Authors: Grzegorz Górski, Stanisław Górski

The beginning of the eighteenth century brought developments that profoundly altered the existing model of political life in the Commonwealth. These changes resulted from a combination of internal factors and shifts in the international environment surrounding Poland. Unsurprisingly, they were accompanied by a range of pathologies, among which the most destructive was the open involvement of foreign powers in domestic political processes. This interference was closely linked to widespread corruption, practised by both foreign agents and domestic elites.

The processes under consideration were set in motion by two principal factors. The first was the political turmoil surrounding the election that followed the death of John III Sobieski ¹ . The second was the course, and consequences, of the Great Northern War, which proved catastrophic for the Commonwealth, particularly in its social and economic dimensions ² .

To this must be added the devastating effects of the major plague epidemic at the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Combined with the destruction caused by warfare and the prolonged, systematic pillaging carried out by Russian, Swedish, and Saxon armies, the epidemic resulted in widespread devastation, above all in economic terms ³ .

During the struggle for the throne at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, three principal political camps emerged within the Commonwealth. Much as in the preceding two centuries, however, their structure largely followed patterns already described above. What is particularly important is that, on the basis of these divisions, political groupings of a fundamentally different character were to emerge in the decades that followed. It is therefore worth examining the factions that took shape at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Around the Saxon ruling house there emerged the so-called Wettin faction, which supported the candidacy of Augustus II. Prominent roles within this group were played by members of the Flemming, Ożarowski, Denhoff, and Morsztyn families. Although the faction viewed Russia as an ally of the Commonwealth, it would be misleading to describe it, at least at this stage, as unequivocally pro-Russian.

The principal rival of the Saxon camp was the pro-French faction, which backed Stanisław Leszczyński. Its leading figures came from the Lubomirski, Sapieha, Potocki, and Radziwiłł families. In military affairs, this group consistently favoured Sweden. It was largely through the initiatives of its leaders that, at the end of 1715, the General Confederation, known as the Tarnogród Confederation, was formed ⁴ .

Alongside the struggle for the throne, a third political alignment took shape: the so-called republican faction. This group generally positioned itself in opposition to the Saxon camp, since the candidacy in question was associated with efforts to centralise royal authority and was therefore perceived as a direct threat to noble liberties. The defence of the so-called “Golden Liberty” formed the core ideological bond uniting this faction. Its leadership was drawn primarily from the Branicki, Rzewuski, Wiśniowiecki, and Sieniawski families. Ideologically, the republican faction stood close to the pro-French camp, while simultaneously sharing with the Wettin faction a broadly favourable attitude towards Russia. What ultimately united its adherents was opposition to the consequences of the predatory presence of Swedish and Russian troops on the territory of the Commonwealth. In the context of the devastating plague epidemic described above, the exploitation of Polish and Lithuanian lands by foreign armies became intolerable. Notably, the scale of destruction inflicted by Swedish forces was such that Russian troops, and their practices of plunder, came to be regarded as the “lesser evil”.

The combined effects of economic collapse, depopulation, and extreme exploitation, caused by foreign armies and compounded by the epidemic, led to a profound destabilisation of the Commonwealth’s social and economic fabric, which had only recently begun to recover from the military and social catastrophes of 1648–1660. These developments hit the petty and middle nobility particularly hard. Beyond the immediate material hardships faced by these broad strata, the crisis fundamentally reshaped the nature of their participation in political life.

As a result, the defining characteristic of this period became the erosion, among large segments of the nobility, of political independence – a feature that had been central to noble democracy until the mid-seventeenth century. From that time onward, and with particular intensity in the eighteenth century, clientelism and political corruption became widespread phenomena, as magnate leaders of emerging factions increasingly constituted the principal – if not the sole – source of financial support for the average noble household ⁵ . Impoverished nobles responded in various ways: some entered service on magnate estates (more often in private military formations than in civilian roles); others incurred debt in an effort to restore their own productive activity; but most commonly they sold their political support at local assemblies (sejmiki) and, if elected, in the national parliament (the Sejm) ⁶ .

The scale of this practice was unprecedented in the history of Polish political life. Yet, when viewed in comparative perspective, against developments in Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or in the United States in the nineteenth century, it becomes clear that such mechanisms were characteristic of a particular stage in the evolution of democratic systems ⁷ . Nevertheless, whereas elsewhere this phenomenon represented a step beyond earlier, more exclusive forms of political mobilisation, within the constitutional framework of the Polish–Lithuanian state, especially in its Polish component, it marked, in comparison with the late sixteenth century, a significant deterioration in the quality of political life. These tendencies continued to intensify in subsequent decades. Only in the final quarter of the seventeenth century, owing to a temporary improvement in the social and economic position of the nobility, did this model of political organisation experience a brief slowdown.

