship, a relative balance between the Familia and the hetmanic camp persisted, although after 1772 the influence of the Patriotic Party expanded rapidly. Lublin emerged as one of the key political and intellectual centres supporting reform, including initiatives in the military, administrative, and educational spheres. In the Kraków voivodeship, the Familia retained dominance while the hetmanic party remained largely on the defensive. During the Great Sejm, the Patriotic Party quickly strengthened its position there, benefiting from Kraków’s role as a hub of reformist thought.

In the Mazovian voivodeships, the Familia predominated, later sharing influence with the Patriotic Party, particularly in the eastern parts of the region. The hetmanic camp, by contrast, remained relatively weak in Mazovia.

In Greater Poland, the hetmanic party found support among the Leszczyński and Opaliński families, with its principal base in the Poznań voivodeship, while the Familia dominated eastern Greater Poland, especially the Kalisz voivodeship. At the same time, the Patriotic Party gradually increased its influence in the region by mobilising sections of the nobility that had previously remained politically passive.

Within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the hetmanic party drew its main support from the Radziwiłł family and its extensive client networks. Its strongest influence was exercised in the Vilnius and Kaunas voivodeships, in eastern Novogrudok, and in the Smolensk voivodeship. The Familia, by contrast, concentrated its efforts primarily in the Vitebsk voivodeship and western Novogrudok. The Patriotic Party, meanwhile, never became deeply rooted in Lithuania. Instead, explicitly pro-Russian (and in practice quasi-agent-based) circles exercised considerable influence there. These groups, however, lacked the organisational coherence of the main political camps and relied on a narrow circle of magnate families closely tied to Russia.

The political climate of 1788–1792 proved particularly favourable to the expansion of the Patriotic Party, largely through close cooperation with the Familia. This alliance was broken when King Stanisław August acceded to the Targowica Confederation. The brief rule of the Targowica leaders following the defeat of the Kościuszko Uprising, together with the repression carried out by the Russian occupying authorities, led to the destruction of both political formations. In effect, this also marked the collapse of Polish political life itself – a process ultimately sealed by the Third Partition and the final destruction of the first Polish state.

¹ For a detailed discussion of the interregnum following the death of John III Sobieski, see: M. Komaszyński, Księcia Contirgo niefortunna wyprawa po koronę Sobieskiego, Warsaw 1971.

² A classic study that continues to retain substantial scholarly value is: J. Feldman, Polska w dobie Wielkiej Wojny Północnej 1704–1709, Kraków 1925.

³ The plague epidemic lasted from 1708 to 1714, reaching its greatest intensity between 1708 and 1712. It primarily affected the countries of the Baltic Sea basin, causing particularly severe devastation in coastal cities. It is estimated, for example, that Gdańsk lost more than 50 per cent of its population, Königsberg and Szczecin approximately 20 per cent each, Riga, Pärnu, and Tallinn around 70 per cent, and Stralsund, Stockholm, Malmö, and Copenhagen roughly 40 per cent of their inhabitants. The origins of the epidemic are commonly associated with Podolia and Volhynia, where Swedish troops were operating. Their movements across Polish territories from 1706 onwards significantly contributed to the spread of the plague in these regions and in Ruthenia. During this period, Lviv lost approximately 40 per cent of its population, while even greater losses were recorded in Stanisławów, Przemyśl, Jarosław, Stryi, and Kolomyia. In rural areas, where losses are more difficult to quantify, mortality is estimated at between 40 and 50 per cent of the population. As it advanced further westward, the plague devastated Kraków (approximately 20,000 victims), followed by Warsaw (around 30,000) and Poznań (about 9,000), before spreading into Ducal Prussia and Warmia. From there it reached Lithuania and, together with the troops of J. Potocki, passed through Silesia into the Habsburg lands and southern Germany. For a broader discussion of this phenomenon, see: K.E. Frandsen, The Last Plague In Baltic Region 1709–1713, Copenhagen 2009; R.I. Frost, The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe 1558–1721, London 2000; J. Zapnik, Pest und Krieg im Ostseeraum. Der „Schwarze Tod” in Stralsund während des Großen Nordischen Krieges (1700–1721), Hamburg 2007; K. F. Helleiner, The Population of Europe from the Black Death to the Eve of Vital Revolution [in:] Rich E. E., Wilson C. H., (eds.) The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire. Vol. 4. Cambridge. 1967. It should be noted, however, that Polish historiography still lacks comprehensive studies of the course of this catastrophe and, above all, of its long-term social and economic consequences for the lands of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances and political-constitutional consequences of the Tarnogród Confederation, see: A.A. Witusik, Przywódcy konfederacji tarnogrodzkiej, [in:] Konfederacja tarnogrodzka i jej tradycje, Tarnogród 1995.

⁵ A broader analysis of this problem is offered by M. Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczypospolitej. Państwo magnackie jako region polityczny, Warsaw 2013.

⁶ For a broader discussion of these phenomena, see, inter alia: J. Lukowski, Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century 1697–1795. London 1991; Zielińska Z., Walka stronnictw w Polsce w XVIII wieku. Warsaw 1997.

⁷ For a broader discussion of this phenomenon, see the remarks in: G. Górski, Metoda Johnsona. Demokratyczny przełom, czyli o przemianach prawa wyborczego w USA i Wielkiej Brytanii w XIX wieku, “Znaki Nowych Czasów”, Warsaw 2003, no. 5–6, p. 181–187.

⁸ Formally, on 3 November 1716, the Treaty of Warsaw was concluded. Among other provisions, it introduced fiscal and military reforms, fixed the permanent strength of the army at 18,000 troops in the Crown and 6,000 in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the so-called komput), curtailed the prerogatives of chancellors, hetmans, and other senior officials by subjecting them to strict parliamentary oversight, stipulated the withdrawal of Saxon troops from the Commonwealth, prohibited Saxon ministers from interfering in Polish and Lithuanian internal affairs, and limited the authority to levy taxes and raise troops. The treaty was subsequently confirmed in 1717 by the so-called Silent Sejm (Sejm Niemy). For a broader discussion, see: Z. Wójcik (ed.), Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, vol. 2 1572–1795 Warsaw 1982.

⁹ For a more detailed discussion, see W. Bednaruk, Trybunał Koronny. Szlachecki sąd najwyższy w latach 1578 –1794, Lublin 2008.

¹⁰ The composition of the Tribunals (including the Lithuanian Tribunal) comprised both clerical and lay deputies. Lay deputies were elected annually at so-called deputational sejmiki, usually in the number of one or two per voivodeship. Owing to legal differences between Greater Poland and Lesser Poland, Tribunal sessions were held separately for each province (in Lublin and Piotrków respectively, and later also in Lutsk for the eastern voivodeships). This issue is examined in greater depth in the still seminal study by O. Balzer, Geneza Trybunału Koronnego; studium z dziejów sądownictwa polskiego XVI wieku, Warsaw 1886.

¹¹ Of particular importance in this context was the long-standing dispute over the division of the Ostrogski entail This controversy became one of the principal catalysts of political division in the mid-eighteenth century. The events in question are described in greater detail, albeit in a vivid and not entirely impartial manner, in the memoirs of J. Kitowicz, Opis obyczajów za panowania Augusta III, Poznań 1840.

¹² For a broader discussion, see: J. Feldman, Stanisław Leszczyński, Warsaw 1984.

¹³ On the role and significance of the Dzików Confederation, see S. Truchim, Konfederacja dzikowska, Poznań 1921.

¹⁴ A broader discussion of this issue is provided by W. Konopczyński, Dzieje Polski nowożytnej, vol. 2.

¹⁵ A comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon is offered in W. Konopczyński’s monumental work, Konfederacja barska, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1991.

¹⁶ It should nevertheless be noted that, until the very end, the Familia sought to secure the throne for August Czartoryski. Ultimately, however, Catherine II dictated the election of Stanisław Poniatowski, whom she regarded as the most reliable guarantor of Russian interests in the Commonwealth. Cf.: K. Zienkowska, Stanisław August Poniatowski, Wrocław 2004, p. 132 ff.

¹⁷ This overview is based on the findings presented in the following studies: M. Kosman, Reformy w Polsce XVIII wieku. Warsaw 1993; S. Kieniewicz, Dzieje Polski do 1795 roku. Warsaw 1992; T. Korzon, Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisława Augusta (1764–1794), vol. 1–6, Warsaw 1897; J. Lukowski, op. cit.; Z. Zielińska, op. cit.; W. Konopczyński, Pisarze polityczni XVIII wieku, Warsaw 1966.

Political Life in the Kingdom of Poland and the Polish i Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

Wed, 18 Feb 2026 06:31:27 GMT

Authors: Michał Z. Dankowski, Grzegorz Górski

The development of constitutional institutions based on democratic mechanisms led to a marked intensification of political activity, primarily among the so-called noble nation. Until the early fifteenth century, participation in political life was largely confined to narrow circles of magnates and the higher clergy. From that point onwards, however, increasingly broad strata of the emerging noble estate became politically engaged.

In the first half of the fifteenth century, the nobility succeeded in securing from successive monarchs, most notably Ladislaus Jogaila, a series of general privileges ¹ . These culminated in the Nieszawa Privilege of 1454, issued by Casimir IV Jagiellon. This negotiated act formally recognised the constitutional role of territorial assemblies (sejmiki), thereby entrusting the noble nation with a significant degree of co-responsibility for the governance of the state ² .

The territorial assemblies, which evolved from earlier provincial gatherings (wiece), became representative bodies of the nobility residing within a given voivodeship ³ . It is important to stress that the Cerekwica–Nieszawa Privileges did not grant the nobility the right to participate in sejmiki, since this right derived from much older, pre-state traditions. Rather, the monarch confirmed and substantially strengthened the political role and representative function of the nobility in the public life of the Kingdom.

A detailed examination of the institutional foundations, organisation, and constitutional evolution of the sejmiki lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. These issues have been addressed extensively in the scholarly literature, both in synthetic studies and in specialised analyses ⁴ . For the purposes of this study, however, it is essential to identify, within the broader processes shaping the development of the sejmiki, the emergence of forms of political life that may be regarded as approximating modern democracy. From this perspective, a crucial issue is the appearance of political groupings whose activity extended beyond individual sejmik sessions and beyond matters strictly limited to local concerns.

This development was closely connected with the formation of the Sejm of the Kingdom, and later the Sejm of the Commonwealth, within which, alongside the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies emerged. The latter was composed of representatives elected by individual voivodeship (territorial) sejmiki ⁵ , rendering the selection of deputies a matter of statewide political significance.

Broadly speaking, three distinct phases may be identified in this process. During the sixteenth century, a series of developments significantly accelerated the political organisation of society in the Kingdom of Poland ⁶ .

Prior to this, during the initial phase of the emergence of noble democracy ⁷ , in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the principal axis of political division lay in the divergent interests of the Kingdom’s two main provinces: Greater Poland and Lesser Poland. This constituted the earliest and most natural framework for articulating shared political interests within the noble nation, centred primarily on the preservation of provincial distinctiveness ⁸ .

After 1505, when the constitution Nihil novi guaranteed the decisive participation of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the enactment of generally binding law within the Kingdom ⁹ , the selection of representatives for individual voivodeships became a matter of fundamental political importance for local communities. As a result of this far-reaching constitutional change, it became natural for voivodeship delegations to form supra-regional political groupings in order more effectively to defend their interests ¹⁰ .

The first phase of this process occurred at the end of the sixteenth century and was closely linked to political developments surrounding the first three royal elections. Political rivalry focused on the elections that brought Henry of Valois to the throne in 1574, Stephen Báthory in 1576, and Sigismund III Vasa in 1587. This period, spanning more than a decade, was marked by the intensive formation of political groupings advocating particular royal candidates. On one side stood the royalist and so-called “democratic” camp, led by Jan Zamoyski, who simultaneously held the two highest offices in the state: that of Grand Chancellor of the Crown and Grand Hetman of the Crown. Opposing them was the faction supporting the candidacy of a Habsburg for the Polish throne, commonly referred to as the Austrian (or Rakuszanie) party. These political alignments continued to operate, albeit with changing personal configurations, under subsequent monarchs. In practice, a degree of continuity in this pattern can also be observed during the reigns of Ladislaus IV Vasa and John II Casimir. Although the elections of the later Vasa kings did not serve, unlike the earlier interregna, as major catalysts for the emergence of new political divisions, their reigns were nevertheless characterised by tensions that generated dynamic political transformations.

A second major axis of political division, along which voivodeship delegations tended to coalesce, concerned attitudes towards the monarch and the demands of royal policy, particularly in the spheres of foreign affairs and military organisation. Here, the principal source of tension was taxation. Decisions in this area were, in many cases, directly linked to the state’s military requirements and, more specifically, to the directions of foreign policy pursued by the king. Since the financing of military campaigns depended decisively on the position adopted by the Sejm, it was within both of its chambers that increasingly distinct political divisions emerged ¹² .

A particularly important issue during the reigns of both Sigismunds was the so-called execution of the laws13. This question constituted the principal axis of political confrontation for several decades and strongly influenced the formation of more durable political groupings.

A key factor shaping the executionist movement and the associated political divide was the religious question. The spread of Protestantism among the Polish nobility in the mid-sixteenth century led to the predominance of Protestants within the faction advocating the execution of the laws. At the same time, the programme of this movement included far-reaching proposals for reforming various elements of the political and social order of the Kingdom. Opposing this faction was a political camp based primarily on the higher clergy, who formed a substantial component of the upper chamber of the Sejm – the Senate, together with a growing number of Catholic deputies. This group perceived the demands of the executionist movement as a threat that could lead to Protestant domination of the state.

Another significant factor contributing to the early formation of political factions was attitudes towards preferred alliance orientations for the Kingdom. In this sphere, a phenomenon of political corruption began to intensify at a relatively early stage. Numerous members of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies succumbed to the temptation to accept various forms of financial inducements from foreign powers. The Habsburg dynasty pursued particularly active policies in this regard, successfully recruiting a considerable number of parliamentarians into the so-called imperial party. Less powerful, though at times influential, was the faction associated with the House of Brandenburg, which was primarily concerned with securing its succession in Ducal Prussia. This option proved especially attractive to Protestant deputies from Greater Poland and Lithuania. At various times, a French party also played a role in public life. French diplomacy consistently sought opportunities to draw the Commonwealth into its broader anti-Habsburg strategies ¹⁴ .

An additional catalyst for political division was the attitude towards royal marriages, both those of reigning monarchs and those of their offspring. There is little doubt that Queen Bona’s energetic efforts to build her own political faction exerted a profound influence on the emergence of anti-royalist opposition during the reign of Sigismund the Old. A similar dynamic can be observed in connection with the marriage of Sigismund Augustus to Barbara Radziwiłł, as well as his subsequent matrimonial choices. In much the same way, this issue played a major role in mobilising opponents of the throne during the reigns of Ladislaus IV, John II Casimir, and John Sobieski. It must be emphasised that these questions were closely intertwined with political divisions arising from rivalry between Habsburg, French, and Brandenburg interests.

Finally, and no less importantly, a further factor shaping successive compositions of the Chamber of Deputies and influencing the character of the Senate was the persistent demand for constitutional reform. In this context, particular attention focused on problems of royal succession, as well as on attempts to establish clearer formal frameworks for parliamentary procedure, especially within the Chamber of Deputies, and for defining the mutual relations of the three estates of parliament: the King, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies. An important strand of these debates consisted of efforts to systematise the law and to reform the judicial system and existing court procedures.

One concept that gradually emerged from these constitutional disputes and gained increasing prominence was that of absolutum dominium ¹⁵ . The defence of established liberties and privileges against perceived attempts by the throne to strengthen royal authority led to growing political polarisation within both chambers of parliament. A crucial factor reinforcing this line of division was a process observable throughout the sixteenth century in almost all European states: the progressive marginalisation of representative bodies (parliamentary assemblies) ¹⁶ in co-decision-making on matters of general state importance. This tendency ultimately resulted in the emergence of absolutist models of government across much of Europe ¹⁷ . Seen in this broader context, the anxieties expressed by Polish political circles were by no means unfounded. It should also be noted that the most significant perceived threat associated with absolutum dominium was linked to Habsburg – or more broadly, German – influence. It is striking that opponents of these absolutist tendencies readily aligned themselves with French policy and, for reasons that are not entirely clear, failed to perceive a comparable danger emanating from that direction.

Until the death of Sigismund II Augustus, these tensions gave rise to two relatively stable political camps: the court party and the anti-court party. A third grouping of comparable durability may be identified in the supporters of the execution of the laws. Each of these groupings articulated a distinct political programme, which it sought to implement by securing majority support in both chambers of the Sejm. At this stage, however, these factions possessed no permanent organisational structures, generally did not formulate written political programmes (although the executionist movement maintained a systematically revised list of demands), and were characterised, owing to a variety of factors, by considerable fluidity in their personal composition. Leadership within these camps was likewise unstable. In this sense, they may be described as largely improvised and formed on an ad hoc basis. At the same time, this distinctive flexibility facilitated the achievement, especially in moments of crisis, of the so-called “general consensus” ¹⁸ , without which effective decision-making by the estates represented in the Sejm was impossible.

The decisive turning point that dramatically intensified political life and accelerated the formation of political factions was the death of Sigismund II Augustus. As a consequence, the principle of the elective monarchy became an unquestioned constitutional foundation of the state ¹⁹ . What is particularly significant is that, already at the first election, it was established that the king would be chosen through a viritim election ²⁰ . This meant that every member of the noble nation was entitled to participate personally in the election of the monarch. Since three royal elections followed in relatively rapid succession, these events became a powerful catalyst for political polarisation.

The key factor shaping the first election and the choice of Henry of Valois was the issue of religious tolerance. The early decades of the second half of the sixteenth century witnessed decisive advances by the Catholic Reformation, while internal conflicts and doctrinal divisions within the Protestant camp significantly weakened its political position. The incorporation of the Ruthenian voivodeships into the Crown in 1569 further intensified discontent among the Orthodox population, who feared an aggressive Catholic campaign in those territories ²¹ . Disputes surrounding these issues crystallised into two principal political camps: Catholic and non-Catholic. The outcome of this confrontation was the Sandomierz Agreement ²² and, subsequently, the Warsaw Confederation ²³ . An additional factor influencing Henry’s election was the widespread conviction that Habsburg candidates embodied, on the one hand, a pronounced inclination towards absolutum dominium and, on the other, an overtly hostile attitude towards religious dissenters. It is noteworthy that those dissenters who supported Henry failed to perceive any comparable danger in his experience of operating within a political system no less centralised than that of the Habsburgs ²⁴ . Even more strikingly, they did not interpret his involvement in the violent religious conflicts in France, including the recent massacre of Protestants during the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, as a threat to their own interests.

The political alignments formed during this election survived largely unchanged until the subsequent election of Stephen Báthory. By that time, the undisputed leader of the anti-Habsburg (or “Austrian”) camp had become the hetman and chancellor Jan Zamoyski. It was Zamoyski’s energetic intervention that led to the proclamation of the Transylvanian prince, initially regarded as an unlikely candidate, as King of Poland. The political camp constructed by Zamoyski played a decisive role during the reign of King Stephen.

Following the king’s unexpected death, Jan Zamoyski undertook vigorous efforts to secure his own election to the throne. These ambitions, however, were thwarted by the prevailing political climate, which proved unfavourable both to the idea of electing a so-called “Piast” (the contemporary term for a domestic candidate) and, in particular, to Zamoyski himself. This situation brought about a profound reconfiguration of the political landscape. Zamoyski was pushed into deep political defensiveness, and his death in 1605 further accelerated the disintegration of the so-called “chancellery” faction ²⁵ .

Against this background, a major factor shaping the dynamics of political life in this period was the so-called Zborowski affair ²⁶ . As a result of the prolonged conflict between King Sigismund III and Jan Zamoyski, together with their respective political camps, a serious political crisis erupted after the chancellor’s death in the form of the Zebrzydowski rebellion ²⁷ , which proved to be a pivotal event, exerting a lasting influence on the practical functioning of political life in both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the first half of the seventeenth century ²⁸ .

As noted above, the elections of Władysław IV and John II Casimir attracted intense interest from foreign courts, most notably those of the Habsburgs, France, Russia, and Prussia, but did not give rise to durable political factions. Instead, what emerged were temporary cliques rather than stable political formations. A leading role in shaping these groupings was played by the reigning monarchs themselves, in conjunction with a small number of increasingly powerful magnate families. The scale of external interference in the political life of the Commonwealth led, following the abdication of John II Casimir, to a pronounced tendency to favour the election of “national” Piast rulers. Nevertheless, the circles promoting, successively, the candidacies of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, John III Sobieski, and Stanisław Leszczyński arose on an ad hoc basis and lacked any durability comparable to that of the political groupings that had existed a century earlier.

An additional factor contributing to the deterioration of political life during this period was the increasingly pathological use of the liberum veto ²⁹ . It should be noted that its entrenchment was significantly facilitated by its repeated exploitation under both John II Casimir and John III Sobieski, who, through their supporters, also resorted to the deliberate disruption of parliamentary sessions.

¹ These consisted of three royal acts: the Czerwińsk Privilege of 1422, the Warta Statute of 1423, and the Jedlnia–Kraków Privilege of 1430–1433. For the texts of these privileges, see: S. Kutrzeba, Historja źródeł dawnego prawa polskiego, vol. 1, Lviv– Warsaw–Kraków 1925, p. 79–82.

² Seeking to encourage the nobility to participate in the war against the Teutonic Order, Casimir IV Jagiellon undertook not to summon the pospolite ruszenie (noble levy), impose new taxes, or enact new laws without the consent of the territorial assemblies (sejmiki). This commitment was made to the nobility of Greater Poland at Cerekwica and to the nobility of Lesser Poland at Nieszawa. For a broader discussion of the origins of these privileges, see: M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1454–1466, Warsaw 1967.

³ On the institution of the territorial assemblies (sejmiki), see above all the synthesis by W. Kriegseisen, Sejmiki Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVII i XVIII wieku, Warsaw 1991, as well as numerous monographs published over the past three decades devoted to the activity of individual assemblies. Still of fundamental importance are the classic works by A. Pawiński: Rządy sejmikowe w Polsce 1572–1795: na tle stosunków województw kujawskich, Warsaw 1888; and Sejmiki ziemskie: początek ich i rozwój aż do ustalenia się udziału posłów ziemskich w ustawodawstwie sejmu walnego 1374–1505, Warsaw 1895.

⁴ An extensive overview of the scholarly literature is provided, inter alia, in: R. Kozyrski, Sejmiki województw Małopolski właściwej 1572–1648 – stan badań, organizacja, specyfika sejmikowa, propozycje badawcze, “Miscellanea Historico–Iuridica” 2022, vol. 21, issue 1 https:// repozytorium.uwb.edu.pl/jspui/bitstream/11320/14756/1/MHI_21_1_R_Kozyrski_Sejmiki_wojewodztw_Malopolski.pdf [accessed on:

16.08. 2025]. Among recent works, notable examples include: R. Kozyrski, Sejmik szlachecki ziemi chełmskiej 1648–1717, Lublin 2006; A. Król, Sejmik ziem lwowskiej, przemyskiej i sanockiej w Sądowej Wiszni za panowania Wazów (1587–1668), Przemyśl 2023; K. Mazur, W stronę integracji z Koroną. Sejmiki Wołynia i Ukrainy w latach 1569–1648, Warsaw 2006; J. Stolicki, Sejmiki województw ukrainnych podczas wygnania 1648–1700, Kraków 2023; J. Ternes, Sejmik chełsmki za Wazów (1587–1668), Lublin 2004; M. Ujma, Sejmik lubelski 1572–1696, Warsaw 2003; Zwierzykowski M., Samorząd sejmikowy województw poznańskiego i kaliskiego w latach 1696–1732, Poznań 2010, as well as the somewhat earlier study by S. Achremczyk, Życie sejmikowe Prus Królewskich w latach 1647–1772, Olsztyn 1999; J. Choińska-Mika, Sejmiki mazowieckie doby Wazów, Warsaw 1998; A. Filipczak-Kocur, Sejmik sieradzki za Wazów (1587–1668), Opole 1989; Z. Naworski, Sejmik generalny Prus Królewskich 1569–1772. Organizacja i funkcjonowanie na tle zgromadzeń stanowych prowincji, Toruń 1992; S. Płaza, Sejmiki i zjazdy szlacheckie województw poznańskiego i kaliskiego. Ustrój i funkcjonowanie (1572–1632), Warsaw–Kraków 1984; S. Płaza, Sejmiki i zjazdy szlacheckie województwa sieradzkiego. Ustrój i funkcjonowanie (1572–1632), Warsaw–Kraków 1987; A.B. Zakrzewski, Sejmiki Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XVI–XVIII w. Ustrój i funkcjonowanie: sejmik trocki, Warsaw 2000.

⁵ Individual voivodeships and lands customarily sent a fixed number of deputies, generally from one to six. Initially, this had little practical significance, since the Chamber adopted its positions by the consent of individual voivodeships (lands) rather than by counting individual votes. Only in the seventeenth century did the role of individual deputies increase, as a result of the pathological evolution of the institution of liberum veto. A detailed discussion of this process is provided by M.Z. Dankowski, Liberum Veto – chluba czy przekleństwo, Toruń 2019. Formally, the number of deputies amounted to 204, although in practice approximately 190 attended parliamentary sessions, as some deputies from Royal Prussia were merely titular and remained at home. Cf.: S. Ochmann- Staniszewska, Z. Staniszewski, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy. Prawo – doktryna – praktyka, vol. 2, Wrocław 2000, p. 25–27.

⁶ To a lesser extent and with some delay, this process also occurred in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This situation resulted from the far greater influence exerted on political life in the Grand Duchy by powerful aristocratic families, which clearly dominated the Lithuanian nobility. Only after the Union of Lublin did a partial revival and activation of the broader Lithuanian noble estate occur; even then, however, political life in the Grand Duchy remained markedly less developed than in the Crown. Cf.: J. Bardach, Studia z ustroju i prawa Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XIV–XVII w., Białystok 1970, p. 11–67.

⁷ The revival of political activity associated with the war against the Teutonic Order in 1409–1411 already transcended the previously established framework of political participation. Until that point, political processes had been shaped almost exclusively by secular and ecclesiastical magnates. In this respect, the magnate elites of Lesser Poland had exercised particularly strong influence, a situation that had persisted since the thirteenth century. The early fifteenth century, however, brought about a fundamental change. Through the growing activity of local assemblies (sejmiki), institutionally reinforced by the privileges granted by Ladislaus Jogaila and Casimir IV Jagiellon, broad segments of the emerging noble nation were drawn into co-decision-making in public affairs. Cf.: W. Kriegseisen, op. cit., p. 17–25.

⁸ This affected not only internal political relations, most notably the maintenance of a relative balance of influence between the elites of the two principal provinces, but also the sphere of foreign policy. It shaped divergent perceptions of external threats and differing orientations in the search for international alliances. On the origins of this division, see: G. Labuda, W sprawie pochodzenia nazw: Wielkopolska i Małopolska, “Przegląd Zachodni” 1954, no. 5–6, p. 114–119.

⁹ For a recent interpretation of the significance of the Nihil novi constitution, see: W. Uruszczak, “Sejm walny wszystkich państw naszych”: konstytucja Nihil novi i sejm w Radomiu w 1505 roku, Radom 2005.

¹⁰ It is noteworthy that, at the same time, the so-called general assemblies (sejmiki generalne), which had previously served as forums for coordinating the political positions of individual provinces, also entered a period of decline. This development constituted a significant consequence of the constitutional transformation brought about by the legislation of 1505. The sole enduring exception was the general assembly of Royal Prussia. Cf.: Z. Naworski, op. cit. In exceptional circumstances, the general assembly of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was also revived prior to the general Sejm of 1685. Cf. R. Kołodziej, Litewski sejmik generalny w Słonimiu na tle sytuacji w Rzeczypospolitej przed sejmem 1685 roku, “Res Historica” 2015, no. 40, p. 97–113.