It should also be noted that the principal political factions possessed clearly defined territorial bases of influence. The Wettin faction was strongest in western Lesser Poland and Mazovia; the pro-French faction exerted its greatest influence in Greater Poland and in Lithuania; while the republican faction enjoyed its broadest support in eastern Lesser Poland and in the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

A decisive turning point in the political life of this period came with the so-called Silent Sejm and its resolutions, which resulted, inter alia, in the dissolution of the Tarnogród Confederation ⁸ . The proceedings of the Sejm of 1717, regardless of their most detrimental consequences (including the effective confirmation of a Russian protectorate over the Commonwealth), marked a breakthrough in the further evolution of political factions, which from this point onward began to form according to new principles. A central role in this transformation was played by the Czartoryski family, whose political activity led to the emergence of the so-called Familia.

This faction retained a dominant position in Polish public life until the end of the eighteenth century and, in a broader sense, survived in exile, carrying the idea of Polish independence until the restoration of the state. Although the Czartoryski family exercised a pre-eminent influence within it and came to personify the faction as a whole, the Familia already displayed features characteristic of a modern political party. Viewed through the lens of modern party typologies, the Familia can unquestionably be described as a voluntary political organisation of a committee-based type (one oriented towards the pursuit of electoral objectives), democratic in structure, governed through collective leadership, and, above all, distinguished by a clearly articulated political programme. It should, of course, be stressed that the Familia acquired the defining features of a modern political formation only gradually.

The Czartoryski family traced its lineage to the grand-ducal Gediminid dynasty; its political prominence, however, was largely the achievement of Kazimierz Czartoryski. He skilfully preserved the family’s economic base during the turmoil of the Great Northern War and the devastation wrought by the plague. After Augustus II was restored to the Polish–Lithuanian throne, Kazimierz strongly supported the king’s temporary anti-Russian orientation and, on this foundation, began to assemble broader social backing for his political initiatives. His efforts were supported by his three sons – Fryderyk Michał, August Aleksander, and Teodor – who stood out among their contemporaries for their intellectual abilities and level of education. The true driving force behind the Familia’s political advance, and its informal leader, however, was Stanisław Poniatowski, who married Kazimierz’s daughter, Konstancja. Taking advantage of a temporary alignment with Augustus II, the Czartoryskis focused on consolidating both their own economic position and that of their supporters. The central arena of their political activity soon became the struggle for dominance in local assemblies (sejmiki) across individual voivodeships. Even greater importance, however, was attached to securing control over the Crown Tribunal and the Lithuanian Tribunal.

At this juncture, it is worth addressing the significance of political competition over the Tribunals. After 1720, rivalry for seats in these bodies became, given the chronic inefficiency and frequent paralysis of other state institutions, especially the Sejm, and the near-total inertia of the executive under both Wettin monarchs, the principal arena of political confrontation ⁹ .

Despite their many shortcomings ¹⁰ , the Tribunals adjudicated matters of fundamental economic importance ¹¹ . For the Czartoryski family, whose economic position was expanding rapidly, judicial protection of newly acquired estates was essential. This, in turn, required dominance in the sejmiki, which elected lay judges to the Tribunals. As judicial mandates had to be renewed annually, securing re-election could not rely solely on corruption. It therefore necessitated the construction of a durable political base across a sufficiently wide network of local assemblies – an objective that, in practice, required the creation of a political faction organised on new principles. An inevitable consequence of this activity was the Familia’s growing influence over the election of deputies to the Sejm. Although, during the later years of Augustus II’s reign and almost throughout that of Augustus III, Sejms were frequently dissolved without enacting legislation, the Familia’s dominance, established in the vast majority of sejmiki and, consequently, within both the Sejm and the Tribunals, persisted at least until the early years of Stanisław August’s reign. It should be recalled that one outcome of this intensified political mobilisation was the second mass election of a “Piast” candidate – Stanisław Leszczyński in 1733 – in which the Familia temporarily cooperated with a reconfigured pro-French faction ¹² . This alliance, which sought to salvage this candidacy through the Confederation of Dzików, ultimately failed ¹³ . The Familia’s subsequent withdrawal from this venture enabled it gradually to consolidate its position around King Augustus III. As a result of its wide-ranging political activity, the Familia reached the height of its influence in the 1740s ¹⁴ .