¹¹ Among the extensive scholarly literature on this subject, particular attention should be drawn to the following works: S. Grzybowski, Jan Zamoyski, Warszawa 1994 and W. Sokołowski, Politycy schyłku złotego wieku. Małopolscy przywódcy szlachty i parlamentarzyści w latach 1574–1605, Warsaw 1997.

¹² Fiscal issues in this period are discussed, inter alia, in: A. Filipczak-Kocur, Skarb litewski za pierwszych dwóch Wazów 1587–1648, Wrocław 1994.

¹³ A synthetic overview of the significance of the executionist movement for the development of political life, particularly within the Crown, is provided by W. Konopczyński, Dzieje Polski Nowożytnej. Volume 1: 1506–1648, Warsaw–Kraków–Łódź–Poznań–Vilnius–Zakopane 1936. Among more recent studies, see E. Nowak-Jamróz, Naprawić Rzeczypospolitą. Postulaty szlacheckie z lat 1533–1570, Piotrków Trybunalski 2021. This work also contains an extensive bibliography on the subject.

¹⁴ To date, no comprehensive monograph has been devoted to the activities of political factions in the Commonwealth connected with foreign courts.. Fragmentary information on this topic may be found in studies devoted to particular sessions of the general Sejm, as well as in partial analyses of court and opposition factions operating within specific regions of the state.

¹⁵ Absolutum dominium was an abstract concept, encompassing in essence everything that was regarded as contrary to the apologetically construed “noble liberty”. In its initial phase, this perceived threat was identified with the model of authority exercised by the Habsburgs and, in effect, carried a strong anti-German undertone. Cf.: M.Z. Dankowski, Strach przed absolutum dominium przyczyną destabilizacji parlamentarnej Rzeczypospolitej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, in: A. Korytko, B. Krysztopa-Czupryńska (ed.), W Rzeczypospolitej Wazów i Królów Rodaków, Warsaw 2025, p. 227–248.

¹⁶ The process of the “extinguishing” of representative assemblies in practice affected nearly all European states. For a broader discussion of this process, see G. Górski, Historia ustrojów państw, Warsaw 2001.

¹⁷ The deeper causes of these processes, reaching back to institutional solutions that emerged as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, are examined in an insightful study by J. Górska-Szymczak, op. cit.

¹⁸ At the time, deliberations in the Chamber of Deputies were dominated by the practice of “forging a consensus”, which consisted in securing an overwhelming majority in support of a given issue while marginalising small minorities. For a broader discussion, see I. Lewandowska–Malec, Sejm walny koronny Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów i jego dorobek ustawodawczy, Kraków 2009.

¹⁹ In fact, the elective character of the Kraków throne had already been in operation since the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Cf.: K. Baczkowski, “Panowie przyrodzeni” a elekcyjność tronu w Polsce średniowiecznej, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego” 2008, MCCXCI, Prace Historyczne

no. 135, p. 53-63. This principle was subsequently consolidated, although initially it was limited to elections conducted within the Piast dynasty and later the Jagiellonian dynasty. Crucially, however, the act of election remained confined to a narrow circle of the magnate elite, particularly that of Lesser Poland. A fundamental constitutional transformation occurred only after the death of Sigismund II Augustus, when the right of every free nobleman to participate in the election of the king was formally recognised.

²⁰ The viritim election denoted precisely this universality of active suffrage exercised by the entire nobility in the royal election. For a broader discussion, see I. Lewandowska-Malec, Wolna elekcja króla Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, “Z Dziejów Prawa” 2019, vol. 12 (20), p. 147–162.

²¹ This issue had, in principle, been regulated following the incorporation of Red Ruthenia into the Kingdom of Poland by Casimir the Great in the mid-fourteenth century. Owing to his decisions, the Kingdom of Poland became, on a European scale, a unique bi-confessional state, in which two state religions were de facto accepted, alongside an unprecedented level of tolerance toward Jews. Cf.: A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w dziejach Rzeczypospolitej, “Elpis” 1999, no. 1 (14), p. 90–91.

²² The Sandomierz Agreement of 1570 constituted an accord among Lutherans, Calvinists, and the Bohemian Brethren. It provided for the mutual recognition of sacraments and for coordinated action against the Catholic Reformation. For a detailed analysis, see K. Długosz-Kurczabowa, Konfesja Sandomierska. Warsaw 2001.

²³ The Act of the Warsaw Confederation of 1573 guaranteed unconditional and perpetual peace within the Commonwealth among those “divided by religion” (dissidentes in religione), prohibited the initiation of conflict under any religious pretext, and granted the nobility the right to determine the confession of their subjects. On the significance of this act, see Konfederacja warszawska 1573 roku wielka karta polskiej tolerancji, ed. M. Korolko, J. Tazbir, Warsaw 1980.

²⁴ See the remarks on this issue in: G. Górski, Historia ustrojów państw…

²⁵ For a broader discussion, see: V. Urbaniak, Zamoyszczycy bez Zamoyskiego. Studium dekompozycji ugrupowania politycznego, Warsaw 1995.

²⁶ Samuel Zborowski, a member of one of the most powerful magnate families of the period, killed the nobleman Wapowski during a brawl. Owing to the involvement of King Stephen Báthory and Jan Zamoyski, he was sentenced to death, and the sentence was carried out as a result of Zamoyski’s determination. The case became the focal point of political conflict in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth during the 1580s. Cf.: S. Grzybowski, op. cit., p. 161–178.

²⁷ The initiator of the rebellion was Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, Voivode of Kraków, around whom opponents of King Sigismund III rallied. The rebels’ principal slogan was resistance to the aforementioned absolutum dominium. The king was accused of seeking to centralise power on a model inspired by Habsburg practices. Insightful observations on this issue may be found in: H. Wisner, Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego albo sandomierski: cezura epizod z dziejów walk politycznych początki XVII wieku, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1983, vol. 90, no. 3.

²⁸ One consequence of the Zebrzydowski rebellion was the clarification of the formal conditions governing the exercise of the right of resistance against the ruler, that is, the so-called privilege of de non praestanda oboedientia, in the constitution adopted in 1609 (VL 2, p. 462–463). This act specified the principles under which the lawful withdrawal of obedience to the reigning monarch would henceforth be permissible. Cf.: E. Opaliński, Kultura polityczna szlachty polskiej w latach 1587–1652, Warsaw 1995, p. 43 ff.

²⁹ A broader discussion of this issue is provided in the previously cited study by: M. Z. Dankowski, Liberum Veto – chluba czy przekleństwo.

The Establishment and Development of the Network of Counties from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Century

Tue, 17 Feb 2026 09:02:24 GMT

Authors: Michał Z. Dankowski, Stanisław Górski

As indicated above, the administrative reforms implemented during the reign of Casimir the Great proved exceptionally durable. The fundamental territorial division into two provinces – Lesser Poland and Greater Poland – acquired a significance extending beyond the history of the medieval Kingdom of Poland and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Notably, many of the territorial units established at that time, organised around local administrative centres, survived the period of the partitions following the collapse of Polish statehood. Subsequently, these units continued to function in the reborn Second Polish Republic after 1918. They also persisted during the period of the Polish People’s Republic until the administrative reform of 1975. Finally, they were re-established within the Third Polish Republic as a result of the comprehensive reorganisation of the state’s administrative structure carried out in 1998.

According to the definition proposed by the pioneer of research into the history of Polish administration, Zygmunt Gloger, the term powiat (county) denotes “a group of opola (i.e. neighbouring villages and agricultural settlements, surrounded and interconnected by fields – author’s note), which jointly held assemblies and courts, and were notified and convened to deal with matters of common concern.” The etymology of the term is linked to the words wiec (assembly), powiecać (to summon), and powiadamiać się (to notify one another). In their original form, counties performed administrative, judicial, and defensive functions ¹ .

It is therefore appropriate to examine the process by which the original network of counties took shape. The analysis begins with the two principal provinces of the Kingdom – Greater Poland and Lesser Poland – and then turns to those territories that were later incorporated into the Kingdom and subsequently into the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, namely Masovia and Royal Prussia ² , as well as to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in its territorial configuration following the Union of Lublin. As an illustrative point of departure, the territorial configuration of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1619 has been adopted. This date marks the recovery of the Smolensk lands following the Truce of Deulino with the Tsardom of Russia ³ . At that time, the Commonwealth also encompassed Livonia and the territory of Courland ⁴ .

Figure 1. The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the early seventeenth century, showing the contemporary administrative division into voivodeships, lands, and counties. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1619, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_I_Rzeczypospolitej [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

An additional map illustrates the division of the Polish–Lithuanian state during this period into provinces, with voivodeships and lands indicated.

Figure 2. Division of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into provinces. Source: Wikemedia Commons, Administrative provinces of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plik:Prowincje_I_RP.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Counties in Lesser Poland

In Lesser Poland, during the initial phase of the province’s existence, up to the incorporation of Red Ruthenia by Casimir the Great, three voivodeships were established: Kraków Voivodeship, Sandomierz Voivodeship, and Lublin Voivodeship.

In the Kraków Voivodeship, at the close of the fourteenth century, only three counties were in operation: Kraków, Proszowice, and Żarnowiec. During the sixteenth century, however, a series of administrative changes led to a significant reorganisation of the county network. As a result, the following counties were in existence: Proszowice, Lelów, Szczyrzyc, Książ, Sącz, Biecz, and the so-called Silesian County, which encompassed the Duchies of Zator and Oświęcim ⁵ . In addition, two ecclesiastical territorial units were situated within the boundaries of the voivodeship: the Muszyna Starosty (also referred to as the Muszyna State) and the Sławków Starosty. Ultimately, by the second half of the seventeenth century, a stable administrative structure had emerged, comprising the following counties: Proszowice, Lelów, Książ, Szczyrzyc, Sącz, Biecz, and Silesian County.

Figure 3. Kraków Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa krakowskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/wojewodztwo-krakowskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Sandomierz Voivodeship comprised territories divided into the following counties: Sandomierz, Wiślica, Pilzno, Radom, Opoczno, Chęciny, Szydłów (until 1465), and Tarnów (until 1465), as well as the Stężyca Land. The latter, although administratively part of the Sandomierz Voivodeship, was not subdivided into counties and functioned as a separate territorial unit.

Figure 4. Sandomierz Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa sandomierskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne.exgeo. pl/korona/wojewodztwo-sandomierskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 13.12.2025].

Figure 5. Lublin Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa lubelskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/woje- wodztwo-lubelskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Lublin Voivodeship was established in 1474, when King Casimir IV Jagiellon separated it from the Sandomierz Voivodeship ⁶ . It comprised the following counties: Lublin, Urzędów, Kurów (in existence until 1465), and Parczew (in existence until 1465), as well as the Łuków Land ⁷ .

In the mid-fourteenth century, additional voivodeships created by King Casimir the Great in Red Ruthenia – territories incorporated into the Crown – were also included within the Province of Lesser Poland ⁸ . As a result of their constitutional and administrative organisation, three principal units were initially formed: the Ruthenian Voivodeship, the Bełz Voivodeship, and the Chełm Land (voivodeship).

The Ruthenian Voivodeship initially consisted of four territorial units with the status of lands: Sanok, Przemyśl, Halych, and Lviv ⁹ . In the seventeenth century, these units formally acquired the designation of counties.

Figure 6. Ruthenian Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Ruthenian Voivodeship in the seventeenth century, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-ruskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Bełz Voivodeship was incorporated into the Crown in 1462, having previously existed as a fief of the Masovian dukes ¹⁰ . Within its boundaries, the following counties were established: Bełz, Grabowiec, Horodło, Lubaczów, and the Busk Land.

Figure 7. Bełz Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa bełskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regiony- historyczne.exgeo.pl/korona/wojewodztwo-belskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Finally, within the Chełm Land, five counties were initially created: Chełm, Krasnystaw, Hrubieszów, Luboml, and Ratno. After 1465, only two counties remained: Chełm and Krasnystaw ¹¹ . Over time, Chełm Land came to be referred to in official documents as a voivodeship, as it functioned as an autonomous administrative unit vis-à-vis the Ruthenian Voivodeship and possessed, inter alia, its own regional assembly (sejmik). Only in the early sixteenth century was Chełm Land definitively incorporated into the Ruthenian Voivodeship, under circumstances that remain only partially clarified ¹² .

Figure 8. Chełm Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa chełmskiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ ziemia-chelmska-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Following the death of Vytautas the Great in 1430, the Duchy of Podolia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland. After a series of conflicts with Vytautas’s successor, Švitrigaila, the region was definitively integrated into the Crown in 1437. Three years earlier, the Podolian Voivodeship had already been established ¹³ . This voivodeship comprised three counties: Kamieniec, Latyczów, and Czerwonogród.

As a result of the resolutions adopted at the Union of Lublin in 1569, several territories were transferred from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Crown. These included the Kyiv Duchy, where the Kyiv Voivodeship was created, as well as the Volhynian Land, which was organised into the Volhynian and Bracław Voivodeships. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the Chernihiv Voivodeship also existed. At the same Lublin Sejm, Podlasie was likewise incorporated into the Crown; this region is discussed separately below ¹⁴ .

The Volhynian Voivodeship was divided into three counties: Łuck, Włodzimierz, and Krzemieniec.

The Bracław Voivodeship, established in 1566 and incorporated into the Crown three years later ¹⁵ , comprised two counties: Bracław and Winnica.

The extensive Kyiv Voivodeship was similarly divided into three counties: Kyiv, Żytomierz, and Owrucz ¹⁶ .

Figure 9. Division of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into voivodeships in 1619, showing the Volhynian, Podolian, Bracław, and Kyiv Voivodeships. Source: Wikimedia Commons, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Administrative division, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_I_ Rzeczypospolitej#/media/Plik: Podzia%C5%82_administracyjny_I_ RP.svg [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Counties in Greater Poland

Greater Poland – the cradle of Polish statehood – initially comprised two historically principal lands: Poznań and Kalisz. As early as the first half of the fourteenth century, both acquired the status of voivodeships. In 1768, at the request of King Stanisław August Poniatowski, the Gniezno Voivodeship was separated from the northern part of the Kalisz Voivodeship.

Within the Poznań Voivodeship, the following counties functioned: Poznań, Kościan, Wałcz, and the Wschowa Land.

Figure 10. Poznań Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa poznańskiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-poznanskie-xvi-xviii-w--mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025 ].

Figure 11. Kalisz Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa kaliskiego w XVII wieku https://www.regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/wo- jewodztwo-kaliskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

For most of the period under consideration, the Kalisz Voivodeship was divided into six counties: Kalisz, Konin, Pyzdry, Gniezno, Kcynia, and Nakło. From the latter three, the Gniezno Voivodeship was subsequently formed. In the final years of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Środa County was additionally established (from 1791) ¹⁷ .

Over time, the Greater Poland Province also came to include the voivodeships of Sieradz, Łęczyca, Brześć

Kujawski, and Inowrocław. These lands – remnants of former Piast duchies from the period of territorial fragmentation – formed a natural link between core Greater Poland and Lesser Poland. Their transformation into voivodeships took place during the reign of Casimir the Great.

Within the Łęczyca Voivodeship, the counties of Łęczyca, Orłów, Brzozów, and (from 1791) Inowłódz were established.

Figure 12. Łęczyca Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa łęczyckiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-leczyckie-xvi-xviii-w--mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Sieradz Voivodeship comprised four counties: Sieradz, Szadek, Piotrków, and Radomsko. The Wieluń Land, which formed part of this voivodeship, was further divided into the Wieluń and Ostrzeszów Counties ¹⁸

Finally, the Brześć Kujawski Voivodeship was subdivided into five counties: Brześć, Kowal, Kruszwica, Przedecz, and Radziejów.

Figure 13. Sieradz Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa sieradzkiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-sieradzkie-xvi-xviii-w--mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Figure 14. Brześć Kujawski Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa wojewódz- twa brzesko-kujawskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne. exgeo.pl/korona/wojewodztwo-brze- sko-kujawskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

In the Inowrocław Voivodeship, the territorial division comprised the Bydgoszcz County and the Inowrocław County, as well as the Dobrzyń Land. The latter was subdivided into three counties: Rypin, Lipno, and Dobrzyń ¹⁹ .

Figure 15. Inowrocław Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa inowrocławskiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne.exgeo. pl/korona/wojewodztwo-inowroclawskie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Counties in Masovia

From the period of territorial fragmentation onwards, Masovia long remained outside the borders of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland. As successive branches of the Masovian Piast dynasty became extinct, individual lands were gradually incorporated into the Polish state. The process was completed in 1526 ²⁰ . Following the administrative changes introduced by the Union of Lublin in 1569, Masovia was assigned to the Greater Poland Province. In the form shaped by earlier structural developments within the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the region comprised three voivodeships: Masovia, Płock, and Rawa, encompassing a total of thirty-three counties.

Within the Masovian Voivodeship, ten lands functioned as intermediate administrative units between the voivodeship and the county: Ciechanów, Czersk, Liw, Łomża, Nur, Różan, Warsaw, Wizna, Wyszogród, and Zakroczym.

The Ciechanów Land consisted of three counties: Ciechanów, Przasnysz, and Sąchock.

The Czersk Land likewise comprised three counties: Czersk (also known as Garwolin), Grójec, and Warka.

The Łomża Land included four counties: Łomża, Kolno, Ostrołęka, and Zambrów. The Nur Land was divided into three counties: Nur, Kamieńczyk, and Ostrów.

The Różan Land comprised two counties: Różan and Maków. The Warsaw Land included three counties: Warsaw, Błonie, and Tarczyn.

A similar number of counties existed in the Wizna Land: Wizna, Radziłów, and Wąsosz. The Zakroczym Land consisted of two counties: Zakroczym and Nowe Miasto.

Finally, the Liw Land and the Wyszogród Land were not subdivided into counties.

Figure 16. Masovian Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa mazo- wieckiego w XVII wieku, https://www.re- gionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/woje- wodztwo-mazowieckie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 12.2025].

Figure 17. Płock Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa płockiego w XVII wieku, https://www.regionyhistoryczne. exgeo.pl/korona/wojewodztwo--plockie-xvi-xviii-w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Within the Płock Voivodeship, the following counties were established: Płock, Bielsk, Raciąż, Sierpc, Płońsk, Szreńsk, Niedzborz, and Mława.

It should be noted that the counties of Szreńsk, Niedzbórz, and Mława together formed the so-called Zawkrze Land.

The Rawa Voivodeship exhibited a more complex territorial structure. It was divided into three lands, each further subdivided into two counties.

The Rawa Land comprised the Rawa and Biała counties. The Gostynin Land consisted of the Gostynin and Gąbin counties. The Sochaczew Land was divided into the Sochaczew and Mszczonów counties.

Figure 18. Rawa Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Rawa Voivodeship, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Ziemia_rawska [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Counties in Royal Prussia

Like Masovia, Royal Prussia was incorporated into the Greater Poland Province under the provisions of the Union of Lublin. It was divided into three voivodeships: Pomeranian, Chełmno, and Malbork ²¹ . In addition, Warmia constituted a separate ecclesiastical territory, known as the Dominium of Warmia, administered by Catholic bishops ²² .

The Pomeranian Voivodeship comprised the following counties: Tczew, Człuchów, Tuchola, Świecie, Mirachowo, Puck, Nowe, and Gdańsk. In addition, certain territories, particularly in the Vistula delta, were administered directly by the city of Gdańsk ²³ .

Figure 19. Pomeranian Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa pomorskiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-pomorskie-xvi-xviii--w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

The Chełmno Voivodeship comprised only two counties—Chełmno and Michałowo—as well as territories administered directly by the city of Toruń ²⁴ .

Figure 20. Pomeranian Voivodeship in the seventeenth century. Source: Regiony historyczne, Mapa województwa pomorskiego w XVII wieku, https://www. regionyhistoryczne.exgeo.pl/korona/ wojewodztwo-chelminskie-xvi-xviii--w-mapy [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

Finally, the Malbork Voivodeship likewise consisted of two counties: Malbork and Sztum.

Figure 21. Malbork Voivodeship and the Duchy of Warmia in the seventeenth century. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Malbork Voivodeship and the Prince-Bishopric of Warmia in the seventeenth century, https://pl.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Wojew%C3%B3dztwo_malborskie [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

By contrast, the Dominium of Warmia, also known as the Duchy of Warmia, did not possess an internal county structure (the territory of the Duchy is visible on the map above).

Counties in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

Over successive periods, a varying number of voivodeships formed part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Throughout the entire existence of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, these included the voivodeships of Vilnius, Trakai, Nowogródek, Brześć Litewski, Podlasie, Samogitia, Minsk, Mstislav, Vitebsk, and Polotsk. Until 1569, the Duchy also comprised the Volhynian, Kyiv, and Bracław Voivodeships, while the Chernihiv and Smolensk Voivodeships formed part of its territory for limited periods.

The voivodeships permanently incorporated into the Commonwealth contained the following counties and lands:

Vilnius Voivodeship: Vilnius, Ashmyany, Lida, and Braslaw;
Trakai Voivodeship: Trakai, Kaunas, Upytė, and Ukmergė;
Novogrudok Voivodeship: Novogrudok, Slonim, and Volkovysk;
Brest Voivodeship: Brest, Kobryn, and Pinsk;
Podlasie Voivodeship: Drohiczyn, Mielnik, and Bielsk;
Samogitian Voivodeship: the lands of Raseiniai, Šiauliai, and Telšiai;
Minsk Voivodeship: Minsk, Rechitsa, and Mozyr;
Mstislav Voivodeship: Mstislav and Krychev;
Vitebsk Voivodeship: Vitebsk and Orsha;
Polotsk Voivodeship: Polotsk and Dzisna ²⁵ .

Figure 22. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the mid-seventeenth century, showing the voivodeships then forming part of the province. Source: Wikimedia Commons, The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the midseventeenth century, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wojew%C3%B3dztwo_brzeskolitewskie#/media/Plik:Brest-Litovsk_Voivodeship_within_Lithuania_in_the_17th_century.png [accessedon: 14.12.2025].

Overall, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, more than 150 counties and lands functioned within the voivodeships permanently forming part of the Commonwealth. These units differed markedly in terms of territorial size, population, and internal administrative organisation.

1 Z. Gloger, Geografia historyczna ziem dawnej Polski, Kraków 1903, p. 131–132.

2 As a consequence of the resolutions of the Lublin Sejm of 1569, both regions were customarily classified as part of the Greater Poland Province. Cf.: Z. Gloger, op. cit., p. 81–82.

3 For a detailed discussion, see: A. Małow, Dokumenty polsko-rosyjskiego rozejmu zawartego 11 (1) XII 1618 r. we wsi Dywilino, “Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny” 2020, vol. XVII, no. 2, p. 7–100.

4 Both territories were incorporated into the Commonwealth following the secularisation of the Order of the Sword Brothers in 1561. Livonia (excluding its northern part – Estonia) became joint property of Poland and Lithuania under the Treaty of Stettin of 1570, which ended the First Northern War. The southern part of the former monastic state became a fief of the Commonwealth known as the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia. The region’s administrative system was established by the constitution “Ordynacya Ziemie Inflantckiey” at the Sejm of 1598 (Volumina Legum, vol. 2 [1550–1609], ed. J. Ohryzko, St Petersburg 1859, pp. 377–378), later amended by the constitution “Ordynacya Xięstwa Inflantskiego” of 1677, following the loss of much of the territory after 1620 and the creation of a single Livonian voivodeship from its south-eastern part (so-called Polish Livonia; Volumina Legum, vol. 5 [1669–1696], ed.

J. Ohryzko, St Petersburg 1860, p. 237).

5 For an analysis of the formation of the political system of this region, see: A. Nowakowski, Dzieje ustroju i prawa księstw Oświęciomskiego i Zatorskiego,

Białystok 1988.

6 Cf. K. Myśliński, Geneza i znaczenie powołania woj. lubelskiego w 1474 r., “Rocznik Lubelski” 1973, vol. 16, p. 9-25.

7 A broader analysis of these divisions and their evolution is provided in: K. Chłapowski, Granice i podziały administracyjne Królestwa Polskiego i Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w XV–XVIII wieku. “Studia Geohistorica” 2019, no. 7, p. 165–189 and Z. Gloger, op. cit., p. 172–200.

8 J. Szyszka, Kształtowanie się podziałów terytorialnych Rusi Czerwonej na przykładzie ziemi lwowskiej, “Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechne” 2011, no. 3 (7), p. 120–140.

9 Z. Gloger, op. cit., p. 211–220.

10 For a broader discussion of the origins and organisation of the Bełz Voivodeship, see: A. Janeczek, Osadnictwo pogranicza polsko-ruskiego. Województwo bełskie od schyłku XIV do początku XVII w., Warsaw 1993, p. 21–34.

11 Z. Gloger, op. cit., p. 220–223.

12 W. Ćwik, J. Reder, Rozwój administracyjno-terytorialny ziemi chełmskiej, [in:] J. Willaume (ed.), Ziemia chełmska. Materiały z sesji naukowej historyków odbytej w Chełmie 21 VI 1959 r., Lublin 1961.

13 A broader treatment is provided in the monumental classic study by: O. Halecki, Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej, vol. 1: W wiekach średniach, Kraków

14 O ziemi podlaskiey. Przywiley przywrócenia ziemie podlaskiey do Korony Polskiey, VL 2, p. 77–80.

15 As stated in the act of incorporation of the Volhynian Land into the Crown. VL 2, p. 81.

16 For a more detailed discussion of the administrative divisions of the Ukrainian voivodeships, see: W. Bobiński, Województwo kijowskie w czasach Zygmunta III Wazy: studium osadnictwa i stosunków własności ziemskiej, Warsaw 2000.

17 Z. Gloger, op. cit., s. 80 ff.

18 H. Rutkowski, Podziały administracyjne. Granice państwowych jednostek terytorialnych, in: H. Rutkowski (ed.), Atlas historyczny Polski. Województwo sieradzkie i województwo łęczyckie w drugiej połowie XVI wieku. Część II. Komentarz. Indeksy, Warsaw 1998, p. 26.

19 For a broader discussion of these issues, see: A. Gąsiorowski, Powiat w Wielkopolsce XIV–XVI wieku: z zagadnień zarządu terytorialnego i podziałów Polski późnośredniowiecznej, Poznań 1965.

20 For a broader discussion of the administrative division of Masovia prior to its incorporation into the Crown, see: B. Sobol, Sejm i sejmiki ziemskie na Mazowszu książęcym, Warsaw 1968.

21 Numerous valuable observations on the territorial structure of Royal Prussia are provided in: S. Gierszewski, Badania nad zaludnieniem Prus Królewskich,

“Roczniki Humanistyczne”, 1987 no. 35 (2), p. 289–300.

22 For a more detailed discussion of the administration of Warmia in the pre-partition period, see: A. Kopiczko, Ustrój i organizacja diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1525–1772, Olsztyn 1993.

23 See E. Cieślak (ed.), Historia Gdańska, vol. 2 and 3/1, Gdańsk 1982–1993. This work also contains an extensive bibliography on the subject.

24 Cf. M. Superczyński, Administracja i sądownictwo dawnego Torunia w świetle źródeł z XIV–XVIII wieku, “Rocznik Toruński” 2015, vol. 42.

25 The functioning of counties in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is discussed in greater detail in the multi-volume work edited by A. Rachuba,

Urzędnicy Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego: Spisy.

Early Administrative Divisions in the Piast State and the Reorganisation of State Administration under the Reign of Casimir the Great

Tue, 17 Feb 2026 07:37:27 GMT

Author: Joanna Górska-Szymczak

Despite decades of scholarly debate, there is still no definitive consensus on the precise shape of the administrative structure of the Piast state during its formative phase in the tenth and eleventh centuries ¹ . Nevertheless, notwithstanding the diversity of interpretations and theoretical approaches, scholars broadly agree on the existence of a territorial unit known as the opole, whose origins can be traced back to the pre-state period ² . Over time, alongside the development of a network of newly established fortified settlements (gords) founded by successive Piast rulers, larger territorial units emerged in the form of gord districts. These units were subsequently transformed into castellanies as a result of the widespread introduction of a new administrative office of the castellan. These structures merit closer examination.

The opole originated in the tribal era and functioned as a territorial community encompassing several, or occasionally more than a dozen, settlements situated in close proximity. The primary bond uniting this community was kinship, as opola were inhabited by clans linked by ties of blood. As a rule, these units lacked clearly defined or fixed geographical boundaries ³ . Their territorial extent was therefore determined by the settlement range of the clans that constituted them.

The principal purpose of establishing such communities was, above all, defensive. Initially, they served to protect against raids or attacks by external adversaries of the tribal or clan group to which the opole belonged. Equally significant was the need to safeguard members of the community from threats posed by other groups within the same tribe or clan. The prevailing principle of collective responsibility, together with the associated notion of retaliation as a cornerstone of contemporary ideas of justice, generated a strong demand for collective protection within the opole ⁴ .

Electoral History of Poland (Sixteenth Century to the Early Twentieth

For this reason, the organisation of collective defence constituted the paramount task of the community inhabiting the territory of an opole. The principal fortified settlement (gord), constructed through collective effort, served as a refuge in times of serious danger and gradually emerged as the central organisational hub of the opole. The council of elders, which stood at its head, together with the leader (opolanin), was responsible for logistical preparations for the defence of the gord (most importantly, securing food supplies) as well as for military readiness, including the provision of weapons and the training of members of the opole for combat. In addition, it oversaw the collection of levies adopted at democratic assemblies (wiec), namely the tributes paid by the population of the opole to finance these activities ⁵ .

Another important function performed by the council of elders was the administration of justice within the opole community. Judicial authority was exercised several times a year during court sessions held in opole strongholds ⁶ .

As the administrative structures of early Piast statehood became increasingly consolidated, particularly with the strengthening of central princely, and later royal, authority, territorial branches of governance also developed. This process was closely linked to the emergence of a new administrative office within the expanding princely–royal administration: that of the castellan (castellanus) ⁷ .

Appointed by the prince, the castellan acted as a direct representative of princely authority and was typically based in strongholds that had previously served as important opole centres. The establishment of this new administrative framework reflected a profound transformation of the prevailing constitutional order. In the early phase of Piast statehood, the constitutional order rested on strongly democratic structures and procedures that had already taken shape in the tribal period. The central institution in this system was the popular assembly (wiec), while a traditionally dominant role was played by tribal or clan elders bound together by ties of kinship. Under the influence of impulses arriving from the west, particularly the Empire, and from the south (Bohemia, Hungary and Italy), both Mieszko I and Bolesław Chrobry gradually and deliberately undermined these democratic foundations.

The office of castellan was clearly designed to displace the autonomous and self-governing authority of the opole elders, assuming responsibility for the execution of their former functions and tasks ⁸ . In consequence, the role and political significance of tribal leadership steadily declined.

Gord districts and the officials who governed them in their new institutional form (castellans or comites) thus took over the competencies previously exercised by opole elders. While military and defensive responsibilities were retained, fiscal duties expanded rapidly, reflecting the growing importance of taxation and tribute levies imposed for the benefit of the ruler. Judicial functions continued to be exercised within these communities, and former decisions were increasingly issued in the name of the ruler, who to a certain extent delegated these prerogatives to castellans or comites ⁹ .

The growing importance of the castellan’s office, accompanied by the gradual disappearance of the post of comes, led to the emergence of the concept of the castellany as a territorial-administrative unit. At the same time, the fiscal competences of castellans were further strengthened. During the thirteenth century, in the context of the weakening position of Piast princes during the period known as the fragmentation of the realm, the role of castellans increased markedly. A significant shift occurred at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Following the accession of Wenceslaus II of Bohemia to the Polish throne, a new administrative office was introduced – that of the starosta (capitaneus) ¹⁰ .

Modelled on Bohemian administrative practices, this institution was intended to weaken the entrenched position of castellans by establishing a new network of officials more closely subordinated to the central authority. However, the relatively short reign of Wenceslaus II of Bohemia, and of Wenceslaus III ¹¹ , who continued his political vision, did not favour either the consolidation of this institution or the fulfilment of the objectives that had originally motivated its creation. Similarly, the numerous political difficulties associated with the reign of Ladislaus the Short were not conducive to strengthening this office. It was only within the framework of the broader programme of administrative modernisation undertaken by Casimir the Great that the office of the starosta was finally and firmly embedded within the state’s administrative system.

A significant innovation accompanying the consolidation of this institution was the deliberate principle that the appointment of a starosta should be independent of the opinion or advice of the local community. It was precisely this right of local (provincial or territorial) communities to co-decide matters alongside the weakened Piast princes, a practice that had developed during the course of the thirteenth century, that in later periods placed substantial constraints on royal authority ¹² . Thus, although starosts were intended to strengthen the monarch’s influence over the functioning of local communities, in practice they quickly came to act as representatives of local interests vis-à-vis the ruler.

Within the Piast state there also existed, certainly from the reign of Mieszko I ¹³ , a division into districts or provinces, although the very terminology used to describe these territorial units remains a matter of scholarly uncertainty ¹⁴ . The prevailing view in the literature is that these units broadly corresponded to territories inhabited by the so-called major tribes. Without engaging in the long-standing debates on this subject, let alone disputes concerning the precise number of such units or, above all, their territorial extent, it may be assumed that they included Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Silesia, Masovia and Pomerania. Even so, serious difficulties arise when attempts are made to reconstruct the principles of this district division on the basis of the Statute of Bolesław III Wrymouth of 1136.

In particular, it remains problematic to establish conclusively the existence of clearly delineated and stable territorial units at this stage.

What is crucial in this context is that these units, regardless of their precise form, were created primarily in response to the need to satisfy legal claims stemming from contemporary concepts of inheritance law and the absence of a distinct notion of public law. Under the constraints imposed by these legal norms, successive rulers appear to have allocated specific domains to their brothers or sons. Over time, these domains gradually developed into more structured territorial entities ¹⁵ .

It should be emphasised, however, that until the mid-twelfth century the administration of such units was not associated with the establishment of separate offices endowed with clearly defined competences. As a rule, they were governed directly by members of the ruling dynasty. Their courts, organised on the model of the ruler’s own entourage, thus functioned as the administrative centres of the provinces entrusted to them. The scope of authority exercised by such provincial governors was generally determined on an ad hoc basis, shaped by immediate circumstances and current political needs.

In summary, given the still limited state of research on this issue, it may be concluded that until the end of the thirteenth century the territorial division of the state and, by extension, concrete institutions of territorial administration, remained in an early stage of formation. It was only during the reign of Casimir the Great that a decisive reorganisation of this system was achieved over the course of the fourteenth century.

The thirteenth century itself was marked by a profound weakening of princely authority within the Piast polity. The progressive fragmentation of the state into smaller territorial units constituted only one, and by no means the most significant, cause of this process. Far more consequential was the intensifying phenomenon of immunisation, which from the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries increasingly affected both entire social groups and individual landholders outside the extended princely family.

Immunisation led to a substantial curtailment of princely authority, above all in the spheres of judicial power and fiscal control. At the same time, it encouraged the development of self-government within newly emerging territorial units – villages and towns. These communities represented a new, classical form of collective organisation, based not on ties of kinship but on legal bonds. As such, they acquired a considerable degree of autonomy and freedom in shaping the internal foundations of their functioning ¹⁶ . The earliest impetus for this process came from the Catholic Church and its emerging territorial structures, dioceses and parishes, as well as from the expanding network of monasteries and abbeys. As a result, a distinct social estate began to take shape: the clergy. Comparable processes of formation, based on so-called location charters, also affected towns and villages. This, in turn, led to the rapid development of new self-governing territorial units, whose inhabitants constituted new social estates – the burghers and the peasantry. During the period under consideration, similar processes also began to affect aristocratic circles and the wealthier strata of the knighthood. In this case, however, development proceeded primarily through individual privileges granted to specific persons ¹⁷ . It was only in the second half of the fourteenth century, as a result of privileges issued by Casimir the Great’s successor, King Louis I of Hungary, that the noble estate was effectively and legally constituted as a distinct social group ¹⁸ .

These transformations were accompanied by extensive grants of landed property to a variety of beneficiaries, as well as by the conferral of economic privileges that granted selected individuals or groups exclusive advantages. This distinct form of privatisation of the former princely domain constituted an additional factor weakening the previously broad powers of local centres of princely authority and the position of local governors ¹⁹ .

It was against this broader background that Casimir the Great, seeking to restore and strengthen royal authority, embarked on a series of measures designed to give concrete institutional form to this objective. One of the most important spheres of his activity was royal administration. Within this framework, Casimir undertook both a reorganisation of the previously rather chaotic territorial division of the realm and a reform of the territorial offices operating within it. These measures were intended, above all, to gradually break the dominance of entrenched elites within individual duchies and territorial domains.

Casimir first strengthened and legally sanctioned (inter alia through the promulgation of ordered and separate collections of law ²⁰ ) the division of the kingdom into two fundamental provinces: Lesser Poland and Greater Poland. He then unified the previously amorphous territorial entities: districts, duchies, castellanies, and magnate lordships. In their place, a coherent, two-tier territorial structure was introduced, comprising lands and voivodeships, as well as counties. Within these units functioned towns and villages distinguished by their legal foundations based on location privileges.

It should be emphasised that the basic territorial framework of the Polish state thus established endured, with only minor later modifications and additions, until the end of its existence in the late eighteenth century.

Alongside the introduction of a new and unified territorial division, Casimir the Great also restructured the administration of these units. He made systematic use of the institution of the starosta, which had been initiated earlier under Wenceslaus II of Bohemia. This office was universalised and its position significantly strengthened.

As a result, the starosta became the most important royal official at the local level, acting as the representative of central authority within a given land or county. His competences encompassed administrative, judicial, policing, and military responsibilities within the territory under his jurisdiction. Starosts administered royal estates (the so-called królewszczyzny ²¹ ) within their districts and supervised the collection of taxes for the royal treasury. They also exercised criminal jurisdiction in the most serious cases, particularly within the framework of the so-called gord courts ²² .

The reforms relating to the office of starosta, whose holders were appointed and dismissed at the monarch’s discretion, made it possible to impose genuine limits on the arbitrariness of local magnates and to achieve a greater degree of administrative uniformity across the state. As a consequence, the former office of castellan lost its earlier substantive powers. The role of castellans was reduced primarily to military and honorary functions. In the former capacity, this included command over castle garrisons and leadership of territorial banners in wartime; in the latter, the honorary status of the office would later be reflected in the attribution to castellans of the right to hold seats in the emerging Senate.

Concurrently with these institutional changes, Casimir the Great began, within the framework of lands and counties, the systematic creation of new territorial units in the form of counties (powiaty), in place of the castellany districts that had developed in a largely ad hoc manner over earlier centuries. The starosts appointed under the new system now exercised authority over clearly defined territorial-administrative units, explicitly designated as counties. It was at this level, under the supervision of the starosta, that the state’s fundamental defensive responsibilities and fiscal functions were concentrated. As a rule, counties became the basic judicial districts within which civil and criminal justice was administered in the name of the king, in accordance with the legal norms systematised in the aforementioned Statutes.

Over time, two distinct categories of the starosta’s office emerged: the gord starosta (starosta grodowy), who exercised authority over a judicial district and was responsible for internal security, and the non-gord starosta (starosta niegrodowy), whose primary duties involved the administration of royal landed estates (królewszczyzny).

It should be emphasised that the institution of the territorial starosta, as a representative of royal authority in the local sphere, endured throughout the entire Middle Ages and well into the early modern period. Within the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, starosts continued to administer royal estates, maintain public order, and preside over gord courts, remaining among the most important local officials until the eighteenth century. Although the office gradually underwent a degree of degeneration, being leased by magnates as a source of additional income, its origins and original purpose lay firmly in the reforms introduced by Casimir the Great.

It is also worth noting that assemblies (wiece) –

gatherings of magnates, knights, and representatives of towns – continued to be convened during Casimir’s reign. Their functions, however, evolved over time. Gradually, they developed into sejmiki ziemskie (local assemblies of the nobility) and, in the course of further institutional evolution, gave rise to the nationwide Sejm. Assemblies held during Casimir’s reign, which brought together dignitaries, territorial officials, and municipal delegates, may therefore be regarded as direct precursors of later noble parliamentarism. Similarly, the royal council, expanded by Casimir as a permanent advisory body, was transformed during the Jagiellonian period into the permanent Crown Senate ²³ .

It may thus be concluded that Casimir’s domestic policy, grounded in cooperation with the nobility and the burghers, while at the same time restraining the arbitrariness of the magnates, established a model of governance that would reach fuller maturity during the Golden Age under the Jagiellonians ²⁴ .

Figure 1. The Kingdom of Poland during the reign of Casimir the Great. Wikimedia Commons, The Kingdom of Poland during the reign of Casimir the Great, https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazimierz_III_Wielki#/media/ Plik:Polska_1333–1370.png [accessed on: 14.12.2025].

¹ The most recent and highly insightful findings are presented in the monograph: J. Osiński, Podział dzielnicowy państwa polskiego według Statutu Bolesława Krzywoustego, Kraków 2024. The author examines this issue as a crucial element for the proper interpretation of the so-called “division of the state” carried out by this ruler.

² A more extensive discussion of this problem may be found, inter alia, in: Z. Wojciechowski, Ustrój polityczny ziem polskich w czasach przedpiastowskich, Lviv 1927; idem: O ustroju szczepowym ziem polskich: uwagi krytyczne, Poznań 1927.

³ The issue is analysed in greater detail by J. S. Matuszewski in Vicina id est… Poszukiwania alternatywnej koncepcji staropolskiego opola, Łódź 1991.

⁴ A broader discussion of the conditions shaping early law and the administration of justice is provided by H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Harvard 1983. Although his observations focus primarily on Germanic communities, similar principles applied to Slavic societies.

⁵ A more detailed discussion of this issue is provided in the classic study by: K. Tymieniecki, Organizacja grodowa w Polsce wczesnofeudalnej, Poznań 1961.

⁶ M. Kowalski, Administracja i sądownictwo w Polsce Piastów i Jagiellonów, Wrocław 2010.

⁷ Alongside the castellan, there existed a closely related office, that of the comes. Both offices were modelled on analogous institutions characteristic of the dominant administrative system of the period, shaped under the rule of Charlemagne and his successors. For a broader discussion, see Chapter V – “Jednostki administracyjne odpowia- dające powiatom w innych krajach europejskich”.

⁸ These processes are discussed in greater detail by G. Górski, Historia administracji, Toruń 2011. They are also examined in: J. Górska- Szymczak, Między demokracją a absolutyzmem. U źródeł nowoczesnej monarchii konstytucyjnej w XI i XII wieku, Toruń 2025. An alternative perspective is offered by: J. Bardach, B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego, Warsaw 1998, as well as:

J.A. Gierowski, Historia Polski: średniowiecze, Kraków 2001.

⁹ The evolution of this process is discussed in greater detail, inter alia, by: S. Kutrzeba, Dawne polskie prawo sądowe w zarysie, Lviv 1921.

¹⁰ A broader discussion is provided by: S. Górka, Administracja i prawo w średniowiecznej Polsce, Kraków 2007 and T. Żmudzki, System administracyjny Polski średniowiecznej, Wrocław 2009. See also the remarks by: G. Górski, op. cit.

¹¹ Wenceslaus II of Bohemia was Duke of Kraków from 1291 and King of Poland from 1300. He died in 1305, and his son, Wenceslaus III, remained on the Polish throne for only just under fourteen months.

¹² This issue is discussed in greater detail by J. Górska-Szymczak, op. cit. See also the remarks by G. Górski, Rzeczpospolita polsko-litewska. Historia pierwszej monarchii konstytucyjnej, Toruń 2017.

¹³ The existence of larger territorial units in the time of Mieszko I is already noted in the chronicles of both Gallus Anonymus and Wincenty Kadłubek.

¹⁴ A more detailed analysis of this issue is provided by J. Osiński, Z dziejów Polski wczesnopiastowskiej, Kraków 2018, as well as Podział…

¹⁵ We share the observations and conclusions formulated by J. Osiński.

¹⁶ This process is discussed in greater detail in the classic study by R. Grodecki, Początki immunitetu w Polsce, Lviv 1930. A more recent treatment of this issue, set within a broad comparative framework, is provided in J. Górska-Szymczak, op. cit.

¹⁷ Although the privileges issued at Cienia and Lutomyśl were, in principle, of a general nature, they referred primarily to the political rights of the barones. Their main purpose was to guarantee a group of the most important ecclesiastical and secular lords the right to offer “advice and opinion” to the ruler.

¹⁸ Of decisive importance in this respect were the royal privileges issued in Buda in 1355 and in Košice in 1374. For a broader discussion of the significance of these general privileges for the formation of the noble estate, see: J. Dąbrowski, Ostatnie lata Ludwika Wielkiego, Kraków 2009, as well as O. Halecki, O genezie i znaczeniu rządów andegaweńskich w Polsce, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1921, vol. 35.

¹⁹ This process is discussed in greater detail by R. Grodecki, Studia nad dziejami gospodarczymi Polski w XII wieku, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1915, vol. 29. The issue is also addressed by J. Górska-Szymczak, op. cit.

²⁰ Reference is made here to the so-called Statutes of Casimir the Great—the Greater Poland Statute (finally approved in 1362) and the Lesser Poland Statute (1362). The text in a modern critical edition is available in: Statuty Kazimierza Wielkiego, ed. T.K. Kubicki, Łódź 1995. For a broader discussion of the role and significance of the Statutes, see: W. Uruszczak, Statuty Kazimierza Wielkiego jako źródło prawa polskiego, “Studia z Dziejów Państwa i Prawa Polskiego” 1999, no. 3, p. 97–115.

²¹ The “royal domain,” commonly referred to as królewszczyzna, was in fact the property of the Crown (and, in Lithuania, of the Grand Duchy), and thus constituted public property. For a broader discussion of its development, see: J. Luciński, Rozwój królewszczyzn w Koronie od schyłku XIV wieku do XVII wieku, Poznań 1970.

²² For a more detailed discussion, see the remarks by: S. Górka, op. cit., and T. Żmudzki, op. cit.

²³ For a broader treatment, see the important study by: J. Dąbrowski, Kazimierz Wielki: Twórca Korony Królestwa Polskiego, Kraków 2007.

²⁴ On the role of Casimir the Great and his reforms, in addition to the fundamental studies by R. Grodecki, see also the important observations in: J. Wyrozumski, Kazimierz Wielki. Wrocław 1986.

Electoral system in the 2011-2019 elections for Senate

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:59:51 GMT

The 2011-2019 elections were conducted using the electoral system set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Electoral Code Act. The electoral system for the Sejm has undergone significant changes compared to the one used in the 2001-2007 period with regard to the structure of electoral districts.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:
The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the rights of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 2011-2019 elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland, the area of the country was divided into 100 single-mandate constituencies in which 100 senatorial seats were distributed. The area of the districts in the Senate elections was contained in the grid of districts in the Sejm elections.

One senator was elected in each district.

Significantly, the Senate elections did not implement the principle of equality (this principle did not apply to Senate elections in the constitutional provisions). The number of inhabitants per seat in each district varied widely.

The seats were divided in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes received by the candidates in the constituency.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 44 (the part of Warsaw comprising the districts of Białołęka, Bielany, Śródmieście, Żoliborz).

Electoral formula

The 2011-2019 elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland were conducted using a majority representation formula using the relative majority method in single-mandate constituencies (FPTP). The distribution of seats took place separately in each of the 40 constituencies.

Method of voting

Each voter had one vote. He or she cast his or her vote for a candidate of his or her choice from among those put forward in the constituency. The candidate with the most votes was elected. If a seat became vacant, a by-election had to be held.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

Electoral system in the 2001-2007 elections for Senate

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:34:44 GMT

The 1991-1997 elections were conducted using the electoral system defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and in the Act Electoral Ordinance to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland. The electoral system for the Sejm has undergone significant changes compared to the one applied in the 1991-1997 period with regard to the structure of electoral districts.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland between 2001 and 2007, the area of the country was divided into 40 multi-mandate constituencies in which 100 senatorial seats were distributed. These constituencies, for the most part (with the exception of constituency 12 [Kraków] which included the area of Sejm constituencies 12 [Chrzanów] and 13 [Kraków]), overlapped with Sejm constituencies.

Between 2 and 4 senators were elected in the districts.

Significantly, the elections to the Senate did not implement the principle of equality (this principle did not apply to Senate elections in the constitutional provisions). The number of inhabitants per seat in each district varied widely.

The seats were divided in individual electoral districts on the basis of the number of votes obtained by candidates in a given district.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 18 (Warsaw).

The detailed distribution of seats between constituencies is shown in the table:

Electoral formula

Elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland in the period 2001-2007 were conducted using a majority representation formula using the relative majority method in multi-mandate constituencies (block voting). The distribution of seats took place separately in each of the 40 electoral districts.

Method of voting

Each voter had votes equal to the number of senators elected in the district. He or she cast his or her votes for candidates of his or her choice from among those nominated in the district. A voter could not accumulate his votes (he could not, for example, cast all available votes for one candidate), but he was not obliged to use all the votes available to him. This was a growing problem in each successive election - an increasing proportion of voters used only one of their available votes. Candidates took their seats in the order of the number of votes obtained. If a seat became vacant, a by-election had to be held.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 12 kwietnia 2001 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 2001 nr 46 poz. 499 (z późn. zm.).

Electoral system in the 1991-1997 elections for Senate

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 13:05:05 GMT

The 1991-1997 elections were conducted using the electoral system set out in the constitutional provisions and in the Electoral Ordinance for the Senate of the Republic of Poland. The electoral system for the Sejm underwent significant changes compared to the one used in 1989, particularly with regard to the electoral formula.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 1991-1997 elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland, the country's territory was divided into 49 multi-mandate electoral districts in which 100 senatorial seats were distributed.

The division into districts corresponded to the division of the country into provinces (of which there were 49 at the time).

In 47 districts, 2 senators each were elected, while in the two most populous districts (Warsaw and Katowice provinces), 3 were elected.

The seats were divided in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes received by the candidates in the constituency.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in the district covering Warsaw Province.

Electoral formula

The 1991-1997 elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland were conducted using a majority representation formula using the relative majority method in multi-mandate constituencies (block voting). The distribution of seats took place separately in each of the 49 electoral districts.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 10 maja 1991 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1991 nr 58 poz. 246 (z późn. zm.).

Electoral system for Voivodeship Council elections 1998-2018

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 12:27:54 GMT

Elections to Voivodeship Council have been held in Poland since 1998, in connection with the introduction of a three-tier local government structure with provinces as self-governing communities at the regional level. These elections were conducted using an electoral system based on constitutional norms (albeit only general ones), the Act on Voivodeship Self-Government and the following laws: initially Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gminas, rad rad powiatów i sejmików województwa and later the Electoral Code Act.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be allocated in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In elections to the regional assemblies, the area of each voivodship is divided into multi-mandate electoral districts with a different number of seats. A district is a county (or a city with county rights), several counties or part of a county.

The number of councillors in each assembly depends on the population of the province in question (and, in practice, the number of residents registered in the permanent electoral registers).

Initially, the number of councillors in local councils was 45 in provinces with up to 2 million inhabitants and an additional 5 councillors for every additional 500,000 inhabitants above 2 million. Later (since the 2002 election), the number of councillors was reduced to 30 in provinces with up to 2 million inhabitants and 3 for every additional 500,000 inhabitants added.

In local government elections (including local councils), voting takes place exclusively in the territory of Poland.

The number of councillors elected to each of the assemblies in subsequent elections is shown in the table.

The number of councillors elected in each ward ranged from 5 to 15.

Electoral formula

Elections to provincial assemblies in the period 1998-2018 were conducted using a proportional representation formula using the d'Hondt electoral method. Seats were divided separately in each of the 41 electoral districts.

In these elections, a statutory threshold was applied relating to the valid votes cast on a province-wide basis. In order to take part in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (collectively) had to exceed the threshold of 5% of the validly cast votes. In contrast, no higher threshold was introduced for coalitions or the possibility for committees of voters affiliated to national minority organisations to be exempted from exceeding the threshold.

The exception to this was the election held in 2006, in which so-called list blocking (formation of groups of lists) was applied. The electoral committees could decide to form a block (group of lists) in the elections to a given assembly (each separately). If the block (group of lists) exceeded the threshold of 15% of the valid votes cast on a province-wide basis, its lists in each ward were treated together when the seats were distributed (instead of the number of votes of each of the ward lists of the committees forming the block, the sum of the number of votes cast for the lists of all the committees forming the block was taken into account). The seats obtained by a block of lists in a given constituency were divided among the lists of the individual committees in the constituency using the Sainte-Laguë method, but only among those committees that exceeded the 'ordinary' electoral threshold.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. - Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw; Dz.U. 1998 nr 95 poz. 602 (z późn. zm.); Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

Electoral system in the 2011-2019 Polish parliamentary election for Sejm

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 11:39:26 GMT

The 2011-2019 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland were conducted using the electoral system set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Electoral Code Act.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the voter's powers when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 2011-2019 elections to the Polish Sejm, the country's territory was divided into 41 multi-mandate electoral districts with different numbers of seats. A district could be a voivodeship or a part of a voivodeship. The district boundaries could not intersect the boundaries of poviats or cities with poviat rights.

The smallest constituency was District No. 29 (with the seat of the District Election Commission in Częstochowa), in which 7 MPs were elected, while the largest was District No. 19 (OKW Warsaw), in which 20 MPs were elected. The average number of seats in the districts was 11.22. The seats were divided in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the lists of individual committees in the constituency.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 19 (OKW Warsaw).

The detailed list of districts with the number of seats is shown in the table.

Electoral formula

The 2001 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland were conducted using a proportional representation formula employing the modified Sainte-Laguë electoral method with a first divisor of 1.4. Seats were divided separately in each of the 41 electoral districts.

The election used a statutory threshold relating to validly cast votes nationwide. In order to take part in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (in total) had to exceed the threshold of 5% (in the case of a political party committee and an electoral committee of voters) or 8% (a committee of a coalition of political parties). Electoral committees of voters affiliated to national minority organisations were entitled to an exemption from exceeding the threshold.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

photo by: Łukasz Błasikiewicz

Electoral system in the 2005-2007 Polish parliamentary election for Sejm

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 10:34:14 GMT

The elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the period 2005-2007 were conducted using the electoral system defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and in the Act Electoral Ordinance to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland. Compared to the 2001 elections, the electoral method was changed and the number of seats in some districts was adjusted to demographic changes.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 2005-2007 elections to the Polish Sejm, the country's territory was divided into 41 multi-mandate electoral districts with different numbers of seats. A district could be a voivodeship or a part of a voivodeship. The district boundaries could not intersect the boundaries of poviats or cities with poviat rights.

The smallest constituency was District No. 29 (OKW Częstochowa), in which 7 MEPs were elected, while the largest was District No. 19 (OKW Warsaw), in which 19 MEPs were elected. The average number of seats in the districts was 11.22. The seats were divided in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the lists of individual committees in the constituency.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 19 (OKW Warsaw).

The detailed list of districts with the number of seats is shown in the table.

Electoral formula

Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the period 2005-2007 were conducted using a proportional representation formula using the d'Hondt electoral method. Seats were divided separately in each of the 41 electoral districts.

The elections used a statutory threshold relating to validly cast votes nationwide. In order to take part in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (in total) had to exceed the threshold of 5% (in the case of a political party committee and an electoral committee of voters) or 8% (a committee of a coalition of political parties). Electoral committees of voters affiliated to national minority organisations were entitled to an exemption from exceeding the threshold.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

photo by: Rafał Zambrzycki

Electoral system in the 2001 Polish parliamentary election

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 09:20:41 GMT

The 2001 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland were conducted using the electoral system set out in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and in the law Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. The electoral system for the Sejm underwent radical changes compared to the one applied 4 years earlier. The structure of electoral districts was completely changed, the second, nationwide level of distribution of seats (the so-called national lists) was abandoned, and the electoral method used was also changed.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The way in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein, such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 2001 elections to the Polish Sejm, the country's territory was divided into 41 multi-mandate electoral districts with different numbers of seats. A district could be a voivodeship or part of a voivodeship. The boundaries of the districts could not intersect the boundaries of the poviats or cities with poviat rights.