In both Tribunals, the political predominance achieved at the level of the sejmiki in the Crown and in Lithuania culminated in a resolution favourable to the Czartoryskis, particularly to their Lubomirski allies, in the dispute over the division of the Ostrogski entail in 1754.

The success of the Familia, rooted in the creation of a political organisation that was modern by contemporary standards, prompted the consolidation of its opponents. This occurred around the former republican faction, which, owing to the leading role of families holding hetman offices, notably the Branickis, Potockis, and Rzewuskis, came to be known as the Hetman faction. Combining its forces with a significant segment of the pro-French camp and partly imitating the organisational methods of the Familia, this grouping emerged as the second major force in political life during the reign of Augustus III. Political life until the accession of Stanisław August unfolded largely under the sign of rivalry between these two camps, with the Wettin “court party” playing a more limited role than before.

It should be emphasised that this rivalry was actively exploited by foreign powers, particularly Russia. Nevertheless, the period also reveals that attitudes towards Russia – whether sympathetic or dependent – were no longer fixed. On both sides, cooperation with St Petersburg was accompanied by efforts to cultivate alternative foreign alliances capable of counterbalancing Russian influence.

A further watershed in the evolution of political life was provided by the reform period of 1764–1766 and the conflict over the rights of religious dissidents, culminating in the Bar Confederation. During the confederation, both major political camps, as well as the faction formed by Stanisław Poniatowski after his break with the Familia, assumed a highly fluid character, particularly in terms of personal alignments ¹⁵ . Following the collapse of the confederation, a new configuration of the political scene emerged which retained its core stability until the final collapse of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

It should be emphasised that, during the election of Stanisław August, the Familia entered into cooperation with Russia. As a result, it once again secured control (this time for an extended period) over the decisive majority of local sejmiki and consequently came to dominate the political profile of the Sejm. With Russian backing, the Familia was able, with relative ease, to ensure the election of Stanisław Poniatowski ¹⁶ and to initiate a series of reforms that were significant for the modernisation of the state apparatus. The subsequent rupture between the king and his “uncles”, encouraged by Russia, which was unwilling to support the Familia’s reformist agenda, set in motion processes that led to the emergence of a new political grouping, later known as the Patriotic Party. Stanisław August believed that he could persuade Catherine II to accept the modernisation of the Commonwealth in return for his unconditional loyalty. He also assumed (naively, as events would show) that the programme of reform developed by Prince Stanisław Konarski and Ignacy Potocki would meet with Russian approval.

Although the modernising ambitions of the Patriotic Party overlapped in many respects with those of the Familia, attitudes towards Russia became the decisive line of division between the two camps. The Czartoryskis, following their negative experiences with their former protégé and, subsequently, Russian pressure during the Bar Confederation, adopted a clearly anti-Russian stance. Completing this political constellation was the anti-modernisation hetmanic party, whose leaders argued that the preservation of all traditional “liberties” under Russian protection constituted the very foundation of the Commonwealth.

After 1772, this cleavage became the principal axis of political conflict, shaping the structure of the political scene. The political struggles of the 1770s and 1780s, including the gradual accumulation of influence through contests over sejmiki, thus became the main driving force behind the evolution of political life. The culmination of these processes during the Four-Year Sejm was therefore not an accidental outcome of circumstance, but the result of developments that had been unfolding for several decades. Notably, the fundamental political divisions outlined in the introduction persisted from the early 1720s until the fall of the state.

Against this background, it is important to consider, in broad outline, the influence of individual political groupings in selected voivodeships after 1772 ¹⁷ . This perspective allows for a clearer understanding of the distribution of support for the three principal political currents, particularly during the period of the Great Sejm. It should also be borne in mind that, in most legislative initiatives between 1788 and 1792 (especially in the adoption of the Constitution of 3 May) the Patriotic Party generally cooperated with the Familia.

The Ruthenian, Podolian, and Volhynian voivodeships, together with the more easterly frontier regions, became arenas of intense rivalry between the Familia and the hetmanic party. In Ruthenia itself, as well as in Podolia and Volhynia, the Familia predominated. In the remaining voivodeships of this zone, however, the influence of the hetmanic camp steadily increased. This was particularly evident in the Kyiv voivodeship, which gradually came under the dominance of the Potocki family and, through them, the hetmanic party.