The smallest constituencies were District No. 12 (Chrzanów) and District No. 29 (Częstochowa), where 7 MPs were elected, and the largest was District No. 19 (OKW Warszawa), where 19 MPs were elected. The average number of seats in the districts was 11.22. Seats were distributed in individual constituencies on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the lists of individual committees in the constituency.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in constituency 19 (OKW Warsaw).

A detailed list of the districts with the number of seats is presented in the table.

Electoral formula

The 2001 elections to the Polish Sejm were conducted using a proportional representation formula using the modified Sainte-Laguë electoral method with a first divisor of 1.4. Seats were divided separately in each of the 41 constituencies.

In this election, a statutory threshold was applied relating to validly cast votes nationwide. In order to take part in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (in total) had to exceed the threshold of 5% (in the case of a political party committee and an electoral committee of voters) or 8% (a committee of a coalition of political parties). Electoral committees of voters affiliated to national minority organisations were entitled to an exemption from exceeding the threshold.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

photo by: Krzysztof Kurek

Electoral system in the 1993-1997 Polish parliamentary election

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 09:12:26 GMT

The elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the period 1993-1997 were conducted using the electoral system specified in the constitutional provisions and in the Act Electoral Ordinance to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. The electoral system for the Sejm underwent radical changes compared to the one applied in 1991. The structure of electoral districts was completely changed, the electoral formula was also changed - both with regard to the electoral method applied and the electoral threshold for participation in the distribution of seats at the district level was introduced. The electoral thresholds for the national list were also changed.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 1993-1997 Sejm elections, the country was divided into 52 multi-mandate constituencies in which (a total of) 391 seats were distributed. The remaining 69 seats were distributed at the level of the whole country (one nationwide constituency) on the basis of the number of votes obtained by all the constituency lists of the groupings concerned (national lists were not voted on separately).

The division into districts was based on the division of the country into provinces (of which there were 49 at the time). Only in the case of the most populous voivodeships - Warsaw and Katowice - was it allowed to divide them, but the boundaries of the districts could not encroach on the boundaries of the communes (there were no poviats then).

The smallest constituencies were District No. 3 (Biala Podlaskie Voivodeship) and District No. 7 (Chełmskie Voivodeship), in which 3 Members each were elected, and the largest was District No. 1 (City of Warsaw), in which 17 Members were elected. The average number of seats in the districts was 7.52. 391 The seats were distributed in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the lists of individual committees in the constituency. The remaining 69 seats were distributed at the national level (nationwide constituency) among the national lists submitted.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 1 (City of Warsaw).

The detailed list of districts with the number of seats is shown in the table.

Electoral formula

The 1993-1997 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland were conducted using a proportional representation formula using the d'Hondt method - both for the 52 constituencies and the nationwide constituency. The distribution of seats took place separately in each of the 52 constituencies and separately at the national level.

In these elections, a statutory threshold was applied relating to the valid votes cast nationwide. In order to take part in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (in total) had to exceed the threshold of 8% (electoral coalition committee or 5% (other committees). To take part in the distribution of seats among the national lists, one had to obtain at least 7% of the validly cast votes nationwide.

The electoral committees of registered national minority organisations were entitled to an exemption from the selected threshold (either for participation in the distribution of seats in the districts or for participation in the distribution of seats among the national lists).

Method of voting

Each voter had one vote, which he or she cast for the electoral list of his or her choice submitted by the electoral committee in the district, together with an indication of the specific candidate on that list to whom he or she was giving his or her support. Open lists were therefore used at district level. Candidates on a given ward committee list took their seats in order of the number of votes obtained. If a seat became vacant, priority was given to the next candidate on the same list according to the number of votes obtained. The situation was different with regard to national lists. The voter did not cast a separate vote for them and a vote for the district list automatically implied support for the national list as well. The seats allocated to the individual national lists were allocated to candidates in the order of their placement on the list (excluding those candidates who obtained seats in the constituencies). Closed lists were therefore used.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

photo by: Krzysztof Białoskórski

Electoral system in the elections to the European Parliament 2004-2019

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 08:39:18 GMT

Elections to the European Parliament have been held in Poland since 2004, as a consequence of Poland's entry into the European Union. These elections were conducted using an electoral system based on constitutional norms (albeit only general ones), the European Parliament Election Ordinance Act and then the

Electoral Code.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be divided in each district),
The method of determining the results of the election (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the voter's rights during voting - how many votes he has, whether he can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In elections to the European Parliament, the area of the entire country constitutes one electoral district. In addition to it, 13 electoral districts covering the area of part of a province (2 districts), one province (7 districts) or two provinces (4 districts) have been designated in the country.

The distribution of seats takes place at the district level covering the entire country. The number of Members of Parliament elected from lists in each district is not top-down. This was due to the need for a formula that guarantees the proportional nature of elections.

The number of MEPs elected in Poland has varied over time (this is due to European regulations). In the 2004 elections it was 54 deputies, in 2009 - 50 deputies, in 2014 - 51 and in 2019 - 52.

Votes cast outside Poland are counted in the district covering the Capital City of Warsaw (District 4 - Warsaw I).

Electoral formula

Elections to the European Parliament are conducted using a proportional representation formula using the d'Hondt and Hare-Niemeyer electoral methods.

The distribution of seats among electoral committees is carried out at the level of the entire country (in practice, the entire country is one electoral district). This division is carried out using the d'Hondt method on the basis of the number of votes obtained by all the district lists of individual committees. Then - within each committee separately - the seats obtained by the committee are distributed among its district lists using the Hare-Niemeyer method. The seats within each district list are allocated in order of the number of votes obtained.

In these elections, a statutory threshold was applied relating to validly cast votes nationwide. In order to participate in the distribution of seats, the electoral lists of a given committee (collectively) had to exceed a threshold of 5% of the validly cast votes. In contrast, no higher threshold was introduced for coalitions, nor was there any possibility of an exemption for committees of voters affiliated with national minority organizations.

Given that seats are distributed among electoral committees at the level of a nationwide constituency, not at the level of 13 electoral districts, the amount of natural thresholds in these elections is relatively low. As a result, the elections to the European Parliament are the only elections of authorities in Poland in which exceeding the statutory threshold guarantees in any situation the attainment of seats (and not just participation in the distribution of seats).

A unique situation occurred in 2019, when 52 members of the European Parliament were elected, but only 51 of them could take their seats at the beginning of the term (the 52nd seat could only be taken after the UK left the European Union). The problem arose as to how to indicate who among those elected would take their seats at a later date. To this end, new regulations were introduced, according to which the person elected with the smallest number of votes from the lists of that grouping that won the 52nd seat at the stage of division by the d'Hondt method had to wait to take his seat.

Method of voting

Each voter has one vote, which he casts for the selected electoral list submitted by the electoral committee in the district, together with the indication of the specific candidate from that list to whom he gave his support. Thus, open lists were used. Candidates on a given committee's district list took seats in the order of the number of votes received. If a seat became vacant, the next candidate from the same list was given priority to take it according to the number of votes received.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2004 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Dz.U. 2004 nr 25 poz. 219 (z późn. zm.); Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

Electoral system in the 1991 Polish parliamentary election

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 20 May 2024 08:26:26 GMT

The 1991 elections to the Polish Sejm were the first free and democratic elections to the Sejm after the Second World War.

The 1991 elections were conducted using the electoral system set out in the constitutional provisions and in the Act Electoral Ordinance to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. The electoral system for the Sejm was radically changed compared to the one applied in 1989, which was necessary for the elections to be democratic. The structure of electoral districts was completely changed, and the electoral formula was also altered. The changes also concerned the national list.

The electoral system (in its narrower sense) consists of the following elements:

The structure of the electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
The manner in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds),
The method of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.).

Structure of electoral districts

In the 1991 Sejm elections, the country's territory was divided into 37 multi-mandate constituencies in which (a total of) 391 seats were distributed. The remaining 69 seats were distributed at the level of the whole country (one nationwide constituency) on the basis of the number of votes obtained by all the constituency lists of the groupings concerned (national lists were not voted on separately).

The division into districts was based on the division of the country into provinces (of which there were 49 at the time). A district could correspond to a province, several provinces or part of a province.

The smallest constituency was District No. 5 (Piotrków Voivodeship), District No. 15 (Kalisz Voivodeship), District No. 27 (Zamość and Chełm Voivodeships), District No. 31 (Tarnów Voivodeship), District No. 32 (Nowy Sącz Voivodeship), in which 7 MPs were elected each, and the largest was District No. 1 (City of Warsaw), in which 17 MPs were elected. The average number of seats in the districts was 10.57. 391 The seats were distributed in each constituency on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the lists of individual committees in the constituency. The remaining 69 seats were distributed at the national level (nationwide constituency) among the national lists submitted.

The votes of Polish citizens voting outside Poland were counted in Ward 1 (City of Warsaw).

The detailed list of districts with the number of seats is shown in the table.

Electoral formula

The 1991 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland were conducted using a proportional representation formula using the Hare-Niemeyer method and the modified Sainte-Laguë electoral method with a first divisor of 1.4. The distribution of seats took place separately in each of the 37 constituencies and separately at the national level.

At constituency level, the Hare-Niemeyer method applied, resulting in an overrepresentation of groupings with relatively low support. Moreover, political groupings in each constituency (separately) could decide to form a block of lists. The blocked lists were treated as a single list for the purposes of seat allocation. The distribution of seats within the block was also done using the Hare-Niemeyer method. Importantly, lists could be blocked in each district independently. This meant that lists from the same party could belong to different (or even opposing) blocs in different constituencies.

At the national level, the modified Sainte-Laguë method with a first divisor of 1.4 applied.

A statutory threshold relating to validly cast votes nationwide was applied in these elections, but it only applied to the distribution of seats among national lists. In order to participate in the distribution of seats at the national level, the electoral lists of a given committee (in aggregate) had to exceed the 5% threshold or win seats in at least 5 districts. Significantly, there was no requirement to exceed the threshold in order to take part in the distribution of seats at the level of 37 constituencies.

Method of voting

Maciej Onasz, based on Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

Electoral lists types

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 14:01:17 GMT

What are electoral lists?

Electoral lists are part of the electoral offer directly presented to a given voter. Most often, they do not contain all the possibilities (e.g. they do not include all candidates, but only candidates registered in a given constituency). The electoral lists of all parties (or a list of candidates) are presented to the voter on the ballot card, which he uses to make his choice.

There are several types of electoral lists:

Closed lists: if this form is used, the voter can only vote for the list of the selected formation (party) as a whole. He cannot indicate his preference for a specific candidate from this list. As a rule, when this type of list is used, mandates (within a given list) are allocated in accordance with the order in which the candidates were placed on the list. This form of list was used to divide seats between the so-called "national lists" in the elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland until 1997.
Open lists: if this form is used, the voter has the opportunity to vote for the list of the selected formation (party) as a whole and to indicate a specific, preferred candidate within this list. As a rule, when this type of list is used, seats (within a given list) are allocated in the order of the number of votes obtained by individual candidates. Such lists are currently used in all elections in Poland conducted using proportional representation formulas.
Free lists: when this form is used, the voter has the opportunity to create his or her own combination from among the submitted candidates, even from different lists (creates his or her own list), often creating his or her own ranking of candidates (marking the most preferred candidate with number 1, the second most preferred candidate with number 2, etc.) . Such lists are used, among others, in the single transferable voice (STV) system, which is, however, not used in Poland.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Electoral engineering in Poland since 1989, Łódź 2017.

Natural threshold

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 12:45:44 GMT

What is natural threshold?

Natural electoral thresholds, unlike statutory thresholds, do not derive directly from a legal provision. A natural threshold is understood to be such an endorsement of a political grouping (electoral list or candidate) in a constituency that, if exceeded, ensures a certain probability of winning a seat or a certain number of seats. It most often refers to winning at least one seat in a constituency. There are 3 basic types of natural thresholds:

Inclusion threshold : indicating how much support a list (candidate) in a district must exceed in order for the chance of a seat to be higher than 0%.
Exclusion threshold : indicating how much support a list (candidate) in a district must exceed in order to be certain of winning a seat (100% probability).
Actual threshold : indicating how much support a list (candidate) in a district must cross in order to have a chance of winning a seat higher than the probability of not winning a seat (i.e. a chance of winning a seat higher than 50%).

The level of the natural threshold depends on several elements:

The number of seats for which the threshold is sought (usually 1).
The electoral method used.
The number of declared lists (candidates) in the district.
The number of votes available to the voter (and the possible possibility of their accumulation).

Inclusion threshold

The inclusion threshold indicates what percentage of the votes a list (or candidate) in a constituency must exceed in order to have at least a minimum chance of winning a seat. According to this reasoning, a list (candidate) getting even one vote less makes it impossible to win a seat even with the best possible distribution of the remaining votes.

It is most often calculated for obtaining the first seat in a constituency. The values of the inclusion threshold for the different electoral methods are shown in the table. The number of seats in the constituency is denoted as S, while the number of declared lists (and, in the case of majority formulas, candidates) is denoted as L. Importantly, for most of the methods indicated (apart from block voting and the limited vote system), the voter has one vote. In the case of block voting, as many votes as there are seats to be distributed in the district, and in the case of the limited vote system, the number of votes is greater than 1 but less than the number of seats in the district. Under either system, an elector may not accumulate his or her votes (e.g., with 3 votes, cast them all for the same candidate).

Exclusion thresholds

The exclusion threshold indicates what percentage of the votes a list (or candidate) in a constituency must exceed in order to be certain of winning a seat. According to this reasoning, if a list (candidate) receives even one vote less, the seat is not 100% certain.

It is most often calculated for obtaining the first seat in a constituency. The inclusion threshold values for the different electoral methods are shown in the table. The number of seats in the district is denoted as S, the number of declared lists (and, in the case of majority formulas, candidates) as L and the number of votes available to the voter as G. Significantly, for most of the methods indicated (apart from block voting and the limited vote system), the voter has one vote. In the case of block voting, as many votes as there are seats to be distributed in the district, and in the case of the limited vote system, the number of votes is greater than 1 but less than the number of seats in the district. Under either system, an elector may not accumulate his or her votes (e.g., with 3 votes, cast them all for the same candidate).

Actual threshold

The value of the exclusion threshold indicates what percentage of the votes an electoral roll (or candidate) in a constituency must exceed in order to have a better than 50% chance of winning a seat.

Most often, especially for the first mandate, 75% of the value of the exclusion threshold is given as the actual threshold value. However, this value should be approached with caution - unlike the inclusion and exclusion thresholds, it does not provide clear information.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

Electoral threshold

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 12:33:33 GMT

What is electoral threshold?

An electoral threshold is one element of an electoral formula. A statutory threshold is understood as a legal norm that makes admission to the distribution of seats (either in general or at a particular level of distribution) conditional on obtaining a certain level of support or meeting other criteria. The required support, most often expressed as a minimum percentage of validly cast votes, may be defined for each constituency or for the entire area in which the election is held, with different consequences. Other criteria may apply to systems with different levels of seat allocation, in which participation in the distribution of seats at a given (higher) level may depend not only on obtaining a certain level of support (e.g. expressed as a minimum percentage of the valid votes cast), but also on the number of seats obtained at another (lower) level¹. As an example, one can also mention the electoral system applied in the elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland for the first term (in 1991), in which participation in the distribution of seats from the national list was conditional on the district lists linked to the national list obtaining at least 5% of the validly cast votes or obtaining seats in at least 5 districts.

It is important to relate the thresholds to the entire electoral area (this has been the case in Poland in the elections to the Sejm since 1993) or to the level of each constituency (the model example being the parliamentary elections in Spain²). While in both cases the aim of the application of the thresholds is to eliminate groups with low support, including fringe groups, from participating in the distribution of seats and thus to strengthen the centripetal tendencies of the system and the stability of the established institutions (in this case the lower houses of parliament), this will happen in different ways. While in both cases groups with low support are excluded from the distribution of seats, in cases where a group's electorate is not evenly dispersed but concentrations can be identified, it is likely to be eliminated from the distribution of seats only in the case of the overall threshold, while the prohibitive threshold at district level may be exceeded in a few cases. In the case of Spain, the 3% threshold at constituency level does not affect the chances of regional groups to gain parliamentary seats; in "their" constituencies, they easily surpass it. The use of thresholds at constituency level may serve precisely to allow regional groupings to operate in a given political space (in this case at parliamentary level), which may be particularly important in ethnically and culturally diverse countries.

Barrier thresholds are also differentiated by their homogeneity or gradualness. The latter is considered an innovation introduced in Central and Eastern Europe during the systemic transformation carried out in the last decade of the 20th century³. Homogeneity here means the application of identical electoral thresholds for each electoral participant regardless of the committee formula or other body nominating candidates, while gradualism means differentiation of the level of the barrier threshold according to the nature of the entity nominating the candidates, on the assumption that entities that are coalitions (agreements) of two or more groups formed to exceed the statutory threshold, which would be impossible (or unlikely) if each of these entities ran separately, are obliged to exceed a higher barrier threshold.

Examples of the application of a gradual barrier threshold are the elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland since 1993 (5% for political party committees (KW) and voters' committees (KWW) and higher - 8% - for committees of coalitions of political parties (KKW)) as well as the elections to the Hungarian National Assembly (after the 2012 amendment, (following the 2012 amendment, lists of political parties exceeding 5% of the validly cast votes are entitled to participate in the nationwide distribution of seats (93 seats); in the case of joint lists submitted by several parties, the threshold is raised to 10% in the case of a joint list of two parties and 15% in the case of three or more parties).

In some systems, the possibility of exempting specific groupings from crossing the electoral threshold is applied. An example is the Polish elections to the Sejm, where the Electoral Committees of voters affiliated to national minority organisations are entitled to exemption from the obligation to exceed the threshold. Contrary to the often repeated popular opinion - this does not only apply to the German minority but to all national minorities in Poland.

The level of deformation resulting from the application of barrier thresholds can vary widely. When its height does not exceed the level of the effective natural threshold in the districts, the effect of its application should be limited, at least from the point of view of groupings with similar support across the country. On the other hand, if the size of the barrier threshold is higher than the level of the natural thresholds in the districts, the deformation effect caused by the threshold can be expected to be high. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that in practice, proportional elections are most often held in districts of different sizes, in which the natural thresholds are, necessarily, different.

The application of the barrier thresholds, irrespective of their reference to the electoral area as a whole or to individual constituencies, has two consequences. Firstly, they affect the mechanism for the distribution of seats among the various groupings by possibly eliminating some of the groupings and the lists they present, which should be referred to as the mechanical effect of the application of the barrier thresholds. The second effect (or second set of effects) relates to voters' attitudes towards the possible prospect of the groupings they would potentially plan to vote for not achieving the legally required support - and this effect can be called the psychological effect. A group facing the risk of failing to meet the threshold is exposed to an additional cost - some voters, fearing that their votes will be "wasted" if they vote for the group closest to their views but likely to fail to meet the threshold, may vote (even if this means voting partly against their own views) for another group which has a greater chance (or certainty) of exceeding the threshold⁴.

Thus, a group at risk of failing to meet the barrier threshold "loses twice". - on the one hand, it bears the mechanical effects of the barrier threshold, while on the other hand, it additionally bears the costs of the psychological effect, which makes it more likely that a given grouping will not achieve the support required by the barrier threshold. In Polish electoral practice, the majority of formations formed by Janusz Korwin-Mikke and, among others, the Zjednoczona Lewica in the 2015 elections to the Polish Sejm may be taken as an example of a grouping that found itself in such a situation.

Barrier thresholds can take on different values, each time setting them (or leaving them unchanged) should be seen as a political decision. In practice, widely varying levels of statutory thresholds are used - from a threshold of 0.67% in the elections to the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, which has very little impact on the final distribution of seats (all 150 seats are distributed in one statewide constituency, so the nominal TN natural threshold and the barrier threshold are almost equal - 1/151 * 100% and 1/150 * 100% respectively) to the level of 10% in the Turkish elections (which was intended to prevent the Kurdish minority from obtaining parliamentary representation) or 12% at the constituency level in the Swedish Riksdag elections.

In the case of gradual thresholds, practice also provides different solutions - in Poland these are the thresholds (in the elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland) of 5% for party committees and voters and 8% for coalitions of parties, in the aforementioned Hungarian parliamentary election system the prohibitive threshold is 5%, 10% or 15% depending on the number of entities issuing joint lists (joint lists of one entity, joint lists of two parties, joint lists of three or more parties), while in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic (the lower house of parliament) there were, until the most recent changes introduced by the 2006 reform, thresholds of 5% for a grouping running alone, 10% for a coalition of two parties, 15% for three parties and 20% for a coalition of 4 or more groups⁶.

The use of barrier thresholds has an additional relevance for those electoral methods that do not meet the monotonicity condition due to the number of parties allowed to participate in the seat distribution - i.e. quota methods, which are prone to the new state paradox. In such a situation, a grouping allowed to participate in the distribution of seats due to the fulfilment of the legal standard defining the barrier threshold would obtain more seats in the constituency when the barrier threshold is not applied. The risk of the paradox of the new state does not apply to divisive methods, which always satisfy the aforementioned monotonicity condition. This phenomenon has already been described in the chapter on electoral formulas .

In practice, the effect of the application of barrier thresholds of a particular structure and height depends on a number of factors such as the structure of constituencies and the resulting height of individual natural thresholds and, of course, the distribution of support between the various groupings. Each time they are applied - in addition to the mechanical and psychological consequences mentioned - they also affect the behaviour of institutional actors in the electoral process. Groups in danger of failing to cross the electoral threshold are likely to seek to enter into agreements to avoid this risk⁷. Such an action should be considered rational, although it is also possible for groupings that put up candidates to participate in the electoral process despite being fully aware that it is impossible for them to cross the barrier thresholds. This may be the case, in particular, when the participation of a given grouping in the electoral process is not aimed at a real fight for taking over seats, but is intended to serve other purposes - e.g. to promote the leader or to introduce a particular topic into the public debate. Ultimately, the thresholds may have both a small direct effect on the outcome of the election, e.g. when all major political groupings running candidates achieve results well above the threshold (although there may then be an indirect effect of the thresholds in the form of a consolidation of the main political groupings). On the other hand, especially in the case where one of the groupings running in the elections does not reach the support required by the barrier threshold, but wins a slightly lower number of votes, the level of deformation caused by this can be significant. Table 41 provides a summary of simulations of the results of elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in electoral districts, using voting results from 1993-2015, for the four electoral methods analysed in the variants without the prohibitive thresholds and with the prohibitive thresholds consistent with those used in a given election (in each case this means 5% for political party committees and voters' committees and 8% for committees of coalitions of political parties). For the simulation relating to the 1993 and 1997 results, seats distributed on a statewide level were omitted. The calculated difference in the number of seats obtained in each election with and without the barrier threshold was expressed as an absolute value, hence the sum of the differences should be understood as the sum of the changes, not as the number of seats that shifted between the committees. The results are presented only for those committees that gained at least one seat in at least one variant analysed. The results of the 1989 and 1991 elections were not analysed, in the first case due to the application of a completely different electoral formula and the fact that those elections did not fulfil the conditions necessary to be considered free, and in the second case due to the non-application of barrier thresholds in those elections (for the distribution of seats in constituencies - at the level of the national list the threshold functioned). While, in the author's opinion, it is reasonable to carry out simulations using the results of voting in elections in which statutory thresholds were applied also for the situation in which these thresholds would not have been present, the reverse action is without justification. The lack of application of thresholds at constituency level in the 1991 elections conditioned the adoption of specific strategies by individual electoral actors, which did not necessarily presuppose the attainment of a certain level of support of 5% or more. The simulation is justified because if the statutory thresholds are applied, they are taken into account in the creation of strategies of individual political actors, which does not mean that each of them manages to achieve the planned goal, but it can be assumed that the adopted assumptions are not contradictory to those which would apply if the thresholds were not applied - it is difficult to imagine that individual groups would then stop aiming at maximising their electoral result and lower the planned goal expressed by the share of a given group in the set of valid votes cast.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ An example of such a solution is the electoral system applied in the elections to the German Bundestag, in which, as an alternative to the threshold of 5% of the votes validly cast nationwide, there is also a threshold for a given group to obtain 3 direct seats (allocated in single-mandate districts); as an example, there is also the electoral system used in the elections to the Sejm of the first term of the Republic of Poland (in 1991), in which participation in the distribution of seats from the national list was conditional on the district lists linked to the national list obtaining at least 5% of the validly cast votes or obtaining seats in at least 5 districts. Art. 100 ust. 2, Ustawa z dnia 28 czerwca 1991 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1991 nr 59 poz. 252.

² M. Rulka, Progi wyborcze – analiza prawnoporównawcza, „Studia Wyborcze” 2009, tom 8, pp. 31.

³ D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, pp. 101.

⁴ M. Pellicer, E. Wegner, the mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds, „Electoral Studies” 2014, Vol. 33, pp. 258-259.

⁵ P. Uziębło, Wpływ systemów wyborczych na systemy partyjne (wybrane zagadnienia), „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2001, nr. 3, pp. 76.

⁶ A. Renwick, Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Czech Republic, http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/Files/media/MEDIA_127/FILE/Czech_Republic_summary.pdf [dostęp 01.05.2016 r.], pp. 7.

⁷ Although one can also point to examples to the contrary, in particular the Coalition Committees Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy in 2001 and the Zjednoczona Lewica SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni in 2015. Both committees obtained support higher than the basic electoral threshold (5% each time), but due to the form of the committee they were obliged to exceed a higher threshold (8%), which they failed to do. In these cases, the decision to elect such a form of committee should be considered a serious mistake, which consequently eliminated these groupings from the parliamentary platform (in the case of the AWSP permanently, and in the case of the Zjednoczona Lewica - or rather the groupings comprising it, as this formula of cooperation was terminated by them after the 2015 elections - at least for one term).

Electoral formula

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 11:59:07 GMT

What is an electoral formula?

While the structure of the electoral wards is the most important factor in translating the results of the vote into the distribution of seats at the national level (or at another general level - e.g. the provincial level in the case of local elections), the distribution of seats within a ward depends most strongly on the application of a particular electoral formula. An electoral formula is a function that transforms the set of decisions made by voters in a constituency into a set of seats to be allocated within that constituency.

Among the electoral formulas, two groups can be distinguished - majority and proportional formulas. Some typologies also distinguish an intermediate type. Electoral formulae, due to their importance for the functioning of the electoral system as a whole, as well as the fact that they focus the interest of both politicians and public opinion (especially when it changes), usually determine the names of entire systems - hence we may encounter, for example, the term d'Hondt proportional representation system.

Historically, the first formulas used were majority formulas, characterised by relative simplicity of operation. A "pure" or "model" example of how this formula works is the FPTP (first past the post) formula for single-mandate constituencies. In this case, the seat is allocated to the candidate with the highest number of votes in the constituency (relative majority). In addition to the highest support condition, some majority formulae impose additional ones - the requirement to obtain a certain support (absolute majority or expressed as a percentage of voters/voters) or the requirement to have a certain proportion of eligible voters in the constituency (usually 50%) participate in the vote. If the additional conditions are not met, a re-vote (the so-called second round) is held, in which the set of candidates is reduced according to the adopted criteria. In the repeat vote, it is usually sufficient to obtain a relative majority, although there are also cases of additional requirements. Majority formulas are also used in multi-member constituencies, in which seats are allocated to candidates in turn according to the number of votes obtained.

The proportional representation formulae historically developed later than the majority formulae and, moreover, originally served not to allocate seats within a constituency, but to distribute seats between constituencies. The basic idea behind them is to ensure that the share of a given group's votes in the constituency pool is mapped as accurately as possible onto the share of seats to be distributed in the constituency.

The most important element of the electoral formula is the electoral method and, in addition to this, the electoral threshold.

What is an electoral method?

Methods of majority representation

Majority representation formulas use methods based on several types of majority. The most commonly used is the relative majority method - in this case, the seat is given to the candidate who obtained the most votes in the constituency (or, in the case of multi-member constituencies, those candidates who obtained the most votes consecutively). It does not matter how many votes (what proportion of them) he or she actually won - what matters is that it was more than any of the candidates. Alternatively, the absolute majority method is used. In this case, the support of more than half of the voters is required to win a seat. If none of the candidates obtains such a majority, it is necessary to trigger additional measures, such as holding a run-off election, with a smaller number of candidates (usually 2). Some systems use an intermediate solution - there is a requirement for a certain majority, but it is not 50%. Most often this means a lower value (e.g. 40%).