In the Lublin voivodeship, a relative balance between the Familia and the hetmanic camp persisted, although after 1772 the influence of the Patriotic Party expanded rapidly. Lublin emerged as one of the key political and intellectual centres supporting reform, including initiatives in the military, administrative, and educational spheres. In the Kraków voivodeship, the Familia retained dominance while the hetmanic party remained largely on the defensive. During the Great Sejm, the Patriotic Party quickly strengthened its position there, benefiting from Kraków’s role as a hub of reformist thought.

In the Mazovian voivodeships, the Familia predominated, later sharing influence with the Patriotic Party, particularly in the eastern parts of the region. The hetmanic camp, by contrast, remained relatively weak in Mazovia.

In Greater Poland, the hetmanic party found support among the Leszczyński and Opaliński families, with its principal base in the Poznań voivodeship, while the Familia dominated eastern Greater Poland, especially the Kalisz voivodeship. At the same time, the Patriotic Party gradually increased its influence in the region by mobilising sections of the nobility that had previously remained politically passive.

Within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the hetmanic party drew its main support from the Radziwiłł family and its extensive client networks. Its strongest influence was exercised in the Vilnius and Kaunas voivodeships, in eastern Novogrudok, and in the Smolensk voivodeship. The Familia, by contrast, concentrated its efforts primarily in the Vitebsk voivodeship and western Novogrudok. The Patriotic Party, meanwhile, never became deeply rooted in Lithuania. Instead, explicitly pro-Russian (and in practice quasi-agent-based) circles exercised considerable influence there. These groups, however, lacked the organisational coherence of the main political camps and relied on a narrow circle of magnate families closely tied to Russia.

The political climate of 1788–1792 proved particularly favourable to the expansion of the Patriotic Party, largely through close cooperation with the Familia. This alliance was broken when King Stanisław August acceded to the Targowica Confederation. The brief rule of the Targowica leaders following the defeat of the Kościuszko Uprising, together with the repression carried out by the Russian occupying authorities, led to the destruction of both political formations. In effect, this also marked the collapse of Polish political life itself – a process ultimately sealed by the Third Partition and the final destruction of the first Polish state.

¹ For a detailed discussion of the interregnum following the death of John III Sobieski, see: M. Komaszyński, Księcia Contirgo niefortunna wyprawa po koronę Sobieskiego, Warsaw 1971.

² A classic study that continues to retain substantial scholarly value is: J. Feldman, Polska w dobie Wielkiej Wojny Północnej 1704–1709, Kraków 1925.

³ The plague epidemic lasted from 1708 to 1714, reaching its greatest intensity between 1708 and 1712. It primarily affected the countries of the Baltic Sea basin, causing particularly severe devastation in coastal cities. It is estimated, for example, that Gdańsk lost more than 50 per cent of its population, Königsberg and Szczecin approximately 20 per cent each, Riga, Pärnu, and Tallinn around 70 per cent, and Stralsund, Stockholm, Malmö, and Copenhagen roughly 40 per cent of their inhabitants. The origins of the epidemic are commonly associated with Podolia and Volhynia, where Swedish troops were operating. Their movements across Polish territories from 1706 onwards significantly contributed to the spread of the plague in these regions and in Ruthenia. During this period, Lviv lost approximately 40 per cent of its population, while even greater losses were recorded in Stanisławów, Przemyśl, Jarosław, Stryi, and Kolomyia. In rural areas, where losses are more difficult to quantify, mortality is estimated at between 40 and 50 per cent of the population. As it advanced further westward, the plague devastated Kraków (approximately 20,000 victims), followed by Warsaw (around 30,000) and Poznań (about 9,000), before spreading into Ducal Prussia and Warmia. From there it reached Lithuania and, together with the troops of J. Potocki, passed through Silesia into the Habsburg lands and southern Germany. For a broader discussion of this phenomenon, see: K.E. Frandsen, The Last Plague In Baltic Region 1709–1713, Copenhagen 2009; R.I. Frost, The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe 1558–1721, London 2000; J. Zapnik, Pest und Krieg im Ostseeraum. Der „Schwarze Tod” in Stralsund während des Großen Nordischen Krieges (1700–1721), Hamburg 2007; K. F. Helleiner, The Population of Europe from the Black Death to the Eve of Vital Revolution [in:] Rich E. E., Wilson C. H., (eds.) The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire. Vol. 4. Cambridge. 1967. It should be noted, however, that Polish historiography still lacks comprehensive studies of the course of this catastrophe and, above all, of its long-term social and economic consequences for the lands of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances and political-constitutional consequences of the Tarnogród Confederation, see: A.A. Witusik, Przywódcy konfederacji tarnogrodzkiej, [in:] Konfederacja tarnogrodzka i jej tradycje, Tarnogród 1995.