The relative majority method is used in elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland (since 2011 in single-mandate districts, previously in multi-mandate districts) and in elections of councils of smaller municipalities, while the absolute majority method was used, for example, in the elections of the Sejm of the People's Republic of Poland and the Senate of the People's Republic of Poland in 1989.

In addition to the requirement for a majority (relative or absolute), there are sometimes additional requirements - e.g. to obtain a certain level of support among all those eligible to vote or for a minimum required voter turnout.

Proportional representation methods

The electoral formulas for proportional representation make use of different methods of seat allocation, to which they also owe their names. We can divide seat allocation methods into two types: largest residual methods (a.k.a. quota methods, a priori quotient methods) and divisor methods (a.k.a. largest number methods, a posteriori quotient methods)¹.

Maximum residual methods

A common feature of quota residual methods is that they are based on so-called electoral quotients. The electoral quotients take various, albeit similar, forms, the simplest being V/S, obtained by dividing the number of validly cast votes (V) by the seats to be distributed in the district (S). By modifying the simple representation quotient, it is possible to obtain further methods of distributing seats and thus further electoral formulas. Subsequent modifications of the quotient by artificially increasing its denominator (adding fictitious seats to it) may be advantageous for the grouping with the largest support, as they make it easier to win at least half (or, by analogy, a majority) of the seats in the district.

The procedures used in the allocation of seats by means of the largest residual methods are relatively simple. Most often, in the first stage, the number of votes won from the constituency by each group (vi) is divided by the electoral quotient adopted. The individual groupings are allocated (in the first stage) a number of seats equal to the total of the quotient obtained. Except in extreme cases, no seats are allocated to any party after this division. In the second stage, the seats that have not yet been distributed are allocated to the parties with the highest remainder when dividing the number of votes obtained in the constituency by the electoral quotient applied (i.e. the parties with the highest remainder, hence the name)².

The quota method applied under Polish conditions is the Hare-Niemeyer method, using Hare's simple quotient and adapted to the distribution of seats between candidate lists. It was used in the 1991 elections to the Polish Sejm.

Divider methods

The largest average methods, also known as the largest divisor methods, use methods based on ranking the successive quotients formed by dividing the number of votes obtained by each grouping in a district by the successive divisors inherent in the method. The simplest of these, and one of the most widely used in the democratic world, is the d'Hondt method. This method uses a procedure whereby the successive divisors used to calculate the quotients attributed to the groupings concerned are successive natural numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6...). From the resulting series of quotients, the highest values are chosen equal to the number of seats to be allocated and the share of the quotients attributed to a particular group in the resulting set represents the number of seats obtained by that group. This method is the most widely used in Polish elections. What is particularly important, it has been used since 1993 (with a break in 2001) for the distribution of seats in elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. In addition, it has its uses in local government council elections and European Parliament elections.

Other electoral methods are also used among the methods of greatest divisors. The most popular, apart from the d'Hondt method, are the Sainte-Laguë method and its various modifications (the so-called modified Sainte-Laguë methods). These are also the only major-divisor methods used, apart from the d'Hondt method, in the electoral systems of the Third Republic. In its classical form, the Sainte-Laguë method uses a set of divisors, which are consecutive odd natural numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9...). Its modifications, however, consist in changing the first divisor (1) by assigning it a different value. In Polish practice, a modified Sainte-Laguë method with the first divisor being 1.4 was used. In its classical form, the Sainte-Laguë method was used in Poland in municipal council elections in 1990 and 1994, while in its modified version (in the presented form) - in the 1991 elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland with respect to the distribution of seats between national lists of particular groupings and in 2001 with respect to the distribution of all seats in districts.

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ M. Pierzgalski, Metody ilościowe w badaniu systemów wyborczych na przykładach z państw Azji Wschodniej, Łódź 2012, pp. 25. D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, pp. 103.

² M. Gallagher, Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems, „Electoral Studies”, Volume 10, Issue 1, 1991, pp. 38.

Structure of electoral districts

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 11:50:24 GMT

What is an electoral district?

One of the basic elements that make up a given electoral system and determine the effects of its functioning in practice is the division of the territory of the state (or another - e.g. a voivodeship in the case of local government elections) into constituencies.

In the simplest terms, a constituency is understood as a separate part of the area in which elections to the collegiate body are held, where votes are aggregated and seats distributed. Sometimes constituencies do not fulfil the latter function, e.g. in the elections to the European Parliament, where the area of Poland is divided into 13 constituencies, but they do not serve to divide the seats between political groupings (this is done at the national level).

Electoral district functions

The division of the area in which the elections are held serves several functions:

Enabling proportional representation of different regions in the composition of the elected body, which is particularly important in the case of conflict between the centre and the periphery.
Reducing the electoral offer (number of candidates) presented directly to each voter, so that he or she is in a better position to know the offer presented to him or her and to make a choice in line with his or her interests and views.
Determining the actual level of proportionality of the electoral system and influencing the final outcome of the electoral formula. It can be argued that while the reformulation of the constituency voting results into election results is directly dependent on the electoral formula used, the reformulation of the voting result at the level of the overall elected body into the overall election result is primarily dependent on the structure of the constituencies.

Electoral districts division

Firstly, elecotral districts are divided into those in which seats are distributed among political groups and those in which seats are not distributed.

Where seats are apportioned in the constituencies, they are divided according to the number of seats to be apportioned in the constituency. The basic distinction is between first-past-the-post ("FPTP") and single non-transferable vote ("SNTV").

The multi-mandate constituencies in place include both two-mandate and three-mandate constituencies, as well as constituencies where all the seats are allocated (which, for example, means a 150-mandate constituency in Dutch lower house elections and a 120-mandate constituency in Israel). The use of a nationwide constituency makes it possible to achieve a very proportional distribution of seats in relation to the results of the vote.

Terms such as 'small', 'medium' or 'large' electoral districts are often used to describe constituencies. There is no single, universally applicable rule to distinguish between these terms and their meanings. Undoubtedly, however, as e.g. P. Uziębło points out, "constituencies with fewer than a dozen or so seats have a significant impact on the deformations that occur, which increase as the number of such seats filled in them decreases"¹.

In the case of proportional elections, larger constituencies (i.e. the more seats there are in each constituency) allow for an electoral outcome more in line with the results of the vote.

Elections in Poland have used, and continue to use, electoral districts of very different sizes. These include single-seat constituencies (e.g. in elections to the Senate since 2011 or in elections to councils of small municipalities), constituencies with a few seats (e.g. constituencies with 1 to 5 seats, which were previously used in small municipalities), constituencies that can be called medium-sized (most constituencies in elections to the Sejm) and finally constituencies where all the seats are distributed (a nationwide constituency in elections to the European Parliament).

How are electoral districts created?

In practice, there are various models for dividing the area in which elections are held into electoral districts. The first possibility is to divide the area into equal units (by which is meant equality within the adopted margin) in terms of a specific criterion (e.g. number of inhabitants or persons entitled to vote) - this is characteristic in the case of elections conducted according to the majority formula (e.g. elections to the lower chamber of parliament in France and local elections in Poland in communes with up to 40 000 inhabitants in 1990 and 1994 and in communes that are not cities with the rights of poviats in 2014). The second option, mainly appropriate for proportional elections, is to divide the area into units of different sizes. The most commonly used and simplest, and relatively uncontroversial, method of such division is to base it on the administrative division of the area in which the election is held. This can be seen most clearly in the case of elections to the parliaments of individual countries, but it may also apply to other electoral systems - in Poland, in elections to the European Parliament, the basis for establishing the district structure is the division into provinces (in practice, a district covers the area of a province - 7 out of 13, several provinces - 4, or part of a province - 2), and in elections to local government bodies: districts in elections to Sejmiks (regional assemblies) are established taking into account the structure of counties (and cities with county rights), in elections to county councils - the structure of municipalities, and in the case of municipalities - the auxiliary units of the municipality. The number of seats should then depend on the criterion adopted (e.g. the number of inhabitants or persons eligible to vote; a breakdown based on the number of votes actually cast is also possible). On the other hand, if a ward is used in which all the seats are distributed, there is no warding. The methods indicated may, moreover, occur in various combinations, particularly in electoral systems with different levels of seat distribution.

Manipulation using electoral districts

Malapportionment

Ensuring perfect substantive equality of elections, including at the stage of dividing the area in which the elections are held, is impossible in practice. This is a direct result of the indivisibility of the seats (it is not possible to attribute a district, as well as a grouping or candidate, to a part of a seat).

Unfortunately, in practice, it happens that the number of seats assigned to particular districts does not comply with the adopted principles. As a result, in some constituencies too many (or too few) representatives are elected in relation to how many should be elected (taking into account the criterion adopted - e.g. the number of inhabitants). This phenomenon of unequal representation is referred to as malapportionment. It can have various causes, e.g. it can result from a failure to update the number of seats in particular districts in response to demographic changes and population migrations. Such a problem is currently encountered, for example, in the case of elections to the Polish Sejm.

This can be countered, among other things, by delegating the determination of the number of district seats to independent (expert) bodies or by imposing a legal obligation on the bodies responsible for determining the number of district seats to update at specified intervals.

Gerrymandering

A specific form of electoral manipulation using constituencies is gerrymandering. It involves deliberately shaping the boundaries of an electoral district in such a way that the predicted pattern of support within the district has the effect of ensuring that the election result desired by the electorate is achieved. It is named after Massachusetts Governor Eldbridge Gerry, who in 1812 signed a law changing the structure of electoral districts so that one was shaped to resemble a salamander. This was an example of manipulation to ensure that representatives of the Liberal Democrat Party (to which Gerry belonged) would win in more constituencies. The phenomenon of gerrymandering poses a real threat to the preservation of electoral equality and, as a consequence, can lead to a loss of voter confidence in the electoral process.

This can be countered, among other things, by delegating the setting of constituency boundaries or requesting changes to them to independent (expert) or pluralised bodies.

A specific type of gerrymandering is the so-called 'consensual gerrymandering' occurring, for example, in the United States of America, where the two dominant political forces - the Democratic Party and the Republican Party - are guaranteed to maintain a functioning district division that benefits both parties through the existence of districts that are safe for them (so-called 'strongholds'), which leads to the consolidation of the dominance of both actors on the American political scene and makes it difficult for other political forces to break through².

Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ P. Uziębło, Zasada równości wyborów parlamentarnych w państwach europejskich i południowoamerykańskich, Warszawa 2013, pp. 121.

² M. Pierzgalski, Metody ilościowe w badaniu systemów wyborczych na przykładach z państw Azji Wschodniej, Łódź 2012, pp. 39-40.

Electoral system

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 11:12:09 GMT

What is an electoral system?

The set of definitions of the electoral system is relatively broad and it is impossible to identify a single, universally accepted definition. The concept also exists in broad and narrow (sensu largo and stricto) terms.

The broad view - which is most prevalent in states without long and stable democratic traditions - encompasses the totality of norms, conditions and processes concerning the electoral process, including electoral law. From this perspective, the electoral system is the totality of rules and principles (both legal and non-legal) that determine the preparation and conduct of voting and the determination of election results¹.

However, in political science, and especially in the study of elections and electoral systems, the concept of electoral system sensu stricto is more commonly used. This means the patterns of behaviour according to which voters express their preference for a party and/or a candidate in their vote and the methods of transforming electoral results into mandate results. Electoral systems regulate this process by defining:

the structure of electoral districts (their number, boundaries and the number of seats to be distributed in each district),
the methods of voting (in other words, the powers of the voter when voting - how many votes he or she has, whether he or she can accumulate them, etc.),
the way in which the election results are determined (this is determined by the electoral formula and the elements contained therein such as the electoral method or the statutory electoral thresholds)².

Is there a single, exemplary and most democratic electoral system?

The mosaic of electoral systems developed in democratic states is extremely diverse. Not only is it impossible to speak of one or only one "democratic electoral system", but it must be noted that the solutions used are often very far from each other, and the implementation of the various functions of elections occurs with varying degrees of intensity.

Types of electoral systems

The primary determinant for grouping electoral systems is the application of a particular principle of representation. Traditionally, a distinction is made between majority and proportional systems (sometimes this distinction is supplemented by mixed systems).

The classification of a particular electoral system as either majority or proportional depends firstly on what the purpose of the system in question is. In science, this is referred to as the principle of representation or the objective of representation.

In a majority system, the aim is to give one party (or the smallest possible coalition) a majority of seats in a collegiate body, enabling it to govern, without it being important whether the party has received the support of a majority of voters. The main function of elections in this case is to ensure a majority capable of forming a cabinet (government). In a proportional system, the principle (objective) of representation is to ensure that the public (electoral) support of the various groupings is reflected as perfectly as possible in the elected collegiate body. In other words, the majority principle of representation presupposes such a transformation of votes into seats (seats, e.g. in the Sejm) that the share of one of the factions is significant enough to form a government (which most often means a share of more than half of the seats), while the proportional principle of representation presupposes as perfect a reflection as possible of each party's support among voters in the distribution of seats between the parties.

So-called mixed systems remain a separate issue. There is no consensus among election researchers as to whether such a group should be considered or whether each system should be classified into one of the two basic groups. If we consider that such a group should be distinguished, then we would include such systems that attempt to implement both principles in parallel.

Very often, especially in journalistic and colloquial language, electoral systems are given names referring to the type of system (majority, proportional) and the method used in it. Hence, we may come across the term 'D'Hondt proportional system' or 'relative majority system'. Sometimes, especially in the case of proportional systems, it is sufficient to specify the method itself ('D'Hondt system'). By contrast, for the most popular majority system (relative majority system in single-member constituencies), the short name 'majority system' is often used. These are simplifications, of course, but their use on a day-to-day basis makes communication much easier.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, based on: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ B. Banaszak, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2015, pp. 300.

² D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, pp. 53.

Elections

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 10:24:01 GMT

What are elections?

Elections are a widespread phenomenon that is characteristic of the developed world and, at the same time, should be understood as a phenomenon that performs different functions and thus occupies different places in different political systems. The very concept of elections implies a cyclical process of appointing representatives to specific positions or functions by a given group.

Elections can involve different forms of government, and different social groups - from formalised groups like associations or unions to the level of the nation (society), where they serve to appoint representatives to perform functions and positions of state power. Elections are not the only technique that can be used to achieve such a goal; others, such as appointment or establishment by succession¹, also function.

Do elections mean democracy?

The concept of elections is often, in an automatic, not to call it natural, associated with a settlement of a democratic nature. This coincides with the definition of elections as a democratic method of appointing people to a community-specific representative body or to positions of leadership. This definition can be applied both in the context of public authority and in other areas of social life in which direct participation of members of a community in consultation and decision-making is not possible and the responsibilities of participation in authority have been democratically ceded to representatives or to persons holding positions of authority.

Defining elections as a democratic form of (ceding) the establishment of power must, however, be juxtaposed with the reality that elections are common in both democracies and systems that cannot be considered democratic².

Elections devoid of democratic content can be used in various processes of selection and establishment of representatives in non-democratic (authoritarian) political systems. Their understanding, their meaning and the catalogue of functions performed will then be different.

The understanding of elections in the various political systems determines the freedom of action of the political actors, the range of possible options from which the choice is made and the actual freedom to choose from the resulting offer. There is a fundamental difference between a situation in which the voter has a (limited) opportunity to choose candidates of only one political formation and a situation in which the palette of possibilities presented to him is wider and includes various candidates of different political groupings - both hitherto ruling and opposition.

Importance of elections

The importance of elections varies from one political system to another. Unsurprisingly, it is widest and most prominent in democratic systems, but it would be a mistake to conclude that only in these systems do elections have any role. The link between elections and democracy has already been mentioned above - without elections (according to the democratic definition, i.e. without open competition between social forces and political groups in a competition for power) there can be no democracy. In such a system, elections are the only (or, under certain conditions, the most important) source of legitimisation of political leadership and political power. In democracies, legitimacy through elections is twofold - firstly in relation to the political actors who, as a result of specific elections, gain the right to exercise power; secondly, elections are a source of legitimacy for the entire political system both on a formal level - by legitimising the way in which power is exercised - and in terms of the public consciousness relating to the actions of political systems.

This is different in authoritarian systems, including consolidated authoritarianisms. The latter, called totalitarianisms, do not use elections to legitimise power. The legitimisation of power and of the political system is derived in other ways, such as relying on the historical mission of the working class in the totalitarian system of the USSR. In these political systems, elections, being under the total control of the centre of power, are a tool (instrument) of rule, not its basis. By contrast, in authoritarian systems using semirationalist elections, they legitimise existing power relations and provide the basis for their continuation. The system does not allow for the possibility of a change of power, however, there is the possibility of articulating the collective interests of the opposition to a limited extent. The outcome of the vote is not precisely determined, leaving the possibility for it to be shaped (e.g. by the level of turnout or the amount of support for those in power), which can have implications for political power.

Function of elections in democracies

The mosaic of functions that elections can perform involves this multiplicity and variety of occurrence in systems of different nature. In practice, the set of functions performed by elections in democratic systems depends on three groups of factors:

The existing sociopolitical divisions and conflict resolution mechanisms in society, the presence of classes, social strata, distinct ethnic and religious groups, interest groups (including organised and unorganised), and the relations between them, the nature and depth of social antagonisms.
The structure of the political system and, in particular, the regime (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentary-cabinet rule, committee rule, etc.), the nature of the unitary or composite state, the mechanisms in operation for resolving conflicts between parliamentary factions or between other institutionalised actors (e.g. between the constituent parts of a federal state).
The structure of the party system and the degree of development of both the system and individual political parties, including the number of parties in the system and patterns of interaction.

The catalogue of functions that elections can fulfil in a democratic system is not clearly established, and should furthermore be regarded as variable with the development of modern social relations³. We can include:

Legitimisation of the political system and the faction (party or coalition) in power.
Transfer of public trust to individuals and parties (factions).
Recruitment of political elites, including regional or sub-regional elites.
Articulation of the views and beliefs of the electorate (and more broadly of those eligible to vote who do not consciously exercise their right to vote).
Social mobilisation.
Increased awareness of social problems and challenges facing the state and society in the population.
Controlling, directing and mitigating social conflicts.
Formation of community political will.
Realising the struggle for political power and moving it to the programmatic level.
Forming the government (as well as other institutions - e.g. the executive bodies of local authorities) or enabling its formation by shaping the composition of the collegiate body (where no grouping has an independent majority, the government is formed as a result of inter-party arrangements, in which, however, the potential of the individual actors depends on the outcome of the elections).
Forming a parliamentary majority and an opposition (and analogous institutions e.g. at local government level).
Enabling a change of power.

Function of elections in non-democracies

The set of possible functions of elections held in totalitarian systems, for obvious reasons, is limited. These elections cannot perform functions that require the existence of different electoral offerings alternative to each other and the possibility of making an unfettered choice from among the various proposals. Elections are then to be understood as an instrument of power for its stabilisation. They are used to mobilise the public, or to communicate to the public the objectives of state policy and the means of achieving them.

In authoritarian systems, semirational elections may have a broader catalogue of functions, although they are similarly focused on stabilising the system. In addition, they may perform functions of:

Partial or full legitimisation of existing power relations.
The articulation of collective (including opposition) interests.
Improving the perception of the state in the international arena, especially by elites and societies of democratic states and international organisations based on or referring to democratic values.
Enabling changes, including personnel changes, in power structures.
Disclosing (under certain conditions also disintegrating) the opposition.

The information presented in the table makes it possible to note the distance between the meaning and functions of elections in the different political systems. If the catalogue of functions performed by elections in democracies is taken as a reference point, elections in authoritarian systems may (but need not) fulfil - at least in part - most of them. The exception is the settlement of the exercise of power through elections, which is specific only to democratic systems. The role of elections in consolidated authoritarianisms is different - they do not (and cannot) fulfil the vast majority of the functions considered. The exception is the raising of citizens' awareness, which is a function fulfilled by elections in all systems, but it is heterogeneous in nature.

Maciej Onasz, based on Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ Wybory, [in:] A. Sokala, B. Michalak, P. Uziębło, Leksykon prawa wyborczego i referendalnego oraz systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2013, pp. 271-272.

² As recently as 2000, parliamentary elections were not held in only 24 countries, but this does not allow the conclusion that all the others were democracies; A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Systemy polityczne współczesnego świata, Gdańsk 2004, pp. 208.

³ D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004. pg. 31. Compare with: K. Skotnicki, Wpływ funkcji wyborów na prawo wyborcze i system wyborczy. Zarys problematyki, „Przegląd Sejmowy”, nr 2(79), Warszawa 2007, pp. 11-28.

What has voter turnout been like in presidential elections since 1990?

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Fri, 17 May 2024 09:50:02 GMT

Interest in the presidential elections in Poland

Voter turnout is one of the most important indicators showing the degree of citizens' involvement in the electoral process and their interest in politics. In Poland, voter turnout during presidential elections has varied over the years. However, it is worth noting that among all types of nationwide voting, turnout during presidential elections has reached the highest values for years.

The highest turnout in presidential elections was recorded during the second round in 1995, when it exceeded 68%. In contrast, the lowest turnout was during the first round of elections in 2015, when the turnout was less than 49%. As the chart shows, from the fall of communism in Poland until 2000, turnout remained relatively similar. In the following 3 election years, it fell slightly to return to its former levels again in 2020. Comparing the turnout in the second round of elections in the two extreme years, 1990 and 2020, at the level of unified electoral districts, it can be seen that in the south of the country it remained at or above 60%, while in the other regions it increased by several percentage points.

Comparison of turnout in the second round of the 1990 and 2020 presidential elections.

Spatial differentiation of voter turnout over the years

The spatial distribution of turnout looks even more interesting in Professor Przemysław Śleszyński's analysis published in the 2018 "Atlas Wyborczy Polski" . It shows that the regional differentiation of this phenomenon is relatively large in our country:

"This is influenced by historical-cultural, socio-political conditions and processes of social modernisation. In the first case, a division into civilisation-cultural regions becomes apparent. Societies that are better educated, more religious and have been exercising their civic rights for longer (Galicia, the former Prussian Partition, areas of settlement of small gentry) participate more frequently in social life, as - probably - they better understand the link between individual participation and group or even national responsibility and concern for the common good. The societies of the so-called Western and Northern Territories and the former Congress Kingdom (with minor exceptions), on the other hand, have been somehow accustomed to state interventionism in historical times, and therefore have a weaker awareness of socio-political mechanisms and a greater conviction that it is the state that should bail them out of responsibility for public affairs."

The following maps are taken from the aforementioned Atlas. They show the spatial variation of turnout at municipality level. It can be seen on them that usually an elevated value of the turnout rate occurs in the area stretching from Kaszuby, through Wielkopolska towards Śląsk. It then passes eastwards through Małopolska to the eastern border. Professor Śleszyński points out that:

"The indicated area on the map resembles a slightly curved letter 'L' in shape. Interestingly, it was identified much earlier in studies on the industrialisation and socio-economic development of the country by Professor Stanisław Leszczycki (the so-called 'L' of Leszczycki) and was explained precisely by higher civic activity. On this basis, it can be concluded that the determinants of turnout are quite persistent and rooted in local communities, regardless of more general socio-political factors."

In our next blog posts we will look at other phenomena related to the spatial determinants of elections in Poland, so we encourage you to follow our social media profiles today, where we will keep you updated.

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Senatu RP 2011-2019

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:23:05 GMT

Wybory w latach 2011-2019 zostały przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w Konstytucji RP oraz w ustawie Kodeks wyborczy. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ wyraźnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego w okresie 2001-2007 w odniesieniu do struktury okręgów wyborczych.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Senatu RP w latach 2011-2019, obszar kraju został podzielony na 100 jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych w których rozdzielano 100 mandatów senatorskich. Obszar okręgów w wyborach do Senatu zawierały się w siatce okręgów w wyborach do Sejmu.

W każdym okręgu wybierano jednego senatora.

Co istotne, wybory do Senatu nie realizowały zasady równości (zasada ta nie obowiązywała w odniesieniu do wyborów do Senatu w przepisach konstytucyjnych). Liczba mieszkańców przypadających na jeden mandat w poszczególnych okręgach była bardzo zróżnicowana.

Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez kandydatów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 44 (część Warszawy obejmująca dzielnice: Białołęka, Bielany, Śródmieście, Żoliborz).

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Senatu RP w okresie 2011-2019 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji większościowej wykorzystującej metodę większości względnej w jednomandatowych okręgach wyborczych (FPTP). Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 40 okręgów wyborczych.

Sposób głosowania

Każdy z wyborców dysponował jednym głosem . Głos oddawał na wybranego kandydata spośród zgłoszonych w okręgu . Mandat uzyskiwał ten kandydat, który uzyskał najwięcej głosów. W przypadku zwolnienia mandatu, konieczne było przeprowadzenie wyborów uzupełniających.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Senatu RP 2001-2007

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:23:02 GMT

Wybory w latach 1991-1997 zostały przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w Konstytucji RP oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ wyraźnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego w okresie 1991-1997 w odniesieniu do struktury okręgów wyborczych.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Senatu RP w latach 2001-2007, obszar kraju został podzielony na 40 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych w których rozdzielano 100 mandatów senatorskich. Okręgi te, w większości (z wyłączeniem okręgu 12 [Kraków] obejmującego obszar okręgów sejmowych 12 [Chrzanów] i 13 [Kraków]), pokrywały się z okręgami wyborczymi do Sejmu.

W okręgach wybierano od 2 do 4 senatorów.

Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez kandydatów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 18 (Warszawa).

Szczegółowy podział mandatów między okręgi został przedstawiony w tabeli:

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Senatu RP w okresie 2001-2007 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji większościowej wykorzystującej metodę większości względnej w wielomandatowych okręgach wyborczych (głosowanie blokowe). Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 40 okręgów wyborczych.

Sposób głosowania

Każdy z wyborców dysponował głosami w liczbie równej liczbie senatorów wybieranych w danym okręgu. Głosy oddawał na wybranych kandydatów spośród zgłoszonych w okręgu . Wyborca nie mógł kumulować swoich głosów (nie mógł np. oddać wszystkich dostępnych głosów na jednego kandydata), ale nie miał obowiązku wykorzystania wszystkich dostępnych mu głosów. Było to coraz większym problemem w każdych kolejnych wyborach – coraz większa część wyborców wykorzystywała tylko jeden z dostępnych im głosów. Kandydaci obejmowali mandaty w kolejności liczby uzyskanych głosów. W przypadku zwolnienia mandatu, konieczne było przeprowadzenie wyborów uzupełniających.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 12 kwietnia 2001 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 2001 nr 46 poz. 499 (z późn. zm.).

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Senatu RP 1991-1997

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:23:00 GMT

Wybory w latach 1991-1997 zostały przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w przepisach konstytucyjnych oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ wyraźnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego w roku 1989, szczególnie w odniesieniu do formuły wyborczej.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Senatu RP w latach 1991-1997, obszar kraju został podzielony na 49 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych w których rozdzielano 100 mandatów senatorskich.

Podział na okręgi odpowiadał podziałowi kraju na województwa (których wtedy było 49).

W 47 okręgach wybierano po 2 senatorów, natomiast w dwóch najludniejszych (województwa warszawskie oraz katowickie) – po 3.

Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez kandydatów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu obejmującego województwo warszawskie.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Senatu RP w latach 1991-1997 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji większościowej wykorzystującej metodę większości względnej w wielomandatowych okręgach wyborczych (głosowanie blokowe). Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 49 okręgów wyborczych.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 10 maja 1991 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1991 nr 58 poz. 246 (z późn. zm.).

System Wyborczy w wyborach do sejmików województw 1998-2018

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:59 GMT

Wybory do Sejmików województw są przeprowadzone w Polsce od roku 1998, w związku z wprowadzeniem trójstopniowej struktury samorządu terytorialnego z województwami jako wspólnotami samorządowymi na poziomie regionalnym. Wybory te były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego bazującego na normach konstytucyjnych (choć tylko ogólnych), ustawie o samorządzie województwa oraz w ustawach: początkowo Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw a następnie ustawy Kodeks wyborczy.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do sejmików województw, obszar każdego województwa jest dzielony na wielomandatowe okręgi wyborcze o różnej liczbie mandatów. Okręgiem jest powiat (względnie miasto na prawach powiatu), kilka powiatów lub część powiatu.

Liczba radnych w poszczególnych sejmikach jest zależna od liczby mieszkańców danego województwa (a w praktyce – liczby mieszkańców wpisanych do stałych rejestrów wyborców).

Początkowo, liczba radnych w sejmikach wynosiła 45 w województwach liczących do 2 mln.

mieszkańców oraz dodatkowych 5 radnych na każde kolejne rozpoczęte 500 tys. Mieszkańców powyżej 2 mln. Później (od wyborów w roku 2002) liczbę radnych ograniczono do 30 w województwach liczących do 2 mln. mieszkańców oraz 3 na każde kolejne rozpoczęte 500 tys.

W wyborach samorządowych (w tym do sejmików) głosowanie odbywa się wyłącznie na obszarze Polski.

Liczba radnych wybieranych do każdego z sejmików w kolejnych wyborach została przedstawiona w tabeli.

Liczba radnych wybieranych w poszczególnych okręgach wynosiła od 5 do 15.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do sejmików województw w okresie 1998-2018 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej metodę wyborczą d’Hondta. Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 41 okręgów wyborczych.

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego województwa . Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 5% ważnie oddanych głosów . Nie wprowadzono natomiast wyższego progu dla koalicji ani możliwości zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia progu przez komitety wyborców zrzeszonych w organizacjach mniejszości narodowych.

Wyjątkiem były wybory przeprowadzone w roku 2006 , w których zastosowano tzw. blokowanie list (tworzenie grup list). Komitety wyborcze mogły zdecydować, że w wyborach do danego sejmiku (każdego odrębnie) utworzą blok (grupę list). Jeżeli blok (grupa list) przekroczył próg 15% ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego województwa, jego listy w każdym z okręgów były traktowane łącznie w trakcie podziału mandatów (zamiast liczby głosów każdej z list okręgowych komitetów tworzących blok uwzględniano sumę liczb głosów oddanych na listy wszystkich komitetów tworzących blok). Mandaty uzyskane przez blok list w danym okręgu były dzielone między listy poszczególnych komitetów w okręgu z wykorzystaniem metody Sainte-Laguë , jednak wyłącznie między te komitety, które przekroczyły „zwyczajny” próg wyborczy.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. - Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw; Dz.U. 1998 nr 95 poz. 602 (z późn. zm.); Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Sejmu RP 2005-2007

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:55 GMT

Wybory do Sejmu RP w okresie 2005-2007 były przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w Konstytucji RP oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. W porównaniu z wyborami w roku 2001, zmianie uległa metoda wyborcza oraz dostosowano liczbę mandatów w części okręgów do zmian demograficznych.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Sejmu RP w okresie 2005-2007, obszar kraju został podzielony na 41 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych o różnej liczbie mandatów. Okręgiem mogło być województwo lub część województwa. Granice okręgów nie mogły przecinać granic powiatów lub miast na prawach powiatu.

Najmniejszym okręgiem był Okręg nr. 29 (OKW Częstochowa) w którym wybierano 7 posłów, największym zaś Okręg nr. 19 (OKW Warszawa), w którym wybierano 19 posłów. Średnia liczba mandatów w okręgach wyniosła 11,22 mandatu. Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez listy poszczególnych komitetów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 19 (OKW Warszawa).

Szczegółowa lista okręgów wraz z liczbą mandatów została przestawiona w tabeli.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Sejmu RP w okresie 2005-2007 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej metodę wyborczą d’Hondta. Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 41 okręgów wyborczych.

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego kraju . Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 5% (w przypadku komitetu partii politycznej [ KW ] oraz komitetu wyborczego wyborców [ KWW ]) lub 8% (komitet koalicji partii politycznych [ KKW ]). Komitety wyborcze wyborców zrzeszonych w organizacjach mniejszości narodowych miały prawo do zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia progu.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

fot. Rafał Zambrzycki

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Sejmu RP 2011-2019

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:54 GMT

Wybory do Sejmu RP w okresie 2011-2019 były przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w Konstytucji RP oraz w ustawie Kodeks wyborczy.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Sejmu RP w okresie 2011-2019, obszar kraju został podzielony na 41 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych o różnej liczbie mandatów. Okręgiem mogło być województwo lub część województwa. Granice okręgów nie mogły przecinać granic powiatów lub miast na prawach powiatu.

Najmniejszym okręgiem był Okręg nr. 29 (z siedzibą Okręgowej Komisji Wyborczej w Częstochowie) w którym wybierano 7 posłów, największym zaś Okręg nr. 19 (OKW Warszawa), w którym wybierano 20 posłów. Średnia liczba mandatów w okręgach wyniosła 11,22 mandatu. Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez listy poszczególnych komitetów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 19 (OKW Warszawa).

Szczegółowa lista okręgów wraz z liczbą mandatów została przestawiona w tabeli.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Sejmu RP w roku 2001 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej zmodyfikowaną metodę wyborczą Sainte-Laguë z pierwszym dzielnikiem 1,4 . Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 41 okręgów wyborczych.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

fot. Łukasz Błasikiewicz

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Sejmu RP 2001

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:52 GMT

Wybory do Sejmu RP w roku 2001 były przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w Konstytucji RP oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ radykalnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego 4 lata wcześniej. Całkowicie zmieniono strukturę okręgów wyborczych, zrezygnowano w drugiego, ogólnopolskiego poziomu podziału mandatów (tzw. listy krajowe), zmieniono również stosowaną metodę wyborczą.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Sejmu RP w roku 2001, obszar kraju został podzielony na 41 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych o różnej liczbie mandatów. Okręgiem mogło być województwo lub część województwa. Granice okręgów nie mogły przecinać granic powiatów lub miast na prawach powiatu.

Najmniejszym okręgiem były Okręg nr 12 (Chrzanów) oraz Okręg nr 29 (Częstochowa) w których wybierano 7 posłów, największym zaś Okręg nr. 19 (OKW Warszawa), w którym wybierano 19 posłów. Średnia liczba mandatów w okręgach wyniosła 11,22 mandatu. Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez listy poszczególnych komitetów w danym okręgu.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 19 (OKW Warszawa).

Szczegółowa lista okręgów wraz z liczbą mandatów została przestawiona w tabeli.

Formuła wyborcza

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego kraju. Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 5% (w przypadku komitetu partii politycznej [KW] oraz komitetu wyborczego wyborców [KWW]) lub 8% (komitet koalicji partii politycznych [KKW]). Komitety wyborcze wyborców zrzeszonych w organizacjach mniejszości narodowych miały prawo do zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia progu.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

fot. Krzysztof Kurek

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Sejmu RP 1993-1997

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:50 GMT

Wybory do Sejmu RP w okresie 1993-1997 były przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego przepisach konstytucyjnych oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ radykalnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego w roku 1991. Całkowicie zmieniono strukturę okręgów wyborczych, zmieniono również formułę wyborczą – zarówno w odniesieniu do stosowanej metody wyborczej jak i wprowadzono próg wyborczy uprawniający do udziału w podziale mandatów na poziomie okręgów. Zmieniono również progi wyborcze dla listy krajowej.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Sejmu RP w okresie 1993-1997, obszar kraju został podzielony na 52 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych w których rozdzielano (łącznie) 391 mandatów. Pozostałe 69 mandatów było rozdzielane na poziomie całego kraju (jeden okręg ogólnopolski) na podstawie liczby głosów uzyskanych przez wszystkie listy okręgowe danych ugrupowań (nie głosowano oddzielnie na listy krajowe).

Podział na okręgi bazował na podziale kraju na województwa (których wtedy było 49). Jedynie w przypadku najludniejszych województw – Warszawskiego i Katowickiego – dopuszczono ich podział, przy czym granice okręgów nie mogły naruszać granic gmin (nie było wtedy jeszcze powiatów).

Najmniejszym okręgiem były Okręg nr 3 (Województwo bialskopodlaskie) oraz Okręg nr 7 (Województwo chełmskie) w których wybierano po 3 posłów, największym zaś Okręg nr. 1 (Miasto Stołeczne Warszawa), w którym wybierano 17 posłów. Średnia liczba mandatów w okręgach wyniosła 7,52 mandatu. 391 Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez listy poszczególnych komitetów w danym okręgu. Pozostałe 69 mandatów było rozdzielane na poziomie całego kraju (okręg ogólnokrajowy) między zgłoszone listy krajowe.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 1 (Miasto Stołeczne Warszawa).

Szczegółowa lista okręgów wraz z liczbą mandatów została przestawiona w tabeli.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Sejmu RP w latach 1993-1997 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej metodę d’Hondta – zarówno w odniesieniu do 52 okręgów wyborczych jak i okręgu ogólnokrajowego. Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 52 okręgów wyborczych i oddzielnie na poziomie ogólnokrajowym.

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego kraju. Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 8% (komitet koalicji wyborczej lub 5% (pozostałe komitety). Do udziału w podziale mandatów między listy krajowe uprawniało uzyskanie przynajmniej 7% ważnie oddanych głosów w skali kraju.

Komitety wyborcze wyborców zarejestrowanych organizacji mniejszości narodowych miały prawo do zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia wybranego progu (albo uprawniającego do udziału w podziale mandatów w okręgach albo uprawniającego do udziału w podziale mandatów między listy krajowe).

Sposób głosowania

Każdy z wyborców dysponował jednym głosem , który oddawał na wybraną listę wyborczą zgłoszoną przez komitet wyborczy w okręgu wraz ze wskazaniem konkretnego kandydata z tej listy, któremu udzielał poparcia. Na poziomie okręgów zastosowano zatem listy otwarte . Kandydaci z danej listy okręgowej komitetu obejmowali mandaty w kolejności liczby uzyskanych głosów. W przypadku zwolnienia mandatu, pierwszeństwo w jego objęciu przysługiwało kolejnemu kandydatowi z tej samej listy wedle liczby uzyskanych głosów. Inaczej wyglądała sytuacja w odniesieniu do list krajowych . Wyborca nie oddawał na nie oddzielnego głosu a głos na listę okręgową automatycznie oznaczał również poparcie listy krajowej. Mandaty przyznane poszczególnym listom krajowym były przyznawane kandydatom w kolejności umieszczenia na liście (z wykluczeniem tych kandydatów, którzy uzyskali mandaty w okręgach wyborczych). Zastosowano zatem listy zamknięte .

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

fot. Krzysztof Białoskórski

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Sejmu RP 1991

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:48 GMT

Wybory do Sejmu RP w roku 1991 były pierwszymi wolnymi i demokratycznymi wyborami do Sejmu po drugiej wojnie światowej.

Wybory w roku 1991 zostały przeprowadzone z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego określonego w przepisach konstytucyjnych oraz w ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. System wyborczy do Sejmu uległ radykalnym zmianom w porównaniu do zastosowanego w roku 1989, co było niezbędna aby wybory miały charakter demokratyczny. Całkowicie zmieniono strukturę okręgów wyborczych, zmieniono również formułę wyborczą. Zmiany dotyczyły również listy krajowej.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Sejmu RP w roku 1991, obszar kraju został podzielony na 37 wielomandatowych okręgów wyborczych w których rozdzielano (łącznie) 391 mandatów. Pozostałe 69 mandatów było rozdzielane na poziomie całego kraju (jeden okręg ogólnopolski) na podstawie liczby głosów uzyskanych przez wszystkie listy okręgowe danych ugrupowań (nie głosowano oddzielnie na listy krajowe).

Podział na okręgi bazował na podziale kraju na województwa (których wtedy było 49). Okręg mógł odpowiadać województwu, kilku województwom lub części województwa.

Najmniejszym okręgiem były Okręg nr 5 (Województwo piotrkowskie), Okręg nr 15 (Województwo kaliskie), Okręg nr 27 (Województwo zamojskie i chełmskie), Okręg nr 31 (Województwo tarnowskie), Okręg nr 32 (Województwo nowosądeckie), w których wybierano po 7 posłów, największym zaś Okręg nr. 1 (Miasto Stołeczne Warszawa), w którym wybierano 17 posłów. Średnia liczba mandatów w okręgach wyniosła 10,57 mandatu. 391 Mandaty były dzielone w poszczególnych okręgach wyborczych na podstawie liczb głosów uzyskanych przez listy poszczególnych komitetów w danym okręgu. Pozostałe 69 mandatów było rozdzielane na poziomie całego kraju (okręg ogólnokrajowy) między zgłoszone listy krajowe.

Głosy obywateli polskich glosujących poza granicami Polski były wliczane do okręgu 1 (Miasto Stołeczne Warszawa).

Szczegółowa lista okręgów wraz z liczbą mandatów została przestawiona w tabeli.

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Sejmu RP w roku 1991 były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej metody Hare’a-Niemeyera oraz zmodyfikowanej metody wyborczej Sainte-Laguë z pierwszym dzielnikiem 1,4. Podział mandatów następował oddzielnie w każdym z 37 okręgów wyborczych i oddzielnie na poziomie ogólnokrajowym.

Na poziomie okręgów wyborczych zastosowanie miała metoda Hare’a-Niemeyera, powodująca nadreprezentację ugrupowań o względnie niskim poparciu. Co więcej, ugrupowania polityczne w każdym okręgu (oddzielnie) mogły zdecydować o utworzeniu bloku list. Zblokowane listy – na potrzeby podziału mandatów – były traktowane jak jedna lista. Podział mandatów wewnątrz bloku również dokonywany był z wykorzystaniem metody Hare’a-Niemeyera. Co istotne, listy mogły być blokowane w każdym okręgu niezależnie. Powodowało to, że listy tego samego ugrupowania mogły należeć w różnych okręgach do różnych (a nawet przeciwstawnych sobie) bloków.

Na poziomie ogólnokrajowym zastosowanie miała metoda zmodyfikowana metoda Sainte-Laguë z pierwszym dzielnikiem 1,4.

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego kraju , jednak miał on zastosowanie wyłącznie do podziału mandatów między listy krajowe. Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów na poziomie ogólnokrajowym, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 5% lub uzyskać mandaty przynajmniej w 5 okręgach. Co istotne, udział w podziale mandatów na poziomie 37 okręgów nie był obwarowany wymogiem przekroczenia progu.

Sposób głosowania

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

System Wyborczy w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2004-2019

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:22:44 GMT

Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego są przeprowadzone w Polsce od roku 2004, w konsekwencji wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej. Wybory te były przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem systemu wyborczego bazującego na normach konstytucyjnych (choć tylko ogólnych), ustawie Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego a następnie ustawie Kodeks wyborczy.

System wyborczy (w węższym jego rozumieniu) składa się z następujących elementów:

Struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
Sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze),
Sposobu głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.).

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

W wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego obszar całego kraju stanowi jeden okręg wyborczy. Oprócz niego, na obszarze kraju wyznaczono 13 okręgów wyborczych obejmujących obszar części województwa (2 okręgi), jednego województwa (7 okręgów) lub dwóch województw (4 okręgi).

Podział mandatów ma miejsce na poziomie okręgu obejmującego cały kraj. Liczba posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego wybranych z list w poszczególnych okręgach nie jest odgórnie ustalona. Wynikało to z potrzeby zastosowania formuły gwarantującej proporcjonalny charakter wyborów.

Liczba posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego wybieranych w Polsce zmieniała się w czasie (wynika ona z przepisów europejskich). W wyborach w roku 2004 było to 54 posłów, w roku 2009 – 50 posłów, w roku 2014 – 51 a w roku 2019 – 52.

Głosy oddane poza granicami Polski są wliczane do okręgu obejmującego Miasto Stołeczne Warszawę (Okręg 4 – Warszawa I).

Formuła wyborcza

Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego są przeprowadzane z wykorzystaniem formuły reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystującej metodę wyborczą d’Hondta oraz Hare’a-Niemeyera.

Podział mandatów między komitety wyborcze jest dokonywany na poziomie całego kraju (w praktyce cały kraj jest jednym okręgiem wyborczym). Podziału tego dokonuje się z wykorzystaniem metody d’Hondta na podstawie liczby głosów uzyskanych przez wszystkie listy okręgowe poszczególnych komitetów. Następie – w obrębie każdego komitetu oddzielnie – mandaty uzyskane przez komitet rozdziela się między jego listy okręgowe z wykorzystaniem metody Hare’a-Niemeyera. Mandaty w obrębie poszczególnych list okręgowych są przydzielane w kolejności liczby uzyskanych głosów.

W wyborach tych zastosowano próg ustawowy odnoszący się do ważnie oddanych głosów w skali całego kraju. Aby wziąć udział w podziale mandatów, listy wyborcze danego komitetu (łącznie) musiały przekroczyć próg 5% ważnie oddanych głosów . Nie wprowadzono natomiast wyższego progu dla koalicji ani możliwości zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia progu przez komitety wyborców zrzeszonych w organizacjach mniejszości narodowych.

Biorąc pod uwagę, że mandaty są rozdzielane między komitety wyborcze na poziomie okręgu wyborczego obejmującego cały kraj, nie na poziomie 13 okręgów wyborczych, wysokość progów naturalnych w tych wyborach jest relatywnie niska. Dzięki temu, wybory do parlamentu Europejskiego to jedyne wybory władz w Polsce, w których przekroczenie progu ustawowego gwarantuje w każdej sytuacji uzyskanie mandatów (a nie tylko udział w podziale mandatów).

Wyjątkowa sytuacja miała miejsce w roku 2019, gdy wybierano 52 posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego, jednak z początkiem kadencji swoje mandaty mogło objąć jedynie 51 z nich (52-i mandat mógł zostać objęty dopiero po opuszczeniu Unii Europejskiej przez Wielką Brytanię). Powstał problem, w jaki sposób wskazać kto spośród wybranych obejmie swój mandat w późniejszym terminie. W tym celu wprowadzono nowe przepisy, zgodnie z którymi czekać na objęcie mandatu musiała osoba wybrana z najmniejszą liczbą głosów z list tego ugrupowania, które uzyskało 52-i mandat na etapie podziału metodą d’Hondta .

Sposób głosowania

Każdy z wyborców dysponuje jednym głosem , który oddawał na wybraną listę wyborczą zgłoszoną przez komitet wyborczy w okręgu wraz ze wskazaniem konkretnego kandydata z tej listy, któremu udzielał poparcia. Zastosowano zatem listy otwarte . Kandydaci z danej listy okręgowej komitetu obejmowali mandaty w kolejności liczby uzyskanych głosów. W przypadku zwolnienia mandatu, pierwszeństwo w jego objęciu przysługiwało kolejnemu kandydatowi z tej samej listy wedle liczby uzyskanych głosów.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017; Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2004 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Dz.U. 2004 nr 25 poz. 219 (z późn. zm.); Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112 (z późn. zm.).

Rodzaje list wyborczych

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:07:08 GMT

Czym są listy wyborcze?

Listy wyborcze są częścią oferty wyborczej bezpośrednio przedstawianą danemu wyborcy. Najczęściej, nie zawierają one wszystkich możliwości (np. nie ma na nich wszystkich kandydatów ale jedynie kandydaci zgłoszeni w danym okręgu). Listy wyborcze wszystkich ugrupowań (lub lista kandydatów) są prezentowane wyborcy na karcie wyborczej, za pomocą której dokonuje on wyboru.

Wyróżnia się kilka typów list wyborczych:

· Listy zamknięte : w przypadku zastosowania takiej formy, wyborca ma możliwość wyłącznie oddania głosu na listę wybranej formacji (partii) jako całość. Nie może wskazać swojej preferencji odnośnie konkretnego kandydata z tej listy. Z zasady, w przypadku zastosowania takiego rodzaju list, mandaty (w obrębie danej listy) są przydzielane zgodnie z kolejnością umieszczenia kandydatów na liście. Taka forma listy była wykorzystywana do podziału mandatów między tak zwane „listy krajowe” w wyborach do Sejmu RP do roku 1997.
Listy otwarte : w przypadku zastosowania takiej formy, wyborca ma możliwość oddania głosu na listę wybranej formacji (partii) jako całość oraz na wskazanie konkretnego, preferowanego kandydata w obrębie tej listy. Z zasady, w przypadku zastosowania takiego rodzaju list, mandaty (w obrębie danej listy) są przydzielane w kolejności liczby uzyskanych głosów przez poszczególnych kandydatów. Takie listy są stosowane obecnie we wszystkich wyborach w Polsce przeprowadzanych z wykorzystaniem formuł reprezentacji proporcjonalnej.
Listy wolne : w przypadku zastosowania takiej formy, wyborca ma możliwość utworzenia własnej kombinacji spośród zgłoszonych kandydatów, nawet z różnych list (tworzy własną listę), często tworząc własny ranking kandydatów (oznaczając numerem 1 kandydata najbardziej preferowanego, numerem 2 drugiego w kolejności itd.). Takie listy stosowane są m.in. w systemie pojedynczego głosu przechodniego (STV), który nie jest jednak stosowany w Polsce.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

Naturalne progi wyborcze

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:06:51 GMT

Czym są naturalne progi wyborcze?

Naturalne progi wyborcze, w przeciwieństwie do progów ustawowych, nie wynikają wprost z zapisu prawnego. Przez próg naturalny rozumie się takie poparcie ugrupowania politycznego (listy wyborczej lub kandydata) w okręgu, którego przekroczenie zapewnia określone prawdopodobieństwo uzyskania mandatu lub wskazanej liczby mandatów. Najczęściej odnosi się je do uzyskania przynajmniej jednego mandatu w okręgu. Wyróżniamy 3 podstawowe rodzaje progów naturalnych:

Próg włączenia : informujący o tym, jakie poparcie musi przekroczyć lista (kandydat) w okręgu aby szansa na mandat była wyższa niż 0%.
Próg wyłączenia: informujący o tym, jakie poparcie musi przekroczyć lista (kandydat) w okręgu aby mieć pewność uzyskania mandatu (prawdopodobieństwo 100%).
Próg rzeczywisty : informujący o tym, jakie poparcie musi przekroczyć lista (kandydat) w okręgu aby szansa uzyskania mandatu była wyższa niż prawdopodobieństwo jego nie uzyskania (czyli szansa na mandat wyższa niż 50%).

Wysokość progu naturalnego jest zależna od kilku elementów:

Liczby mandatów, dla uzyskania których poszukiwany jest dany próg (najczęściej 1).
Stosowanej metody wyborczej.
Liczby zgłoszonych list (kandydatów) w okręgu.
Liczby głosów, którymi dysponuje wyborca (i ewentualnej możliwości ich kumulowania).

Próg włączenia

Wartość progu włączenia informuje, jaki odsetek głosów musi przekroczyć lista wyborcza (lub kandydat) w okręgu aby mieć przynajmniej minimalną szansę na uzyskanie mandatu. Zgodnie z tym rozumowaniem, uzyskanie przez listę (kandydata) choćby jednego głosu mniej uniemożliwia uzyskanie mandatu nawet przy najlepszym możliwym rozkładzie pozostałych głosów.

Najczęściej jest obliczany dla uzyskania pierwszego mandatu w okręgu. Wartości progu włączenia dla różnych metod wyborczych zostały przedstawione w tabeli. Jako S oznaczono liczbę mandatów w okręgu, natomiast jako L liczbę zgłoszonych list (a w przypadku formuł większościowych – kandydatów). Co istotne, w przypadku większości wskazanych metod (poza glosowaniem blokowym i systemem limited vote) wyborca posiada jeden głos. W przypadku głosowania blokowego – tyle głosów ile mandatów zostało przeznaczonych do podziału w okręgu, a w przypadku systemu limited vote – liczba głosów jest większa niż 1 ale mniejsza od liczby mandatów w okręgu. W żadnym z tych systemów wyborca nie może kumulować swoich głosów (np., posiadając 3 głosy oddać je wszystkie na tego samego kandydata).

Próg wyłączenia

Wartość progu wyłączenia informuje, jaki odsetek głosów musi przekroczyć lista wyborcza (lub kandydat) w okręgu aby mieć pewność uzyskania mandatu. Zgodnie z tym rozumowaniem, uzyskanie przez listę (kandydata) choćby jednego głosu mniej powoduje, że mandat nie jest w 100% pewny.

Najczęściej jest obliczany dla uzyskania pierwszego mandatu w okręgu. Wartości progu włączenia dla różnych metod wyborczych zostały przedstawione w tabeli. Jako S oznaczono liczbę mandatów w okręgu, jako L liczbę zgłoszonych list (a w przypadku formuł większościowych – kandydatów), natomiast jako G – liczbę głosów, którymi dysponuje wyborca. Co istotne, w przypadku większości wskazanych metod (poza glosowaniem blokowym i systemem limited vote) wyborca posiada jeden głos. W przypadku głosowania blokowego – tyle głosów ile mandatów zostało przeznaczonych do podziału w okręgu, a w przypadku systemu limited vote – liczba głosów jest większa niż 1 ale mniejsza od liczby mandatów w okręgu. W żadnym z tych systemów wyborca nie może kumulować swoich głosów (np., posiadając 3 głosy oddać je wszystkie na tego samego kandydata).

Próg rzeczywisty

Wartość progu wyłączenia informuje, jaki odsetek głosów musi przekroczyć lista wyborcza (lub kandydat) w okręgu aby mieć wyższą niż 50% szanse na uzyskanie mandatu.

Najczęściej, szczególnie dla pierwszego mandatu, jako wartość progu rzeczywistego podaje się 75% wartości progu wyłączenia. Do tej wartości należy jednak podchodzić z ostrożnością – w przeciwieństwie do progów włączenia i wyłączenia, nie daje ona jednoznacznej informacji.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

Progi wyborcze

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:06:23 GMT

Czym jest próg wyborczy (ustawowy)?

Próg wyborczy (inaczej próg ustawowy, próg zaporowy, klauzula zaporowa) jest jednym z elementów formuły wyborczej. Przez próg ustawowy rozumie się taką normę prawną , która uzależnia dopuszczenie do udziału w podziale mandatów (w ogóle lub na danym poziomie ich podziału) od uzyskania określonego poparcia lub spełnienia innych kryteriów. Wymagane poparcie, najczęściej wyrażone jako minimalny odsetek ważnie oddanych głosów, może zostać określone w odniesieniu do każdego okręgu lub w odniesieniu całego obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory, co będzie niosło za sobą różne konsekwencje. Można również spotkać wartość progu ustawowego określonego liczbą głosów – takie rozwiązanie stosowano we Włoszech do roku 1992. Inne kryteria mogą dotyczyć systemów wykorzystujących różne poziomy alokacji mandatów – w ich wypadku udział w podziale mandatów na danym (wyższym) poziomie może być uzależniony nie tylko od uzyskania określonego poparcia (np. wyrażanego przez minimalny odsetek ważnie oddanych głosów), ale też przez liczbę mandatów uzyskanych na innym (niższym) poziomie¹. Jako przykład można również podać system wyborczy zastosowany w wyborach do Sejmu RP I Kadencji (w roku 1991), w którym udział w podziale mandatów z listy krajowej uzależniony został od uzyskania przez listy okręgowe powiązane z listą krajową przynajmniej 5% ważnie oddanych głosów lub uzyskania mandatów w przynajmniej 5 okręgach.