⁵ A broader analysis of this problem is offered by M. Kowalski, Księstwa Rzeczypospolitej. Państwo magnackie jako region polityczny, Warsaw 2013.

⁶ For a broader discussion of these phenomena, see, inter alia: J. Lukowski, Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century 1697–1795. London 1991; Zielińska Z., Walka stronnictw w Polsce w XVIII wieku. Warsaw 1997.

⁷ For a broader discussion of this phenomenon, see the remarks in: G. Górski, Metoda Johnsona. Demokratyczny przełom, czyli o przemianach prawa wyborczego w USA i Wielkiej Brytanii w XIX wieku, “Znaki Nowych Czasów”, Warsaw 2003, no. 5–6, p. 181–187.

⁸ Formally, on 3 November 1716, the Treaty of Warsaw was concluded. Among other provisions, it introduced fiscal and military reforms, fixed the permanent strength of the army at 18,000 troops in the Crown and 6,000 in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the so-called komput), curtailed the prerogatives of chancellors, hetmans, and other senior officials by subjecting them to strict parliamentary oversight, stipulated the withdrawal of Saxon troops from the Commonwealth, prohibited Saxon ministers from interfering in Polish and Lithuanian internal affairs, and limited the authority to levy taxes and raise troops. The treaty was subsequently confirmed in 1717 by the so-called Silent Sejm (Sejm Niemy). For a broader discussion, see: Z. Wójcik (ed.), Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, vol. 2 1572–1795 Warsaw 1982.

⁹ For a more detailed discussion, see W. Bednaruk, Trybunał Koronny. Szlachecki sąd najwyższy w latach 1578 –1794, Lublin 2008.

¹⁰ The composition of the Tribunals (including the Lithuanian Tribunal) comprised both clerical and lay deputies. Lay deputies were elected annually at so-called deputational sejmiki, usually in the number of one or two per voivodeship. Owing to legal differences between Greater Poland and Lesser Poland, Tribunal sessions were held separately for each province (in Lublin and Piotrków respectively, and later also in Lutsk for the eastern voivodeships). This issue is examined in greater depth in the still seminal study by O. Balzer, Geneza Trybunału Koronnego; studium z dziejów sądownictwa polskiego XVI wieku, Warsaw 1886.

¹¹ Of particular importance in this context was the long-standing dispute over the division of the Ostrogski entail This controversy became one of the principal catalysts of political division in the mid-eighteenth century. The events in question are described in greater detail, albeit in a vivid and not entirely impartial manner, in the memoirs of J. Kitowicz, Opis obyczajów za panowania Augusta III, Poznań 1840.

¹² For a broader discussion, see: J. Feldman, Stanisław Leszczyński, Warsaw 1984.

¹³ On the role and significance of the Dzików Confederation, see S. Truchim, Konfederacja dzikowska, Poznań 1921.

¹⁴ A broader discussion of this issue is provided by W. Konopczyński, Dzieje Polski nowożytnej, vol. 2.

¹⁵ A comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon is offered in W. Konopczyński’s monumental work, Konfederacja barska, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1991.

¹⁶ It should nevertheless be noted that, until the very end, the Familia sought to secure the throne for August Czartoryski. Ultimately, however, Catherine II dictated the election of Stanisław Poniatowski, whom she regarded as the most reliable guarantor of Russian interests in the Commonwealth. Cf.: K. Zienkowska, Stanisław August Poniatowski, Wrocław 2004, p. 132 ff.

¹⁷ This overview is based on the findings presented in the following studies: M. Kosman, Reformy w Polsce XVIII wieku. Warsaw 1993; S. Kieniewicz, Dzieje Polski do 1795 roku. Warsaw 1992; T. Korzon, Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisława Augusta (1764–1794), vol. 1–6, Warsaw 1897; J. Lukowski, op. cit.; Z. Zielińska, op. cit.; W. Konopczyński, Pisarze polityczni XVIII wieku, Warsaw 1966.