Duże znaczenie ma odniesienie progów zaporowych do całego obszaru, na którym przeprowadzane są wybory (z taką sytuacją mieliśmy i mamy do czynienia w Polsce w wyborach do Sejmu RP od roku 1993) lub do poziomu każdego okręgu wyborczego z osobna (czego modelowym przykładem są wybory parlamentarne w Hiszpanii²). O ile w obu przypadkach celem zastosowania progów zaporowych jest eliminacja z udziału w podziale mandatów ugrupowań o niskim poparciu, w tym ugrupowań skrajnych, a co za tym idzie – wzmocnienie tendencji dośrodkowych systemu oraz stabilności wyłonionych instytucji (w tych akurat przypadkach – izb niższych parlamentów), to będzie działo się to w różny sposób. O ile w obu przypadkach ugrupowania o niskim poparciu zostają wykluczone z udziału w podziale mandatów, to w wypadku, gdy wyborcy danego ugrupowania nie są rozproszeni równomiernie, ale można wskazać ich skupiska – prawdopodobnie zostanie wyeliminowane z udziału w podziale mandatów wyłącznie w wypadku progu na poziomie całościowym, natomiast próg zaporowy na poziomie okręgów może w kilku przypadkach przekroczyć. W wypadku Hiszpanii próg 3% na poziomie okręgów nie wpływa na szanse ugrupowań regionalnych na dostanie się do parlamentu – w „swoich” okręgach przekraczają go bez problemu. Stosowanie progów zaporowych na poziomie okręgu służyć może właśnie dopuszczeniu do funkcjonowania w danej przestrzeni życia politycznego (w tym wypadku aktywności na płaszczyźnie parlamentarnej) reprezentantów ugrupowań regionalnych, co może mieć szczególne znaczenie w państwach zróżnicowanych etnicznie i kulturowo.

Progi zaporowe różnicuje również ich jednorodność lub stopniowalność. Ta ostatnia jest uznawana za innowację wprowadzoną w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w trakcie transformacji systemowej przeprowadzanej w ostatniej dekadzie XX wieku³. Jednorodność oznacza w tym miejscu stosowanie identycznych progów wyborczych dla każdego uczestnika wyborów bez względu na formułę komitetu lub innego ciała wystawiającego kandydatów, natomiast stopniowalność oznacza zróżnicowanie poziomu progu zaporowego ze względu na charakter podmiotu zgłaszającego kandydatów, zgodnie z założeniem, że podmioty będące koalicjami (porozumieniami) dwóch lub większej liczby ugrupowań powołanymi w celu przekroczenia progu ustawowego, co byłoby niemożliwe (lub mało prawdopodobne) w wypadku gdyby każdy z tych podmiotów startował oddzielnie, zostają zobowiązane do przekroczenia wyższego progu zaporowego. Przykładem zastosowania stopniowalnego progu zaporowego są wybory do Sejmu RP od roku 1993 (5% dla komitetów partii politycznych (KW) i komitetów wyborców (KWW) oraz wyższym – 8% - dla komitetów koalicji partii politycznych (KKW)) jak również wybory węgierskiego Zgromadzenia Narodowego (po nowelizacji w roku 2012, do udziału w podziale mandatów na poziomie ogólnopaństwowym (93 mandaty) są uprawnione listy partii politycznych, które przekroczyły 5% ważnie oddanych głosów, natomiast w przypadku zgłoszenia wspólnych list przez większą liczbę ugrupowań wysokość progu ten ulega podwyższeniu – do 10% w wypadku wspólnej listy dwóch ugrupowań oraz 15% w wypadku 3 lub większej liczby ugrupowań).

W niektórych systemach stosuje się możliwość zwolnienia określonych ugrupowań z obowiązku przekroczenia progu wyborczego. Przykładem są polskie wybory do Sejmu, w których Komitety Wyborcze Wyborców zrzeszonych w organizacjach mniejszości narodowych są uprawnione do zwolnienia z obowiązku przekroczenia progu. Wbrew często powtarzanej, obiegowej opinii – nie dotyczy to tylko mniejszości niemieckiej ale wszystkich mniejszości narodowych w Polsce.

Poziom deformacji wynikającej z zastosowania progów zaporowych może być bardzo różny. W sytuacji, gdy jego wysokość nie przekracza poziomu efektywnego progu naturalnego w okręgach, skutki jego zastosowania powinny być ograniczone, przynajmniej z punktu widzenia ugrupowań o podobnym poparciu w całym kraju. Z drugiej strony – jeśli wysokość progu zaporowego jest wyższa niż poziom progów naturalnych w okręgach, można oczekiwać, że efekt deformacyjny spowodowany przez ten próg będzie wysoki. Należy przy tym pamiętać, że w praktyce wybory proporcjonalne przeprowadza się najczęściej w okręgach o różnej wielkości, w których wysokości progów naturalnych są, siłą rzeczy, zróżnicowane.

Stosowanie progów zaporowych, niezależnie od ich odniesienia do całości obszaru wyborczego lub do poszczególnych okręgów wyborczych, wywołuje dwojakie konsekwencje. Po pierwsze wpływają one na mechanizm rozdziału mandatów między poszczególne ugrupowania przez ewentualną eliminację części ugrupowań i zaprezentowanych przez nie list, co należy określić jako mechaniczny efekt stosowania progów zaporowych . Drugi efekt (czy też drugi zbiór efektów) odnosi się do postaw wyborców wobec możliwej perspektywy nieosiągnięcia wymaganego prawnie poparcia przez ugrupowania, na które potencjalnie planowaliby oddać swój głos – i ten efekt można nazwać efektem psychologicznym . Ugrupowanie stojące przed ryzykiem nieprzekroczenia progu zaporowego jest narażone na poniesienie dodatkowego kosztu – część wyborców, obawiając się, że ich głosy zostaną „zmarnowane” w wypadku ich oddania na ugrupowanie najbliższe ich poglądom, ale mogące nie przekroczyć progu zaporowego, może zagłosować (nawet jeśli oznacza to oddanie głosu częściowo niezgodnie z własnymi poglądami) na inne ugrupowanie, które ma większą szansę (lub pewność) przekroczenia progu zaporowego⁴. Tym samym ugrupowanie zagrożone nieprzekroczeniem progu zaporowego „ traci podwójnie ” - z jednej strony ponosi skutki mechaniczne działania progu zaporowego, z drugiej natomiast ponosi dodatkowo koszty efektu psychologicznego, który uprawdopodabnia nieosiągnięcie przez dane ugrupowanie wymaganego progiem zaporowym poparcia. W polskiej praktyce wyborczej za przykład ugrupowania, które znalazło się w takiej sytuacji mogą zostać większość formacji tworzonych przez Janusza Korwin-Mikke oraz, m.in. koalicja Zjednoczona Lewica w wyborach do Sejmu RP w roku 2015.

Progi zaporowe mogą przyjmować różne wartości, przy czym każdorazowo ich określenie (lub pozostawienie na niezmienionym poziomie) należy traktować jako decyzję polityczną. W praktyce stosuje się bardzo zróżnicowane wysokości progów ustawowych – od progu na poziomie 0,67% w wyborach do izby niższej Parlamentu Holandii, który ma bardzo znikomy wpływ na ostateczny podział mandatów (wszystkie 150 mandatów jest rozdzielanych w jednym, ogólnopaństwowym okręgu wyborczym, więc nominalny próg naturalny T _N oraz próg zaporowy są prawie równe – odpowiednio 1/151 * 100% oraz 1/150 * 100%) do poziomu 10% w wyborach w Turcji (co miało uniemożliwić uzyskanie reprezentacji parlamentarnej przez mniejszość kurdyjską) czy 12% na poziomie okręgu wyborczego w wyborach do szwedzkiego Riksdagu. W wypadku progów stopniowalnych praktyka również podaje różne rozwiązania – w Polsce są to progi (w wyborach do Sejmu RP) 5% dla Komitetów partii oraz wyborców oraz 8% dla koalicji partii, we wspomnianym wcześniej systemie wyborczym do parlamentu węgierskiego próg zaporowy wynosi 5%, 10% lub 15% w zależności od liczby podmiotów wystawiających wspólne listy (listy jednego podmiotu, wspólne listy dwóch podmiotów, wspólne listy trzech i więcej podmiotów), natomiast w wyborach do Izby Poselskiej Republiki Czeskiej (izby niższej parlamentu) funkcjonowały, do ostatnich zmian wprowadzone reformą z roku 2006 progi 5% dla ugrupowania startującego samodzielnie, 10% dla koalicji dwóch partii, 15% - dla trzech oraz 20% dla koalicji 4 lub więcej ugrupowań⁶.

Zastosowanie progów zaporowych ma dodatkowe znaczenie dla tych metod wyborczych, które nie spełniają warunku monotoniczności ze względu na liczbę partii dopuszczonych do udziału w podziale mandatów – czyli metod kwotowych, które są narażone na wystąpienie paradoksu nowego stanu. W takiej sytuacji, ugrupowanie dopuszczone do udziału w podziale mandatów ze względu na spełnienie normy prawnej określającej próg zaporowy uzyskałoby w okręgu wyborczym więcej mandatów w momencie, gdyby próg zaporowy nie został zastosowany. Ryzyko wystąpienia paradoks nowego stanu nie dotyczy metod dzielnikowych, które zawsze spełniają wspomniany warunek monotoniczności. Zjawisko to zostało już opisane w rozdziale poświęconym formułom wyborczym .

W praktyce, efekt zastosowania progów zaporowych o konkretnej strukturze oraz wysokości jest zależny od wielu czynników jak struktura okręgów wyborczych i wynikająca z niej wysokość poszczególnych progów naturalnych oraz – rzecz jasna – rozkład poparcia między poszczególnymi ugrupowaniami. Każdorazowe ich zastosowanie – poza wspomnianymi konsekwencjami mechanicznymi oraz psychologicznymi – wpływa również na zachowanie instytucjonalnych aktorów w procesie wyborczym. Ugrupowania, którym grozi nieprzekroczenie progu wyborczego prawdopodobnie będą szukały możliwości zawarcia porozumień pozwalających na uniknięcie tego ryzyka⁷. Takie działanie należy uznać za racjonalne, choć możliwe jest również występowanie w procesie wyborczym ugrupowań wystawiających kandydatów, mimo pełnej świadomości, że przekroczenie przez nie progów zaporowych nie jest możliwe. Może mieć to miejsce szczególnie w sytuacji, gdy udział danego ugrupowania w procesie wyborczym nie ma na celu realnej walki o objęcie mandatów, ale ma służyć innym celom – np. wypromowaniu lidera lub wprowadzeniu konkretnego tematu do debaty publicznej. Ostatecznie, progi zaporowe mogą mieć zarówno niewielki bezpośredni wpływ na wynik wyborów – np. w sytuacji, gdy wszystkie liczące się na scenie politycznej ugrupowania wystawiające kandydatów osiągają wyniki znacznie przekraczające wysokość progu zaporowego (choć może działać wtedy efekt pośredni progów zaporowych w postaci doprowadzenia do konsolidacji głównych ugrupowań na scenie politycznej). Z drugiej strony, szczególnie w wypadku, gdy któreś z ugrupowań startujących w wyborach nie osiąga poparcia wymaganego progiem zaporowym, jednak zdobywa niewiele niższą liczbę głosów, spowodowany tym samym poziom deformacji może być znaczący. W tabeli 41. zawarto zbiorcze zestawienie symulacji wyników wyborów do Sejmu RP w okręgach wyborczych, z wykorzystaniem wyników głosowania z lat 1993-2015, dla czterech analizowanych metod wyborczych w wariantach bez progów zaporowych oraz z progami zaporowymi zgodnymi z zastosowanymi w danej elekcji (każdorazowo oznacza to 5% dla komitetów partii politycznych i komitetów wyborców oraz 8% dla komitetów koalicji partii politycznych). Dla symulacji odnoszącej się do wyników z lat 1993 oraz 1997 pominięto mandaty rozdzielane na poziomie ogólnopaństwowym. Obliczona każdorazowo różnica w liczbie mandatów uzyskanych w wyborach z progiem zaporowym oraz bez niego została wyrażona jako wartość bezwzględna, stąd sumę różnic należy rozumieć jako sumę zmian, nie jako liczbę mandatów, która uległa przesunięciu między komitetami. Wyniki przedstawiono jedynie dla tych komitetów, które przynajmniej w jednym analizowanym wariancie uzyskały przynajmniej jeden mandat. Nie zostały przeanalizowane wyniki wyborów w latach 1989 oraz 1991, w pierwszym wypadku – ze względu na zastosowanie całkowicie odmiennej formuły wyborczej oraz fakt, że wybory te nie spełniały warunków niezbędnych do uznania ich za wolne, w drugim natomiast ze względu na niezastosowanie progów zaporowych w tych wyborach (do rozdziału mandatów w okręgach wyborczych – na poziomie listy krajowej próg funkcjonował). O ile, zdaniem autora, zasadne jest przeprowadzenie symulacji wykorzystujących wyniki głosowania w wyborach, w których zastosowano progi ustawowe również dla sytuacji, w której progi te nie by nie występowały, to działanie odwrotne pozbawione jest uzasadnienia. Brak zastosowania progów zaporowych na poziomie okręgów w wyborach w roku 1991 warunkował przyjęcie konkretnych strategii przez poszczególnych aktorów wyborczych, które nie musiały zakładać uzyskania określonego poparcia na poziomie 5% lub wyższym. Przeprowadzona symulacja ma uzasadnienie, gdyż w wypadku zastosowania progów ustawowych są one brane pod uwagę przy tworzeniu strategii poszczególnych aktorów politycznych, co nie oznacza, że każdemu z nich udaje się osiągnąć zaplanowany cel, można jednak założyć, że przyjęte założenia nie są sprzeczne z tymi, które miałyby zastosowanie w wypadku, gdyby progi zaporowe nie zostały zastosowane – trudno sobie wyobrazić, żeby poszczególne ugrupowania przestały wtedy dążyć do maksymalizacji wyniku wyborczego i obniżyły planowany cel wyrażony udziałem danego ugrupowania w zbiorze ważnie oddanych głosów.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ Przykładem takiego rozwiązania jest system wyborczy stosowany w wyborach do niemieckiego Bundestagu, w którym, alternatywnie do progu 5% ważnie oddanych w skali kraju głosów, funkcjonuje również próg uzyskania przez dane ugrupowanie 3 mandatów bezpośrednich (przydzielanych w okręgach jednomandatowych); jako przykład można również podać system wyborczy zastosowany w wyborach do Sejmu RP I Kadencji (w roku 1991), w którym udział w podziale mandatów z listy krajowej uzależniony został od uzyskania przez listy okręgowe powiązane z listą krajową przynajmniej 5% ważnie oddanych głosów lub uzyskania mandatów w przynajmniej 5 okręgach. Art. 100 ust. 2, Ustawa z dnia 28 czerwca 1991 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1991 nr 59 poz. 252.

² M. Rulka, Progi wyborcze – analiza prawnoporównawcza, „Studia Wyborcze” 2009, tom 8, s. 31.

³ D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, s. 101.

⁴ M. Pellicer, E. Wegner, the mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds, „Electoral Studies” 2014, Vol. 33, s. 258-259.

⁵ P. Uziębło, Wpływ systemów wyborczych na systemy partyjne (wybrane zagadnienia), „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2001, nr. 3, s. 76.

⁶ A. Renwick, Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945: Czech Republic, http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/Files/media/MEDIA_127/FILE/Czech_Republic_summary.pdf [dostęp 01.05.2016 r.], s. 7.

⁷ Choć można również wskazać przykłady zgoła przeciwne, w szczególności Komitety Koalicyjne Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy w roku 2001 oraz Zjednoczona Lewica SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni w roku 2015. Oba komitety uzyskały poparcie wyższe niż podstawowy próg wyborczy (każdorazowo 5%), jednak ze względu na formę komitetu były zobowiązane do przekroczenia progu wyższego (8%), co się nie powiodło. W tych przypadkach decyzję o wyborcze takiej formy komitetu należy uznać za poważny błąd, który w konsekwencji wyeliminował te ugrupowania z płaszczyzny parlamentarnej (w wypadku AWSP permanentnie, zaś w wypadku Zjednoczonej Lewicy – a raczej ugrupowań wchodzących w jej skład, gdyż ta formuła współpracy została przez nie po wyborach w roku 2015 zakończona - przynajmniej na okres jednej kadencji).

Formuła wyborcza

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:06:03 GMT

Czym jest formuła wyborcza?

O ile największy wpływ na przełożenie wyników głosowania na podział mandatów na poziomie całego kraju (albo na innym ogólnym poziomie – np. województwa w przypadku wyborów do Sejmiku) największe znaczenie ma struktura okręgów wyborczych, to podział mandatów w ramach okręgu zależy w największej mierze od zastosowania określonej formuły wyborczej. Przez formułę wyborczą rozumie się funkcję przekształcającą zbiór decyzji wyborców w okręgu wyborczym na zbiór mandatów przydzielanych w obrębie tego okręgu.

Spośród formuł wyborczych można wyodrębnić dwie grupy – formuły większościowe oraz proporcjonalne. Część typologii wyodrębnia ponadto typ pośredni. Formuły wyborcze, ze względu na ich znaczenie dla funkcjonowanie całości systemu wyborczego, jak również fakt, że skupiają one zainteresowanie zarówno polityków jak opinii publicznej (szczególnie w przypadku jej zmiany), zwykle determinują nazwy całych systemów – stąd możemy spotkać się np. z określeniem system reprezentacji proporcjonalnej d’Hondta.

Historycznie pierwszymi wykorzystywanymi formułami były formuły większościowe , charakteryzujące się względną prostotą funkcjonowania. „czystym” czy też „modelowym” przykładem funkcjonowania tej formuły jest formuła FPTP (first past the post) wymagająca zastosowania w jednomandatowych okręgach wyborczych. W takim przypadku mandat przydzielany jest temu kandydatowi, który uzyskał największą liczbę głosów w okręgu (większość względna ). Oprócz warunku uzyskania najwyższego poparcia, część formuł większościowych stawia dodatkowe - wymogu uzyskania określonego poparcia (większości bezwzględnej lub wyrażonej jako odsetek głosujących/uprawnionych do głosowania) lub wymogu uczestnictwa w głosowaniu określonej części uprawnionych w okręgu (najczęściej 50%). Jeśli dodatkowe warunki nie zostały spełnione, przeprowadzane jest głosowanie ponowne (tzw. II tura), w którym ogranicza się zbiór kandydatów wedle przyjętych kryteriów. W powtórzonym głosowaniu zazwyczaj wystarcza uzyskanie większości względnej, choć występują również przypadki stawiania dodatkowych wymogów. Formuły większościowe znajdują również zastosowanie w wielomandatowych okręgach wyborczych – wtedy mandaty są przyznawane kolejno kandydatom zgodnie z liczbą uzyskanych głosów.

Proporcjonalne formuły wyborcze ukształtowały się historycznie później od większościowych, ponadto służyły początkowo nie do rozdysponowania mandatów w ramach okręgu wyborczego, a do rozdysponowania mandatów między okręgi wyborcze. Podstawowym ich założeniem jest zapewnienie możliwie dokładnego odwzorowania udziału danego ugrupowania w zbiorze głosów w okręgu na udział w zbiorze mandatów przeznaczonych do rozdysponowania w okręgu.

Najważniejszym elementem formuły wyborczej jest metoda wyborcza a oprócz niej – próg wyborczy .

Czym jest metoda wyborcza?

Metody reprezentacji większościowej

Formuły reprezentacji większościowej wykorzystują metody bazujące na kilku rodzajach większości . Najczęściej stosowana jest metoda większości względnej – z tym przypadku mandat otrzymuje ten kandydat, który uzyskał najwięcej głosów w okręgu (a w przypadku okręgów wielomandatowych – ci kandydaci, którzy uzyskali kolejno najwięcej głosów). Nie ma przy tym znaczenia, ile głosów (jaką ich część) faktycznie zdobył – ważne jest, że było to więcej niż którykolwiek z kandydatów. Alternatywą jest zastosowanie metody większości bezwzględnej. W takim przypadku, do uzyskania mandatu wymagane jest poparcie więcej niż połowy głosujących . Jeżeli żaden z kandydatów nie uzyskał takiej większości, niezbędne jest uruchomienie dodatkowych działań, np. przeprowadzenie II tury wyborów, z udziałem mniejszej liczby kandydatów (najczęściej 2). W niektórych systemach stosuje się rozwiązanie pośrednie – jest postawiony wymóg uzyskania określonej większości , jednak nie wynosi on 50%. Najczęściej oznacza to niższą wartość (np. 40%).

Metoda większości względnej jest stosowana w wyborach do Senatu RP (od 2011 w okręgach jednomandatowych, wcześniej w wielomandatowych) oraz w wyborach rad mniejszych gmin, natomiast metoda większości bezwzględnej została zastosowana np. w wyborach Sejmu PRL oraz Senatu PRL w roku 1989.

Obok wymogu uzyskanie większości (względnej czy bezwzględnej), czasami stawiane są dodatkowe wymogi – np. dotyczące uzyskania określonego poparcia wśród wszystkich uprawnionych do głosowania lub dotyczące minimalnej wymaganej frekwencji w głosowaniu.

Metody reprezentacji proporcjonalnej

Formuły wyborcze reprezentacji proporcjonalnej wykorzystują różne metody podziału mandatów, którym zawdzięczają również swoje nazwy. Metody podziału mandatów możemy podzielić na dwa typy: metod największych reszt (inaczej: metod kwotowych, metod z ilorazem a priori) oraz metod dzielnikowych (inaczej: metod największych liczb, metod z ilorazem a posteriori)¹.

Metody największych reszt

Wspólną cechą metod kwotowych reszt jest oparcie ich na tzw. Ilorazach wyborczych . Ilorazy wyborcze przyjmują różne, choć zbliżone do siebie, formy, zaś najprostszym jest V/S, otrzymywany przez podzielenie liczby ważnie oddanych głosów (V) przez mandatów przeznaczonych do rozdysponowania w okręgu (S). Dzięki modyfikowaniu prostej nory reprezentacji można uzyskać kolejne metody podziału mandatów, a przez to – kolejne formuły wyborcze. Kolejne modyfikacje ilorazu przez sztuczne zwiększanie jego mianownika (dodawanie do niego mandatów fikcyjnych) mogą być korzystne dla ugrupowania o największym poparciu, gdyż ułatwiają zdobycie przynajmniej połowy (lub - analogicznie – większości) mandatów w okręgu.

Procedury wykorzystywane w trakcie rozdzielania mandatów za pomocą metod największych reszt są względnie proste . Najczęściej, na pierwszym etapie liczby głosów zdobytych z okręgu przez poszczególne ugrupowania (v _i ) zostają podzielone przez przyjęty iloraz wyborczy. Poszczególnym ugrupowaniom przydziela się (w pierwszym etapie) mandaty w liczbie równej liczbie całkowitej otrzymanego ilorazu. Pomijając przypadki skrajne, po dokonaniu takiego podziału pozostają mandaty nie przydzielone żadnemu ugrupowaniu. W drugim etapie mandaty, które dotąd nie zostały rozdzielone przyporządkowuje się ugrupowaniom, dla których reszty wyniku dzielenia liczby uzyskanych w okręgu głosów przez zastosowany iloraz wyborczy są najwyższe (czyli ugrupowaniom, dla których reszty powstałe w wyniku przeprowadzonego dzielenia są najwyższe – stąd też nazwa)².

Metodą kwotową zastosowaną w warunkach polskich jest metoda Hare’a-Niemeyera, wykorzystująca iloraz prosty Hare’a i dostosowana do rozdziału mandatów między listy kandydatów. Została ona wykorzystana w wyborach do Sejmu RP w roku 1991.

Metody dzielnikowe

Metody największych średnich, zwane również metodami największych dzielników, wykorzystują metody oparte na uszeregowaniu kolejnych ilorazów powstałych przez podzielenie liczby głosów uzyskanych przez poszczególne ugrupowania w okręgu przez kolejne dzielniki właściwe dla danej metody . Najprostszą z nich, a przy tym jedną z najpowszechniej wykorzystywanych w świecie demokratycznym jest metoda d’Hondta . Metoda ta wykorzystuje procedurę zgodnie z którą kolejnymi dzielnikami stosowanymi do obliczenia ilorazów przypisanych danym ugrupowaniom są kolejne liczby naturalne (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6…). Z powstałego szeregu ilorazów wybiera się najwyższe wartości w ilości równej liczbie przydzielanych mandatów, a udział ilorazów przypisanych danemu ugrupowaniu w powstałym zbiorze oznacza liczbę mandatów uzyskanych przez dane ugrupowanie. Metoda ta jest najczęściej stosowaną w wyborach w Polsce. Co szczególnie istotne, jest stosowana od 1993 roku (z przerwą w roku 2001) do podziału mandatów w wyborach do Sejmu RP. Ponadto, ma swoje zastosowanie w wyborach do rad w samorządach oraz w wyborach Parlamentu Europejskiego.

Wśród metod największych dzielników stosowane są również inne metody wyborcze. Najpopularniejszymi, obok metody d’Hondta są metoda Sainte-Laguë oraz różne jej modyfikacje (tak zwane zmodyfikowane metody Sainte-Laguë). Są to również jedyne metody największych dzielników stosowane, poza metodą d’Hondta, w systemach wyborczych III RP. W swojej klasycznej postaci metoda Sainte-Laguë posługuje się zbiorem dzielników, które stanowią kolejne liczby naturalne nieparzyste (1, 3, 5, 7, 9…). Jej modyfikacje polegają natomiast na zmianie pierwszego dzielnika (1) przez przypisanie mu innej wartości. W polskiej praktyce wykorzystywano zmodyfikowaną metodę Sainte-Laguë z pierwszym dzielnikiem wynoszącym 1,4. Metoda Sainte-Laguë w klasycznej postaci została zastosowana w Polsce w wyborach do rad gmin w latach 1990 oraz 1994, natomiast w wersji zmodyfikowanej (w przedstawionej postaci) – w wyborach do Sejmu RP w roku 1991 w odniesieniu do podziału mandatów między listy ogólnopolskie poszczególnych ugrupowań oraz w roku 2001 w odniesieniu do rozdysponowania wszystkich mandatów w okręgach.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ M. Pierzgalski, Metody ilościowe w badaniu systemów wyborczych na przykładach z państw Azji Wschodniej, Łódź 2012, s. 25. D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, s. 103.

² M. Gallagher, Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems, „Electoral Studies”, Volume 10, Issue 1, 1991, s. 38.

Struktura okręgów wyborczych

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:05:43 GMT

Czym jest okręg wyborczy?

Jednym z podstawowych elementów tworzących dany system wyborczy oraz decydujących o efektach jego funkcjonowania w praktyce jest podział terytorium państwa (lub innego - np. województwa w przypadku wyborów do Sejmiku) na okręgi wyborcze .

W najprostszym ujęciu, przez okręg wyborczy rozumiana jest wydzielona część obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory do ciała kolegialnego , na którym następuje agregacja głosów oraz rozdysponowanie mandatów . Czasami okręgi nie pełnią tej ostatniej funkcji – dzieje się tak np. w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego, w których obszar Polski jest podzielony na 13 okręgów wyborczych, jednak nie służą one podziałowi mandatów między ugrupowania (ten odbywa się na poziomie ogólnopolskim).

Funkcje okręgów wyborczych

Podział obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory pełni kilka funkcji:

Umożliwienie proporcjonalnej reprezentacji różnych regionów w składzie ciała wybieranego, co ma szczególne znaczenie w przypadku konfliktu między centrum a peryferiami.
Redukcja oferty wyborczej (liczby kandydatów) przedstawianej bezpośrednio każdemu wyborcy, dzięki czemu ma on większą możliwość poznania przedstawionej mu oferty i dokonania wyboru zgodnego ze swoim interesem oraz poglądami.
Determinowanie faktycznego poziomu proporcjonalności systemu wyborczego i wpływanie na ostateczny efekt funkcjonowania formuły wyborczej. Można stwierdzić, że o ile przeformułowanie wyników głosowania w okręgu na wyniki wyborów jest zależne wprost od zastosowanej formuły wyborczej, to przeformułowanie wyniku głosowania na poziomie całości wybieranego ciała na całościowy wynik wyborów jest w pierwszej kolejności zależne od struktury okręgów wyborczych.

Podział okręgów wyborczych

Okręgi wyborcze dzieli się po pierwsze na takie, w których następuje podział mandatów między ugrupowania polityczne oraz te, w których ten podział nie następuje.

Jeśli w okręgach są rozdzielane mandaty, dzieli się je z uwagi na liczbę mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w danym okręgu. Podstawowym rozróżnieniem jest podział na jednomandatowe okręgi wyborcze (tzw. JOW ) oraz wielomandatowe okręgi wyborcze (WOW) .

Wśród funkcjonujących okręgów wielomandatowych występują zarówno okręgi dwumandatowe oraz trzymandatowe, jak i okręgi, w których do rozdysponowania przeznaczono wszystkie mandaty (co np. w wyborach do izby niższej parlamentu Holandii oznacza okręg 150-mandatowy, a w Izraelu okręg 120-mandatowy). Zastosowanie okręgu obejmującego cały kraj umożliwia uzyskanie bardzo proporcjonalnego podziału mandatów względem wyników głosowania.

Do opisu okręgów wyborczych często stosuje się określenia takie jak „małe”, „średnie” czy „duże” okręgi wyborcze . Nie ma jednej, powszechnie stosowanej zasady pozwalającej odróżnić te pojęcia i ich znaczenie. Niewątpliwie jednak, jak wskazuje np. P. Uziębło, „okręgi, które obejmują mniej niż kilkanaście mandatów, w istotny sposób wpływają na pojawiające się deformacje, które rosną wraz ze zmniejszającą się liczbą takich mandatów w nich obsadzanych”¹.

W przypadku wyborów proporcjonalnych, większe okręgi wyborcze (to znaczy: im więcej mandatów jest w każdym z okręgów) pozwalają na uzyskanie wyniku wyborczego bardziej odpowiadającego wynikom głosowania .

W wyborach w Polsce stosowane były i są okręgi wyborcze bardzo różnej wielkości. Między innymi okręgi jednomandatowe (np. w wyborach do Senatu od roku 2011 czy w wyborach do rad małych gmin) przez okręgi z kilkoma mandatami (np. okręgi od 1 do 5 mandatów, które stosowano wcześniej w małych gminach), okręgi, które można nazwać średnimi (większość okręgów w wyborach do Sejmu) aż po okręgi, w których dokonywany jest podział wszystkich mandatów (okręg ogólnokrajowy w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego).

W jaki sposób tworzy się okręgi wyborcze?

W praktyce stosuje się różne modele podziału obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory na okręgi wyborcze. Pierwszą możliwością jest podział na jednostki równe (przez co należy rozumieć równość w ramach przyjętego marginesu) pod względem określonego kryterium (np. liczba mieszkańców lub osób uprawnionych do głosowania) – jest to charakterystyczne w przypadku wyborów przeprowadzanych wedle formuły większościowej (np. wybory do niższej izby parlamentu we Francji oraz wybory samorządowe w Polsce w gminach do 40 tys. mieszkańców w roku 1990 i 1994 oraz w gminach nie będących miastami na prawach powiatów w roku 2014). Drugą możliwością, właściwą głównie dla wyborów proporcjonalnych, jest podział obszaru na jednostki o różnej wielkości. Najczęściej stosowaną i najprostszą, a przy tym budzącą względnie niewielkie kontrowersje, metodą takiego podziału jest jego oparcie o podział administracyjny obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory. Najwyraźniej widać to na przykładzie wyborów do parlamentów poszczególnych państw, jednak może mieć to również zastosowanie w innych systemach wyborczych - w Polsce w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego podstawą ustalenia struktury okręgów jest podział na województwa (w praktyce okręg obejmuje obszar województwa - 7 z 13, kilku województw - 4 lub części województwa - 2) a w wyborach do organów samorządu terytorialnego: okręgi w wyborach do Sejmików tworzy się z uwzględnieniem struktury powiatów (oraz miast na prawach powiatów), w wyborach do rad powiatów – struktury gmin, a w wypadku gmin – jednostek pomocniczych gminy. Liczba mandatów powinna być wtedy zależna od przyjętego kryterium (np. liczby mieszkańców lub uprawnionych do głosowania, możliwe jest również zastosowanie podziału zależnego od liczby faktycznie oddanych głosów). Odmienną możliwością jest odstąpienie od podziału na okręgi wyborcze w wypadku zastosowania okręgu, w którym dystrybuowane są wszystkie mandaty. Wskazane metody mogą ponadto występować w różnych kombinacjach, w szczególności w systemach wyborczych, w których występują różne poziomy podziału mandatów.

Manipulacje wykorzystujące okręgi wyborcze

Malapportionment

Zapewnienie idealnej równości materialnej wyborów, również na etapie podziału obszaru na którym przeprowadzane są wybory, jest w praktyce niemożliwe. Wynika to wprost z faktu niepodzielności mandatów (nie istnieje możliwość przypisania okręgowi, jak też ugrupowaniu lub kandydatowi, części mandatu).

Niestety, w praktyce zdarza się, że liczba mandatów przypisana do poszczególnych okręgów jest niezgodna z przyjętymi zasadami. W konsekwencji – w części okręgów wybranych jest zbyt wielu (lub zbyt mało) przedstawicieli w stosunku do tego, ilu powinno się wybierać (biorąc pod uwagę przyjęte kryterium – np. liczbę mieszkańców). Takie zjawisko nierównej reprezentacji określane jest terminem malapportionmentu . Może mieć ono różne przyczyny, np. może wynikać z braku aktualizacji liczby mandatów w poszczególnych okręgach w odpowiedzi na zmiany demograficzne i migracje ludności. Z takim problemem mamy np. obecnie do czynienia w przypadku wyborów do Sejmu RP.

Przeciwdziałać mu można m.in. przez przekazanie ustalania liczby mandatów w okręgach ciałom niezależnym (eksperckim) lub przez nałożenie na organy odpowiedzialne za ustalenie liczby mandatów w okręgach prawnego obowiązku dokonywania aktualizacji we wskazanych odstępach czasu.

Gerrymandering

Specyficzną formą manipulacji wyborczej, wykorzystującej okręgi wyborcze, jest gerrymandering . Polega on na celowym ukształtowaniu granic okręgu wyborczego w taki sposób, że przewidywana struktura poparcia w ramach okręgu skutkuje zapewnieniem osiągnięcia pożądanego przez wyniku wyborów. Nazwa ta pochodzi od nazwiska gubernatora stanu Massachusetts Eldbridge Gerry’ego, który w roku 1812 podpisał ustawę zmieniającą strukturę okręgów wyborczych w taki sposób, że jednemu z nich nadano kształt przypominający salamandrę. Był to przykład manipulacji, dzięki której przedstawicielom Partii Liberalno-Demokratycznej (do której należał Gerry) miano zapewnić zwycięstwo w większej liczbie okręgów wyborczych. Zjawisko gerrymanderingu stanowi realne zagrożenie dla zachowania równości wyborczej, a w konsekwencji może prowadzić do utraty zaufania wyborców do procesu wyborczego.

Przeciwdziałać mu można m.in. przez przekazanie ustalania granic okręgów wyborczych lub wnioskowania o ich zmiany ciałom niezależnym (eksperckim) lub spluralizowanym.

Specyficzny rodzaj gerrymanderingu stanowi tzw. „ gerrymandering za porozumieniem stron ” występujący np. w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, gdzie dwie dominujące siły polityczne – Partia Demokratyczna oraz Partia Republikańska – są gwarantami zachowania funkcjonującego podziału na okręgi dającego korzyści obu ugrupowaniom przez istnienie okręgów dla nich bezpiecznych (tzw. „twierdz”), co prowadzi do utrwalenia dominacji obu podmiotów na amerykańskiej scenie politycznej i utrudnia przebicie się innym siłom politycznym².

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ P. Uziębło, Zasada równości wyborów parlamentarnych w państwach europejskich i południowoamerykańskich, Warszawa 2013, s. 121.

² M. Pierzgalski, Metody ilościowe w badaniu systemów wyborczych na przykładach z państw Azji Wschodniej, Łódź 2012, s. 39-40.

System wyborczy

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:05:26 GMT

Czym jest system wyborczy?

Zbiór definicji systemu wyborczego jest względnie szeroki i nie sposób wskazać jednej, powszechnie przyjętej definicji. Pojęcie to również występuje w ujęciu szerokim oraz wąskim (sensu largo i stricto).

Szerokie ujęcie, dominujące najczęściej w państwach pozbawionych długich i stabilnych tradycji demokratycznych – obejmuje całokształt norm, uwarunkowań i procesów dotyczących procesu wyborczego, w tym prawo wyborcze. Z tej perspektywy, system wyborczy to całokształt zasad i reguł (prawnych i pozaprawnych) określających sposób przygotowania i przeprowadzenia głosowania oraz ustalenia wyników wyborów ¹.

W politologii, a szczególnie w badaniach wyborów i systemów wyborczych, częściej jednak stosuje się pojęcie systemu wyborczego sensu stricto. Oznacza to wzorce zachowań wedle których wyborcy wyrażają w głosowaniu swoją preferencję co do partii i/albo co do kandydata oraz metody transformacji wyników wyborczych na wyniki mandatowe . Systemy wyborcze regulują ten proces przez określenie:

struktury okręgów wyborczych (ich liczby, granic oraz liczby mandatów przeznaczonych do podziału w każdym z okręgów),
sposobów głosowania (inaczej uprawnień wyborcy podczas głosowania – ile posiada głosów, czy może je kumulować itp.),
sposobu ustalania wyników wyborów (określają go formuła wyborcza i zawarte w niej elementy jak metoda wyborcza czy ustawowe progi wyborcze)².

Czy istnieje jeden, wzorcowy i najbardziej demokratyczny system wyborczy?

Mozaika systemów wyborczych wykształconych w państwach demokratycznych jest niezwykle różnorodna. Nie tylko nie można mówić o jednym czy jedynym „demokratycznym systemie wyborczym”, ale trzeba zauważyć, że stosowane rozwiązania są często bardzo od siebie dalekie, a realizacja poszczególnych funkcji wyborów występuje z różnym natężeniem.

Podział systemów wyborczych

Podstawowym wyznacznikiem pozwalającym na grupowanie systemów wyborczych jest zastosowanie konkretnej zasady reprezentacji. Tradycyjnie stosowany jest podział na systemy większościowe oraz proporcjonalne (czasami ten podział jest uzupełniany o systemy mieszane).

Zaklasyfikowanie konkretnego systemu wyborczego jako większościowego lub proporcjonalnego wynika w pierwszej kolejności z tego, jaki jest cel działania danego systemu. W nauce nazywany jest on zasadą reprezentacji lub celem reprezentacji.

W systemie większościowym dąży się do zapewnienia jednej partii (lub jak najmniejszej koalicji) większości miejsc w organie kolegialnym, umożliwiającej prowadzenie rządów, przy czym nie jest istotne czy dana partia uzyskała poparcie większości wyborców. Główną funkcją wyborów jest w tym wypadku zapewnienie większości zdolnej do sformowania gabinetu (rządu). W systemie proporcjonalnym zasadą (celem) reprezentacji jest zapewnienie możliwie doskonałego odzwierciedlenia poparcia społecznego (wyborczego) poszczególnych ugrupowań w kolegialnym organie pochodzącym z wyborów. Innymi słowy – większościowa zasada reprezentacji zakłada taką transformację głosów na mandaty (miejsca np. w Sejmie) aby udział jednej z frakcji był na tyle znaczący, że umożliwia sprawowanie rządów (co najczęściej oznacza udział powyżej połowy mandatów), natomiast proporcjonalna zasada reprezentacji zakłada możliwie idealne odwzorowanie poparcia każdej z partii wśród wyborców w podziale mandatów między partie.

Odrębną kwestią pozostają tzw. systemy mieszane . Wśród badaczy wyborów nie ma zgody co do tego, czy taka grupa powinna zostać brana pod uwagę czy też każdy z systemów powinno się zaklasyfikować do jednej z dwóch podstawowych grup. Jeśli uznamy, że taką grupę należy wyodrębnić, to będziemy do niej zaliczać takie systemy, które starają się realizować równolegle obie te zasady.

Bardzo często, szczególnie w języku publicystycznym oraz potocznym, systemom wyborczym nadaje się nazwy odnoszące się do typu systemu (większościowy, proporcjonalny) oraz zastosowanej w nim metody. Stąd też możemy spotkać się z określeniem „system proporcjonalny D’Hondta” czy „system większości względnej”. Czasami, szczególnie w przypadku systemów proporcjonalnych, wystarczy podanie samej metody („system D’Hondta”). Natomiast w przypadku najpopularniejszego systemu większościowego (system większości względnej w jednomandatowych okręgach wyborczych) stosuje się często krótką nazwę „system większościowy”. Są to oczywiście uproszczenia, jednak ich stosowanie na co dzień znacznie ułatwia komunikację.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ B. Banaszak, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2015, s. 300.

² D. Nohlen, Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny: o teorii systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2004, s. 53.

Wybory

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Mon, 02 Oct 2023 10:02:06 GMT

Czym są wybory?

Wybory są zjawiskiem powszechnym i charakterystycznym dla świata rozwiniętego, a przy tym należy je rozumieć jako zjawisko pełniące różne funkcje i zajmujące przez to różne miejsca w poszczególnych systemach politycznych. Samo pojęcie wyborów oznacza cykliczny proces powoływania przez daną grupę przedstawicieli na określone stanowiska lub do pełnienia określonych funkcji .

Wybory mogą dotyczyć różnych form władzy, i różnych grup społecznych – począwszy od sformalizowanych grup jak stowarzyszenia czy związki, skończywszy na poziomie narodu (społeczeństwa), gdzie służą powołaniu przedstawicieli do pełnienia funkcji i stanowisk związanych z władzą państwową. Wybory nie są jedyną techniką, którą można zastosować do realizacji takiego celu, funkcjonują również inne, jak mianowanie czy ustanowienie na mocy sukcesji ¹.

Czy wybory oznaczają demokrację?

Pojęcie wyborów jest często, w sposób automatyczny, by nie nazwać go naturalnym, kojarzone z rozstrzygnięciem o charakterze demokratycznym . Jest to zbieżne z definiowaniem wyborów jako demokratycznej metody powoływania osób w skład organu przedstawicielskiego właściwego dla danej społeczności lub na stanowiska kierownicze. Definicja ta może mieć zastosowanie zarówno w kontekście władzy publicznej, jak i w innych obszarach życia społecznego, w których bezpośrednie uczestnictwo członków danej zbiorowości w konsultacjach i procesie decyzyjnym nie jest możliwe i obowiązki wynikające z uczestnictwa we władzy zostały w sposób demokratyczny scedowane na reprezentantów, względnie na osoby piastujące stanowiska kierownicze.

Zdefiniowanie wyborów jako demokratycznej formy (scedowania) ustanowienia władzy należy zderzyć jednak z rzeczywistością, w której wybory występują powszechnie zarówno w demokracjach, jak i w systemach, których nie można uznać za demokratyczne ².

Wybory pozbawione demokratycznej treści mogą być zastosowane w rozmaitych procesach selekcji i ustanawiania przedstawicieli w niedemokratycznych (autorytarnych) systemach politycznych. Inne będzie wtedy ich rozumienie, inne będzie ich znaczenie, jak również katalog pełnionych funkcji.

Pojmowanie wyborów w poszczególnych systemach politycznych warunkuje swobodę działań aktorów politycznych, zakres możliwej oferty, z której wybór jest dokonywany jak i faktyczną swobodę dokonywania wyboru spośród powstałej oferty. Istnieje zasadnicza różnica między sytuacją, w której wyborca ma (ograniczoną) możliwość wyboru kandydatów jednej tylko formacji politycznej a sytuacją, w której przedstawiona mu paleta możliwości jest szersza i zawiera w sobie różnych kandydatów różnych ugrupowań politycznych – zarówno dotychczas rządzących jak i opozycyjnych.

Znaczenie wyborów

W poszczególnych systemach politycznych różne jest znaczenie wyborów . Najszersze oraz najbardziej doniosłe, co nie powinno dziwić, jest ono w systemach demokratycznych, jednakże błędem byłoby stwierdzenie, że jedynie w tych systemach wybory pełnią jakąkolwiek rolę. Wyżej wspomniano już o powiązaniu wyborów z demokracją – bez wyborów (zgodnych z demokratyczną definicją, tj. bez otwartego współzawodnictwa sił społecznych i grup politycznych w rywalizacji o władzę) nie można mówić o demokracji. W takim systemie wybory są jedynym (lub – w określonych warunkach - najważniejszym) źródłem legitymizacji politycznego przywództwa i władzy politycznej . W demokracjach legitymizacja przez wybory ma charakter dwojaki – po pierwsze w odniesieniu do aktorów politycznych, którzy w wyniku konkretnych wyborów uzyskują prawo do sprawowania władzy , po drugie – wybory są źródłem legitymizacji całego systemu politycznego zarówno na płaszczyźnie formalnej – przez legitymizację sposobu sprawowania władzy jak i świadomości społecznej odnoszącej się do działań systemów politycznych.

Odmiennie kształtuje się to w systemach autorytarnych , w tym w autorytaryzmach skonsolidowanych . Te ostatnie, nazywane totalitaryzmami, nie wykorzystują wyborów do legitymizacji władztwa. Legitymizacja władzy oraz systemu politycznego jest wywodzona w inny sposób, np. polegający na pełnieniu historycznej misji klasy robotniczej w totalitarnym systemie ZSRR. W tych systemach politycznych wybory, podlegając całkowitej kontroli ośrodka władzy, stanowią narzędzie (instrument) panowania , nie jego podstawę. Natomiast w systemach autorytarnych, wykorzystujących wybory semirywalizacyjne, legitymizują one istniejące stosunki władzy i stanowią podstawę dla ich dalszego trwania. System nie dopuszcza możliwości zmiany władzy, jednakże istnieje możliwość artykulacji interesów zbiorowych opozycji w ograniczonym zakresie. Wynik głosowania nie jest dokładnie ustalony, pozostawiając możliwość kształtowania go (np. przez poziom frekwencji lub wysokość poparcia dla sprawujących rządy), co może wywoływać skutki dla władzy politycznej.

Funkcje wyborów w demokracjach

Mozaika funkcji , które mogą pełnić wybory wiąże się to z mnogością oraz różnorodnością występowania w systemach o różnych charakterze. W praktyce, zbiór funkcji realizowanych przez wybory w systemach demokratycznych jest zależny od trzech grup czynników:

Istniejących w społeczeństwie podziałów socjopolitycznych oraz mechanizmów rozwiązywania konfliktów, występowania klas, warstw społecznych, odrębnych grup etnicznych i religijnych, grup interesów (w tym zorganizowanych i niezorganizowanych), oraz relacji między nimi, charakteru i głębokości społecznych antagonizmów.
Struktury systemu politycznego, a w szczególności reżimu (prezydencjalizm, semiprezydencjalizm, rządy parlamentarno-gabinetowe, rządy komitetowe etc.), charakteru unitarnego lub złożonego państwa, funkcjonujących mechanizmów rozwiązywania konfliktów między frakcjami parlamentarnymi lub między innymi zinstytucjonalizowanymi podmiotami (np. między częściami składowymi państwa federalnego).
Struktura systemu partyjnego oraz stopień rozwoju zarówno systemu jak i poszczególnych partii politycznych, w tym również liczba partii w systemie oraz wzory interakcji.

Katalog funkcji jakie mogą spełniać wybory w systemie demokratycznym nie jest jednoznacznie ustalony, należy go ponadto traktować jako zmienny wraz z rozwojem nowoczesnych stosunków społecznych³.

Możemy do niego zaliczyć:

Legitymizację systemu politycznego oraz frakcji (partii lub koalicji) sprawującej władzę.
Transfer zaufania społecznego na osoby oraz partie (frakcje).
Rekrutację elit politycznych, w tym również elit regionalnych czy subregionalnych.
Artykulację poglądów i przekonań wyborców (a szerzej – również uprawnionych do głosowania świadomie nie korzystających z prawa głosu).
Mobilizację społeczną.
Zwiększenie świadomości problemów społecznych i wyzwań stojących przed państwem i społeczeństwem w społeczeństwie.
Kontrolę, ukierunkowanie i łagodzenie konfliktów społecznych.
Kształtowanie wspólnotowej woli politycznej.
Realizację walki o władze polityczną i przeniesienie jej na płaszczyznę programową.
Powołanie rządu (jak i innych instytucji – np. organów wykonawczych jednostek samorządu terytorialnego) lub umożliwienie jego powołania przez ukształtowanie składu ciała kolegialnego (w wypadku, gdy żadne z ugrupowań nie posiada samodzielnej większości, rząd powstaje w wyniku ustaleń międzypartyjnych, w których jednak potencjał poszczególnych aktorów jest uzależniony od wyniku wyborów).
Ukształtowanie parlamentarnej większości oraz opozycji (oraz analogicznych instytucji np. na poziomie samorządowym).
Umożliwienie zmiany władzy.

Funkcje wyborów w systemach niedemokratycznych

Zbiór możliwych funkcji wyborów przeprowadzanych w systemach totalitarnych , z oczywistych względów jest ograniczony. Wybory te nie mogą realizować funkcji wymagających istnienia różnych, alternatywnych względem siebie, elementów oferty wyborczej oraz możliwości dokonania nieskrępowanego wyboru spośród różnych propozycji. Wybory należy wtedy rozumieć jako instrument sprawowania władzy służący jej stabilizacji. Wykorzystywane są one do mobilizacji społeczeństwa, czy do komunikowania społeczeństwu celów polityki państwa i sposobów ich realizacji.

W systemach autorytarnych wybory semirywalizacyjne mogą pełnić szerszy katalog funkcji, choć podobnie są one skupione wokół stabilizacji systemu. Ponadto mogą spełniać funkcje:

Częściowej lub pełnej legitymizacji istniejących stosunków władzy.
Artykulacji interesów zbiorowych (w tym opozycyjnych).
Poprawy odbioru państwa na arenie międzynarodowej, szczególnie przez elity i społeczeństwa państw demokratycznych oraz organizacje międzynarodowe oparte na demokratycznych wartościach lub do takich się odwołujące.
Umożliwienia zmian, w tym personalnych, w strukturach władzy.
Ujawnienia (w określonych warunkach również dezintegracji) opozycji.

Informacje przedstawione w tabeli pozwalają zauważyć dystans między znaczeniem i funkcjami wyborów w poszczególnych systemach politycznych. Jeśli za punkt odniesienia przyjmie się katalog funkcji pełnionych przez wybory w demokracjach, wybory w systemach autorytarnych mogą (lecz nie muszą) spełniać – przynajmniej częściowo – większość z nich. Wyjątkiem jest rozstrzygnięcie kwestii sprawowania władzy w drodze wyborów, właściwe jedynie dla systemów demokratycznych. Inaczej wygląda rola wyborów w autorytaryzmach skonsolidowanych – nie spełniają (i nie mogą spełniać) znacznej większości rozważanych funkcji. Wyjątkiem jest podniesienie świadomości obywateli, która jest funkcją spełnianą przez wybory we wszystkich systemach, jednak ma ona niejednorodny charakter.

Opracowanie: Maciej Onasz, na podstawie: Onasz Maciej, Inżynieria wyborcza w Polsce od roku 1989, Łódź 2017.

¹ Wybory, [w:] A. Sokala, B. Michalak, P. Uziębło, Leksykon prawa wyborczego i referendalnego oraz systemów wyborczych, Warszawa 2013, s. 271-272.

² Jeszcze w 2000 roku wybory parlamentarne nie odbywały się jedynie w 24 państwach, co jednak nie pozwala na stwierdzenie, że wszystkie pozostałe były państwami demokratycznymi. A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Systemy polityczne współczesnego świata, Gdańsk 2004, s. 208.

³ D. Nohlen, op. cit., s. 31. Porównaj: K. Skotnicki, Wpływ funkcji wyborów na prawo wyborcze i system wyborczy. Zarys problematyki, „Przegląd Sejmowy”, nr 2(79), Warszawa 2007, s. 11-28.

Jak wyglądała frekwencja w wyborach prezydenckich od 1990 roku?

lprazmo@gis-expert.pl (GIS - Expert) — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 08:20:47 GMT

Zainteresowanie wyborami prezydenckimi w Polsce

Frekwencja wyborcza jest jednym z ważniejszych wskaźników pokazujących stopień zaangażowania obywateli w proces wyborczy i ich zainteresowanie polityką. W Polsce frekwencja wyborcza podczas wyborów prezydenckich zmieniała się na przestrzeni lat. Warto jednak zauważyć, że spośród wszystkich typów ogólnopolskich głosowań, frekwencja podczas wyborów prezydenckich osiąga od lat najwyższe wartości.

Najwyższą frekwencję w wyborach prezydenckich odnotowano podczas II tury w 1995 r., kiedy przekroczyła 68%. Z kolei najmniejszych zainteresowaniem cieszyła się I tura wyborów w 2015 r., podczas której frekwencja wyniosła niecałe 49 %. Jak pokazuje wykres od upadku komunizmu w Polsce do roku 2000 frekwencja utrzymywała się na względnie zbliżonym poziomie. W ciągu kolejnych 3 wyborów lat nieco spadła, aby znowu wrócić do dawniej notowanych poziomów w 2020 r. Porównując frekwencję w II turze wyborów z dwóch skrajnych lat czyli 1990 i 2020 na poziomie ujednoliconych okręgów wyborczych da się zauważyć, że na południu kraju utrzymywała się ona w okolicy lub powyżej 60%, natomiast w pozostałych regionach wzrosła o kilkanaście punktów procentowych.

Porównanie frekwencji w II turze wyborów prezydenckich w 1990 i 2020 r.

Zróżnicowanie przestrzenne frekwencji na przestrzeni lat

Jeszcze ciekawiej wygląda rozkład przestrzenny frekwencji w analizie profesora Przemysława Śleszyńskiego wydanej w Atlasie Wyborczym Polski z 2018 r. Wynika z niej, że zróżnicowanie regionalne tego zjawiska jest w naszym kraju stosunkowo duże:

"Wpływają na to uwarunkowania historyczno-kulturowe, społeczno-polityczne oraz procesy modernizacji społecznej. W pierwszym przypadku uwidocznia się podział na regiony cywilizacyjno-kulturowe. Społeczeństwa lepiej wykształcone, religijne i dłużej korzystające z praw obywatelskich (Galicja, były zabór pruski, obszary osadnictwa drobnej szlachty) częściej uczestniczą w życiu społecznym, gdyż – prawdopodobnie – lepiej rozumieją związek indywidualnego uczestnictwa z grupową czy nawet narodową odpowiedzialnością oraz troską o dobro wspólne. Z kolei społeczeństwa tzw. Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych i dawnego Królestwa Kongresowego (z małymi wyjątkami), zostały w czasach historycznych niejako przyzwyczajone do interwencjonizmu państwowego, dlatego mają słabsze uświadomienie mechanizmów społeczno-politycznych i większe przeświadczenie, że to właśnie państwo powinno wyręczyć ich w odpowiedzialności za publiczne sprawy."

Poniższe mapy zaczerpnięto ze wspomnianego wcześniej Atlasu. Przedstawiają zróżnicowanie przestrzenne frekwencji na poziomie gmin. Widać na nich, że zazwyczaj podwyższona wartość wskaźnika frekwencji występuje na obszarze ciągnącym się od Kaszub, przez Wielkopolskę w kierunku Śląska. Następnie przechodzi na wschód przez Małopolskę do granicy wschodniej. Profesor Śleszyński zwraca uwagę, że:

"Wskazany obszar na mapie kształtem przypomina nieco wygiętą literę „L”. Co interesujące, był on identyfikowany znacznie wcześniej przy okazji badań nad uprzemysłowieniem i rozwojem społeczno-gospodarczym kraju przez prof. Stanisława Leszczyckiego (tzw. „»L« Leszczyckiego”) i objaśniany właśnie wyższą aktywnością obywatelską. Na tej podstawie można wnioskować, że uwarunkowania frekwencji są dosyć trwałe i zakorzenione w społecznościach lokalnych, niezależnie od bardziej ogólnych czynników społeczno-politycznych."

W kolejnych wpisanych na naszym blogu przyjrzymy się innym zjawiskom związanym z uwarunkowaniami przestrzennymi wyborów w Polsce, dlatego już dziś zachęcamy do śledzenia naszych profili w serwisach społecznościowych, gdzie na bieżąco będziemy informować o nowościach.